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In this thesis, 'person' is treated as a term with some moral content (fairly unspecific
to begin with) describing the reader and myself, at least at the present time. I begin
by looking at psychological theories of personal identity, both reductionist and
'Simple', and find that there are good reasons for abandoning both such approaches.
Then I examine different theories on the necessity of origin, concluding that our time
of origin is essential to our existence, and that the actual combination of our parents'
gametes is essential to our origin, whether or not the two coincide. Our particular
thoughts, in contrast, are not essential to our origin or existence; any or all these
thoughts might never have occurred to us.
I then look at theories according to which human persons are physical beings, but do
not originate with the organism itself. Theories according to which personhood is a
stage of an organism are, I argue, impossible to reconcile with the widespread belief
that our personal status is inseparable from ourselves. Thus the organism before
whatever stage is said to mark the onset of personhood will similarly be a candidate
for personal status. On the other hand, the theory that the onset of personhood is
marked by some substantial change with the advent of some new capacity, threatens
us with two superimposed psychological substances: the person, and the organism
which seems to acquire the capacity.
Tracing back the entity which undergoes change, I examine various forms of
potential in relation to very early human development, offering a new theory on the
specific active tendencies which define our existence. Human persons are, I argue,
'rational-type' organisms, whose morally significant interests begin with their origin
as living wholes. In the remaining chapters I look at the content of our personal
status, in general, and at a time close to our origin.
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When did I begin? This is a question most of us have asked, at various ages, and
with varying degrees of urgency. The question is often linked with that of our moral
status, for we think of ourselves as moral subjects of special importance, with a
status somehow different from that of 'lower animals', of the kind we keep as pets.
What, then, are we essentially, and what marks the origin of our existence as
persons?
It is often said that we can imagine non-human persons - spirits, extraterrestrials,
and so on - who, if they existed, would have a moral status similar in some ways to
our own. Yet the subject of this study will be persons of our own kind, who, I will
argue, have their own existence conditions, not all of which could be shared by non-
human persons. We will thus be asking when human persons originate, not when
similar beings we can imagine might originate. And indeed it may be found that
some of the conditions under which we can imagine human persons beginning, or
continuing, are in fact impossible, given our constitution.
To say that we are concerned with human persons is to restrict the enquiry to
persons like ourselves, but not to prejudge the question whether there are biological
conditions for the existence of whatever selves we are. We will take it that the reader
and the writer of this page are persons, at least at the time of reading and writing.
The aim is to trace such paradigmatic persons as ourselves as far back as we can. It
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will be assumed that persons, whatever else they are, are the kind of thing which can
exist over time. Rather than focus on problems of identity - on how one thing can be
'the same' as itself, or 'two' things the same as each other - we will treat the question
of our continued existence as one of kind membership, or continuity under a sortal.1
Our concern will be not with the task of defining identity, but with criteria of
personal existence: with the kind of history which a human person must, and may
have.
It should be stressed further that our focus of enquiry is not the various meanings
attached to the word 'person', nor the evidence commonly used in identifying
persons. In seeking to establish conditions for the presence of a person we are
looking not for what we use as evidence of this presence, but rather, for what, if
anything, constitutes this presence. Nonetheless, our ontological focus does not
exclude all interest in evidence. As Harold Noonan observes, to say we have other
concerns than the evidential
[...] is not to say that a philosophical account of personal identity can just put aside as a
mere irrelevance what actually counts as evidence for personal identity. For both our
own identity over time and that of others is, we ordinarily think, something of which
we can have knowledge. Conceivably this common opinion may be mistaken, but the
onus of proof is on any philosopher who says so. In the absence of any such proof, then,
it must be regarded as a condition of adequacy on any account of what personal
identity consists in that it not entail that personal identity is unknowable, or not
knowable in the ways we ordinarily take it to be, or leave it completely mysterious how
it can be known in these ways.2
It might be objected that if we already know how to use the term 'person', we
already know our existence conditions, and perhaps even our origin. However, this
does not, of course, follow. That we know certain things about persons - or bees, or
clouds - does not imply that we know everything about them, only that we have
some way of picking them out, at least sometimes, and thus, perhaps, of filling in the
gaps in our knowledge. As Nagel puts it:
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I may understand and be able to apply the term 'gold' without knowing what gold
really is - what physical and chemical conditions anything must meet to be gold. My
prescientific idea of gold, including my knowledge of the perceptible features by which
I identify samples of it, includes a blank space to be filled in by empirical discoveries
about its intrinsic nature. Similarly I may understand and be able to apply the term T to
myself without knowing what I really am. In Kripke's phrases, I what I use to fix the
reference of the term does not tell me everything about the nature of the referent.3
What is it that fixes the reference of the term 'person'? I will take it that persons are
what we are ourselves, and that the term refers, among other things, to our status as
moral subjects of importance. Since we paradigmatic persons are currently reading
and writing, it seems that persons also are, or can be, rational. The concept of a
person is almost always linked in some way with those of rationality and self-
consciousness. Indeed, persons have often been defined by philosophers as thinking,
self-reflective beings. Thus Locke:
This being premised to find wherein personal Identity consists, we must consider what
Person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and
reflection, and can consider itself as it self, the same thinking thing in different times
and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from
thinking, and as it seems to me, essential to it it being impossible for anyone to
perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive.4
In contrast, Locke claims that
the Identity of the same Man consists [...] in nothing but a participation of the same
continued Life, by constantly fleeting particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to
the same organized Body.5
We will be looking in due course at the relationship between personhood and
rationality. What should we say about moral agency? 'Person', being partly, at least,
a moral term, has its place in a world in which there are moral agents. To this many
have added that persons themselves must be agents; thus Kant:
[...] to whatever laws a rational being may be subject, he being an end in himself must
be able to regard himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same laws,
since it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal legislation that distinguishes him
as an end in himself; also it follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative) above all
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mere physical beings, that he must always take his maxims from the point of view
which regards himself, and likewise every other rational being, as law-giving beings (on
which account they are called persons). In this way a world of rational beings (mundus
intelligibili) is possible as a Kingdom of ends, and this by virtue of the legislation proper
to all persons as members.6
Many modern philosophers have suggested that it is the mutual relations an
individual has or can have with others which makes the person. Thus Puccetti:
not all moral objects are moral subjects themselves, yet every moral subject, since it can
also be a moral object to other moral subjects, can have reciprocal moral relations with
other such subjects. It is this dual 'subject-object' feature which characterizes what I call
'moral agents'. And I think it will be consistent with everything put forward up to now
to say, therefore, that our concept of a person is at the same time the concept of a moral
agent.7
Some have suggested that persons must be capable of claiming their rights, or else
their 'personhood' is merely imputed to them by others. Tristram Engelhardt
believes that persons are respected as fellow negotiators
not because one values them or autonomy, but as a condition for the possibility of the
moral enterprise [..] persons have primacy in all moral considerations, for it is with
them that one reasons or negotiates concerning moral matters. It is because they are
possible negotiators that one must respect them as a condition for securing morality
where concrete rational arguments fail.8
Of those who are unable to negotiate Engelhardt says that
[...] one can impute special rights to infants, the profoundly mentally retarded, and the
severely senile. But those entities cannot shoulder the duties of persons, nor participate
in discussions about their own fate. Their destinies remain forever in the hands of
others. It becomes important, then, to determine when humans are persons in the sense
of mutual negotiators who can claim their rights, versus when humans are persons in
the sense of instances of human life to which we impute very important rights.9
Often a preoccupation with social relations has resulted in suggested times for our
emergence as human subjects (birth, implantation, viability, quickening) which have
more to do with the reactions of others than with strictly ontological concerns.
Poplawski and Gillett argue for the gradual acquisition of status by a continuing
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individual, who nonetheless has a certain moral weight from the time of origin, as
the beginning of the overall 'form' of a human life:
a distinct individual enters the human community by forming interactions which are at
first relatively simple and then later more complex emotional, social and moral
engagements. But notice that the extended form of humanity entails that an identifiable
individual who will at some stage be a rational social being with full moral rights is in
existence from vexy early on.10
Thus too Loren Lomasky, while claiming that 'one's self- identity as the individual
one is does not commence with birth' places great stress on epistemological
considerations, such as the individual's recognizability by others, which is, he says,
'crucial for moral motivation'.11
With regard to this last point, it is, of course, true that we need be able to identify an
individual in some way in order to have a duty which refers to that individual. It is
also true that there are moral duties which presuppose a high level of identifiability.
However, it would appear that a fairly minimal level of identifiability is sufficient for
moral motivation. After all, we think we have duties with regard to groups of
strangers, such as famine victims, whom we have never seen and could not identify,
save in very general terms. Moreover, what seems important is not how identifiable
or recognizable these strangers are to us or to others, but rather, whether someone
can identify them sufficiently well to regard them with respect, and if possible, win
for them some benefit. This is not to deny that a high level of recognizability can
have a substantial impact on our emotions. But emotions, though they may inspire
and accompany moral judgements, are not themselves moral judgments; not, at any
rate, in the view of the makers of moral judgements, who will not usually allow that
all they mean to do is to describe, or relieve, their feelings.
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I would argue that is is unreasonable to make personhood depend
either on one's ability to negotiate and make claims (for what of
the severely paralysed, though fully conscious adult?) or on the
actual attitudes adopted by others, which would put an individual
at the mercy of public opinion. Most of us do not believe that our
own personal status is dependent on the attitudes of others.12 We
take a similar view with regard to the personal status of some at
least of our fellow-persons. American courts have ruled at
different times that blacks and Indians were not full persons:
rulings we now regard as grossly unjust. We are only able to form
this opinion on the presupposition that there already existed a
class of human persons, to whom the principles of justice ought to
have been applied.13 Stipulative definitions of person are morally
inappropriate, ignoring as they do the existing individuals for
whose sake morality exists. 14 Society cannot make or unmake
persons by fiat; moreover, any attempt to do so calls into
question the very beliefs which make possible society as we know
it. For just as many, if not all moral principles presuppose that
humans live in society, all societies we know presuppose in their
laws and structures a recognition of the existence of persons who
must be respected. Even unjust laws will tend to show some
recognition of the existence of at least some human subjects
morally deserving of protection.
It is sometimes argued that social contracts, real or hypothetical,
are in some way prior to respect for human persons, which has been,
or could be, derived from such contracts. However, it is not easy
to see how a genuine moral obligation could be derived from a pre-
moral contract (if there could be such a thing) - or even how a
pre-moral contract might produce a false belief that there was such
a thing as a moral obligation. For example, one might decide, out
of fear of attack, to regulate one's actions in consultation with
others. The idea of regulating one's actions for reasons which
refer to the welfare both of oneself and of others is surely a
different idea. Engelhardt's negotiators, if they are to take
their decisions as having moral authority, must already have the
virtue of being disposed to respect each other as persons; to make
agreements, and keep them. Moreover, the fairness of the
agreements cannot be guaranteed if, for example, standards of
fairness are not presupposed in the starting position of the
contracting parties. While both the strong and the weak might have
reasons relating to physical self-preservation to come to some form
of agreement, there is surely no reason to think that the strong
would have just as much of this reason to defer to the weak as the
weak have to defer to the strong. It appears, then, that personal
status could not be derived from real or hypothetical agreements.
\
The content of the term "personal status" will not be examined in
detail until the final section of this thesis. Our immediate task
is to identify the personal subject, since it is possible to reach
agreement on the nature of this subject without agreeing on every
moral principle which may apply to it. Personal status cannot be
described without reference to the constitution of the bearers of
this status. For example, it does not seem possible to determine
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the status of infants without first establishing what kind of being
adults are, and how far back their histories, and their status,
extend. While a number of moral claims will be used in the course
of this thesis to come to ontological conclusions, it will not be
assumed from the outset that persons are moral agents, in addition
to being moral subjects. And indeed, when we disagree over whether
infants are persons, we may be fully agreed that they are neither
rational nor agents, but want to know if they are already a certain
kind of moral suhiect - a question which our ontological enquiries
may help us decide.
Many claims are made about persons which are not specifically
moral. Peter Strawson, for example, claims that our concept of a
person is that of a physical being persisting over time, who can be
identified in the way in which we identify other physical beings.
Strawson believes that the concept of a person is also the concept
of an individual who may be conscious. He claims that persons are
individuals [...] of a certain unique type [...]such that to each
individual of that type there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both
states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics. 15
Strawson claims that the concept of a person is "primitive" and
"logically prior" to the concept of "an individual consciousness".
However, it may be asserted that persons are in some sense "basic"
without their being necessarily material. E.J.Lowe argues that
persons are a basic rum-physical kind, without substantial parts,
which (like, perhaps, some subatomic particles) cannot be defined
in terms of anything else:
g
[...]I would point out that, according to my own precepts, if
persons constitute a genuine k i nd of entity at all, then the
general term "person" is to be construed as a semantica11v simple
sortal term, and as such not reducible by analysis or definition to
some complex general term, incorporating a conjunction of "defining
characteristics" [...] Now why might it be suggested that persons
comprise a basic sort? First of all, it is to be observed that
persons are not, plausibly, constituted by anything. We have seen
already that they have no material constituents [...] Now i f
persons had constituents, then of course they could not be expected
to comprise a basic sort, since we would expect to be able to
formulate their criterion of identity in terms presupposingb the
identity of these constituents whatever they were. But it doesn't
seem that they do: which, I think, is why we find it so difficult
to comprehend how a person could split or divide, since only what
has parts seems capable of division [...] 16
Despite the fact that "person" is a term in common use,
philosophical views on the nature of persons are obviously widely
divergent. In the next chapter, I will look at theories according
to which persons are minds or series of experiences. I will then
examine theories on the necessity of origin, and on the possession
of physical characteristics, often seen as essential to our
personal existence. I will subsequently look at theories according
to which persons have physical characteristics, but do not
originate with the human organism. I will then consider different
kinds of potential, and look in detail at early human development.
Following this, I will look at the interests of persons; that is,
those which are morally significant. Only in this and subsequent
chapters will I attempt to fill in the content of respect for
persons. For the time being, I will take it that persons are
beings like ourselves, to whom is due some particularly serious
form of consideration: consideration their peers are not free to
confer and withdraw as they choose.
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Personal Minds
'Person', we are assuming, is a term with some, still largely unspecified moral
content.What else should we say about persons? Are persons substances, 'things' or
continuants which can undergo change, or 'modes' such as changes or events? Is it
always determinate whether a person is present, or is it always, or sometimes, a
matter of degree?
If persons are living bodies then, it would seem, they are substances: continuants
through time and space, like trees, cats, and so on. But many philosophers argue that
persons cannot be living bodies - or not, at any rate, particular living bodies. For can
we not imagine swapping our bodies with those of others, if not dispensing with
them entirely? It has been claimed not only that I would follow my brain, ifmy brain
were put in someone else's body, but that I would follow the information lifted from
my brain, if the information, but notmy brain, were transferred to another body.
Moreover, though a brain may in fact be causally necessary for my existence, is it
essential to me? Would there be a new person or a continuation of the old one if
some disembodied person appeared with clear causal links to some previous living
human being? Lowe comments:
The relation between a person and his organized body and its constituents is neither
that of identity nor that of constitution [...] the most direct way to establish that an
individual person is identifiable neither with his organized body nor with the parcel of
matter constituting that body at any given time is simply to show that persons do not
have the same criterion of identity as living organisms or as parcels of matter. [...] There
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is nQi apparently an absurdity in speaking of an immaterial person, in the way that
there is in spealdng of an immaterial oak tree or river [...] when we consider what sort
of evidence we look for if we want to detect the presence of a person, we see that we do
not in fact necessarily look for bodily characteristics of any sort: we look for intelligent
activity [...]1
Lowe believes that persons are simple, indivisible psychological substances; a view
we will come to in due course. However, many philosophers hold some form of
reductionist view, arguing that persons are constituted by, and can perhaps be
defined in terms of, certain other things or relations. There is, of course, considerable
disagreement on what does in fact constitute the person. Many follow Locke in
seeing memory, or similar causal relationships, as essential for the appearance and
survival of persons.
As Shoemaker puts it
Remembering is best seen as just a special, albeit very important, case of the retention of
acquired mental states, which in turn is a special case of the sort of causal dependence
that is central to the unity relation for continuants in general.2
The objection that I may remember at 10 what I did at 5, but at 30 only what I did at
10, can be met by describing memory, or psychological continuity in general, in
terms of 'overlapping chains' of direct psychological connections from one time to
the next. Continuity maintained through these chains of connections is, or can be,
sufficient to constitute the history of one person. It may then be argued, either that
the subject of experience is a temporary subject related to other subjects, or that there
is no subject of experience. Persons, like nations, are constructs, which have no
existence apart from the units which compose them To the objection that 'memory'
usually refers to a claim that a person remembers what he or she really experienced,
the reductionist replies by producing the concept of 'quasi-memory' - which does not
assume this, but which, like the concept of memory, refers to knowledge about the
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past 'from the inside'. Appropriately related quasi- memories then combine to make
up the person.
Famously, Hume regarded persons as fictitious entities constructed out of related
thoughts, desires, and so on, which, he claimed, could be described without
reference to a subject. A well-known modern proponent of this view is Derek Parfit.3
Parfit holds that our existence over time involves psychological continuity, which in
turn involves causal continuity, but does not necessarily involve continuity of the
same body or brain. This continuity could even occur in "branching' form, through
two continuants, each appropriately related to the earlier person. In this case
personal identity will not be preserved, identity being a one-one relation. However,
survival will be preserved, and this, Parfit says, is what matters. Parfit distinguishes
between the Narrow View of causal continuity, which requires that the cause must
be the normal, bodily cause,4 the Wide View, which requires that it must be a reliable
cause; and the Widest View, which he himself prefers, which allows that it may be
any cause.5 On the Widest View, if someone were to create a replica of you to
coincide with your death, this would count as sufficient for survival (and identity),
whereas if the replica were somehow to come into being by accident, without your
being vised as a model, the replica would not be you.6
When does the person originate on Parfit's theory? This is something indeterminate.
As far as human development is concerned, Parfit argues that the zygote 'slowly
becomes a human being, and a person'.7 In general, connectedness between one
experience and others may hold to various degrees. For whereas on a non-
reductionist view all parts ofmy life are equally parts of my life, on Parfit's view this
is not the case. More direct connections between one part and another will make it
'more the same person' who survives. A person is a series of events; more like an
impromptu concert than like a cat or a tree. As the first stray notes are followed by
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others, better connected, we may be more and more inclined to say that the concert
has started. Such indeterminacy is found, not only during human development, but
also when, due to accident, surgery, or simply the passage of time, there are fewer
direct connections between the experiences of the present and those of the past.
While it may sometimes be hard to decide if a new person is present, this, Parfit
thinks, is not important. The question is merely one of words. When we have
described the connections which hold between experiences, we have said all we can.
In the same way, when there are new experiences sufficiently connected with the old
ones - whether through brain transfer, brain 'taping', or however - we have all the
survival we could wish for.
Many philosophers have noted with understandable excitement the fact that when
the two hemispheres of the upper brain are severed through the operation known as
a commissurotomy, each hemisphere appears to have a consciousness of its own.8
Some see this as evidence that persons are composite entities who could in theory
split into totally independent halves, or, perhaps, into smaller segments. If 'identity'
is a one-one relationship, identity would not be maintained. Survival, however,
would be maintained: can double success be a failure? To objections that our identity
cannot depend on facts about other people's history - on the presence or absence of
rival continuers - it may be answered that as there is no underlying fact of the matter
concerning our survival, there is no oddity in ruling that identity (as distinct from
mere survival) depends on the presence or absence of a rival continuer. Just as
whether or not I am heir to the throne may depend on the fate of the previous heir,
so whether or not I appear as a separate person depends on whether the previous
person had a closer continuer than I am.
Many objections, of various kinds, have been made to strong reductionism. Strongly
reductionist theories, as indeed Parfit emphasizes, may indicate radical changes to
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our moral and social concepts. In undermining the coherence of lives and the
barriers between them, such views describe a world in which both harms and
benefits may be apportioned regardless of the lives in which they fall. Parfit suggests
that, rather than sharing out benefits among lives, we might instead share them out
among smaller units such as thought-episodes.9 The fact that many painful
experiences will take place in one series provides no reason in itself for rejecting a
course of action which, in making this happen, will add a pleasant experience to each
of a number of other series. For what exactly is it, according to strong reductionism,
which could suffer day after day? It is hard, however, to see how benefits can be
shared out among thoughts, and how long we are to take these thoughts as lasting. If
T, this unit of experience, am in pain at the moment, and 'you' want to do something
to help this unit of experience, will your action transform this unit of experience, or
generate a new one?10 And how are we to account for the phenomenon of reflexive
concern, except as a serious mistake on the part of an experience unit?11 And in
general, to what do we owe respect, and who has 'personal' status: the unit, the
series, or some part of the series? When and how does status accrue to the series or
its members, and how do we deal with the absence of any moral subject, during
periods of total unconsciousness?12 And why should we respect the wishes
expressed in one moment of consciousness, with regard to what will be its remote
descendants? For example, if a body dies or is killed, past sensations may not be
succeeded by new and related sensations. However, it is hard to find a remotely
plausible subject who has been thereby wronged or deprived. If I end a human life I
end a person-concert; bad only, one would think, for some non-reductionist
audience. And what if ending one thought-series will extend another, or help me
start a new and longer series?
Vinit Haksar argues that 'subjectless' items of experience are most ineligible
candidates for moral concern:
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There is not anything it is like to be a group or bundle [...] if
a person is really a group then it too would be a bundle, a mere
logical construct, and it would not have concerns [...] Nor is it
easy to make reductionist sense of praise or blame. Since there is
no agent in any deep sense (for all talk of agency and personhood
is eliminable) it is not clear who deserves punishment. Is it the
individual item of experience? Or is it the whole bundle?
Similar objections are raised by A.I.Melden, who emphasizes that
duties to persons cannot be compared with duties to collective
entities, which can be readily broken down in terms of duties to
individuals:
What is there in the case of a person now viewed on the analogy
with a nation or republic that has rights and obligations? An
experience? That makes no sense. And neither does it make sense
to suppose that it is the whole complex series of interrelated
experiences that has rights or is under any obligation. 14
If strong reduct i oni sm conflicts with so large a part of our
beliefs, the burden of proof lies heavy, as Haksar points out, on
those who defend the theory:
While we cannot prove that there is a permanent self, or even a
series of permanent selves, we can postulate it as a presupposition
of our practical life and subjective experience. It is presupposed
by our egoistic hopes and fears and it provides unity to our
experiences both at a time (synchronic unity) and over time
(diachronic unity). All my experiences are experiences of the same
self. 15
Many have argued further that the whole idea of ownerless
experiences is incoherent. Ownership is, or can be, sufficient to
identify an experience - as where, for example, two qualitatively
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identical but numerically separate experiences might be
distinguished by the fact they had different owners. 16 Ownership
is not only (at least sometimes) sufficient; it is also necessary
to identify experiences. Not only do we look for more than an
experience, or a bundle, when referring to rights, interests,
responsibilities, and so on, but an experience cannot be identified
in the first place, except as the experience of a subject.
Lowe defends this proposition at length, arguing that proposals to
construct the person out of mental events individuated by their
causes fall foul of the fact that causes themselves are events,
which cannot be described without presupposing that we know
something about these events:
[. . . ] even if we suppose, for the sake of argument, that the
individuation of non-mental events is unproblemat i c, it is none the
less the case that no mental event has purely non-mental causes and
effects: that is to say, every mental event has other mental
events amongst its causes and effects. And hence the proposal to
individuate mental events in terms of the sameness of their causes
and effects will again presuppose answers to questions of the very
sort at issue, namely, questions concerning the identity of mental
events. 17
With regard to tests for establishing the existence of separate
streams of consciousness after a commissurotomy, we will need to
decide, before attempting to stimulate (say) one nostril, that the
patient is (for example) awake. Our experimental procedure
presupposes, with respect to each stimulation, that we already have
in view a subject to which any resulting experience may be
assigned. The key point is that whether the stimulation of a
particular nostril results in an olfactory experience depends
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precisely on whether that nostril is functioning as an olfactory
sense organ of a subject who is identifiable as the possessor of a
suitable range of further mental states at the time of
stimulation.18
Having first identified the subject, Lowe maintains, we can then go
on to differentiate experiences in separate "streams of
consciousness" by identifying causes and effects in relation to
that subject.
It might be objected that an experience could be identified by its
non-mental cause, and the cause by its own spatiotemporal
properties or those of its non-mental causes. To this objection
Lowe might reply that to identify something as the cause of an
experience (and not iust as the cause of some external event) we
would still need to associate the outcome of this cause with a
subject of experience. Thus while we can certainly differentiate
between the external events leading up to the touching of the left
and right nostrils, to conclude that an experience results from
these events we will need to assume that a subject is present to be
affected. We would not be engaging in the experiment at all if we
did not have a possible subject to hand in our patient, to whom an
apparent experience could be attributed. While we could always
hypothesize that more than one subject was present (for example,
that our patient was possessed by demons), there would be a strong
prima facie case against this hypothesis, since in any event we
would have to use the reactions of the patient's body in order to
conclude that there had been an experience at all. Any
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recognizable reactions on the part of our hypothetical demons would
thus be parasitic on the normal recognizable reactions of human
subj ects.
One might still argue that if we dn think it theoretically possible
that our patient is possessed, then we must think it possible to
identify experiences without first identifying a subject in that
situation. It might still be the case, however, that a suspected
experience would need to be attributed to one of the following: to
the patient, to some alternative subject mimicking the behaviour of
a human subject, or to an alternative human subject. If a claim to
have had that experience were made by another subject known to
exist (say, the patient's Siamese twin), while the patient denied
having had the experience, then we might feel entitled to conclude
that the experience was not that of the subject we first thought.
Here we are thinking not in terms of ownerless experiences, but of
the presence of more than one possible owner.
Noonan also stresses the fact that experiences come "pre-bundled";
pointing out with regard to the memory criterion of personal
identity that quasi-memories or experiences "from the inside" can
be further described as memories in the presence of appropriate
causal connections. Yet we are only able to separate mere quasi-
memories through our ability to establish if the subject was there
at the time. We cannot look at causal connections to see if these
are appropriate without making assumptions as to who had the
experience:
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What the vicious circularity objection comes to [...] is this. To establish that someone not
only thinks that he remembers, or seems to remember, but actually does remember
doing or experiencing something, we first have to establish that he, that very person,
did indeed do or experience it [...] someone must already have the concept of memory,
and recognition of the applicability of the latter concept must rest on recognition of the
applicability of the former.19
In fact something, whether a person or not, had that experience, and remembers it
now. And it is doubtful whether that something can be kept separate from the
person its history is said to create.
It may be claimed that there are subjects of experience, but rather short-lived
subjects: "thinking substances' or "person-stages'. Such subjects endure, or (like
events) 'perdure' over time, and, succeeded by other subjects to whom they are
connected, constitute the person, or person-over-a- lifetime. To ask when the person
begins we ask when the first thinking substance or person-stage began - or, perhaps,
decide first in which self or span of selves we are interested. While successive
substances are better candidates for personal status than some, they do have
problems of their own. It is unclear how we are to distinguish between one and
another, or how many thinking substances we should try to believe in. And person-
stages are not, as stage-theorists themselves point out, independent, conceptually or
ontologically, of longer-lived persons. Rather, person-stages and persons are
connected, conceptually and ontologically, like a train and its carriages.20 In fact one
can go farther and claim that perduring persons may be divided into as many
person-stages as we like to imagine. Peter Mclnerney, having observed that persons
cannot be reductivelv analysed into person-stages, claims that while person-stages
can be thought to begin with changes in the person:
What we consider to be an important change of characteristics depends upon our
interests. With different interests we would divide the same period of a person's life
into different sequences of person-stages.21
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While it is true that the changes which take place in a person's character can affect
our attitudes with regard to that person's life, to say this is, of course, quite different
from suggesting that there exists a class of distinct personal sub-entities, out of
which persons are formed as a result of their mutual connections. I will argue in a
later chapter that whatever changes take place in a lifetime, there are morally
significant interests which persist throughout. A person, who is a bearer of morally
significant interests, is in that sense wholly present at any one time. In contrast, if
persons are histories, it is hard to know to whom to ascribe an interest in, for
example, a longer life, which will form part of some later stage of a total history
which will not exist if the benefit is not in fact enjoyed. For although it must be a
person-stage who is aware of the coming benefit, it does not follow that this
particular stage, or even (one would think) the person-up-until-now will be in a
position to enjoy it.
There are added complications if, like Noonan,22 we combine the belief that persons
can split with the belief that persons are perdurers. We are then faced with the co¬
existence of two 4-dimensional persons, sharing the same temporal parts before the
split, but having different parts after. There is a period of time over which the two
persons co-exist in one place, indistinguishable from each other. The interests of the
two persons in the results of the split are somehow divided between the two
outcomes, in a way as ingenious as it is far removed from our normal picture of
persons as subjects of interests exclusive to themselves.
Moral guilt, like certain interests, is a long-term, if not a necessary, feature of
persons, which, it would seem, could not be attributed to a later segment of a person
if the crime was in fact committed by an earlier segment. To this objection Noonan
replies that it assumes what it sets out to prove, and that the proponent of perduring
need only claim that the earlier stage is not in fact someone else, but the person
-19-
himself.23 Haksar responds24 by pointing out that punishment nonetheless does not
seem fair, since the constituents of persons are themselves, on Noonan's own
account, a kind of short-lived person, who can do everything that persons do, except
for what persons do over a protracted period of time.
It is true that I might commit some crime at the age, not of 5 but of 30, which might
lead someone to claim that the actual agent was me-at-30; in other words, a person-
stage. But why not simply suppose that the attribute of guilt was acquired by a
persisting self at the age of 30, rather than appearing in the stage-at-the-scene-of-the-
crime and passing on to her innocent successors? Is it even possible to visualize a
crime in the process of being committed by some perduring entity? What are the
boundaries of the person-stage responsible? At what point will we start blaming the
person-stage as she comes to incorporate the relevant criminal intention? For this
entity would not appear to be changing in some reprehensible way, assuming that
all its temporal parts, like those of the person herself, are essential to its existence. It
is surely more natural to believe that enduring persons are the subjects of actions,
which their histories then contain.
We will be looking further at necessary features of persons. Here we should note the
general objection to 'perduring' theories put forward by Wiggins and others, and
discussed by Noonan.25 The objection is that summations of person-stages
necessarily have the stages they have, whereas I do not (I might, for example, have
died at the age of 5). I cannot, then, be identical with the summation of person-
stages, if the summation has properties I do not have. To this Noonan replies that
'might have died at the age of 5' must mean different things when applied to 'me*
and to 'the summation of stages', just as, he says, 'might have been squeezed into a
ball' must mean different things when said of a statue and a lump of clay (which is
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why, despite the statue being identical with the lump of clay, the lump of clay, but
not the statue, might have been squeezed into a ball).
I would maintain that, on the contrary, the statue is not identical with the clay which
constitutes it, precisely in view of the different fates which each might undergo (or
have already undergone). Nor is a person identical with stages in his history; though
here, not wishing to accept a 4-dimensional view of persons, I would deny that the
person was even constituted by stages in his actual history. Rather, the person's
history is constituted by certain stages, though it (i.e., the history of that person)
need not have been constituted by any of these stages - or not, I will argue, once it
had begun.
While in the case of nations we have good reason for allowing for the existence of
constituent persons, in the case of persons what reason do we have for postulating
the existence of constituent person-stages? If person-stages must be said to do at
least some of the things persons do, including things they need not do, why not
apply Occam's razor and refer to a single, enduring entity,26 which can be said to
have, in its own right, long-term interests, duties, and so on? As Haksar comments:
We postulate the simple self because it is presupposed by our system of moral blame
and punishment and by our subjective point of view and prudential fears. Now if we
appeal to such considerations we can rule out certain possibilities. For instance, take the
doubt regarding whether there is one non-reductionist self per human being
throughout his life or one self per person, per year. The former rather than the latter is
presupposed by our prudential fears, as well as by our system of punishment and
moral blame.27
We have been looking at views according to which a person's identity over time
consists in something else - in other things and relations. We will now turn to views
according to which this is not the case. Personal identity does not consist in anything
else, but is distinct from everything observable that might be evidence for it. Persons
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are separately existing entities, distinct from their brains, bodies and experiences. On
the best known version of this view, a person is a purely mental entity: a Cartesian
pure ego, or spiritual substance. Or it may be argued, as Lowe argues, that persons
are simple psychological substances without substantial parts, which, though not
essentially material, are not necessarily wholly immaterial, and which can identify
themselves as 'the necessarily unique subject of certain thoughts and experiences and
as the necessarily unique agent of certain actions.'28
Lowe maintains that while persons have no substantial parts giving rise to
constraints on their identity, there are nonetheless constraints on the possible
histories of persons, which have to do with the 'empirically discoverable natural
laws governing substances of this kind."29 Somewhat surprisingly, Lowe believes
that the origin of persons may be something indeterminate. Since persons are simple
substances grounded in no other substances
there is, and can be, no definitive condition that necessarily determines the ceasing-to-
be (or, indeed, the coming-to-be) of a self. In the case of complex substances which are
governed by criteria of identity the conditions for substantial change (that is, their
coming or ceasing-to-be) can be specified fairly exactly, even though these conditions
may in some cases be infected by some degree of vagueness. But not so with simple
substances - and this is not, with them, a matter of vagueness at all. This observation
certainly seems to apply in the realm of fundamental particle physics, as far as I can
judge. Thus if, in a particle interaction, an electron collides with an atomic nucleus and
various fission products arise, including a number of electrons, it would seem that there
may be no determinate 'fact of the matter' as to whether the original electron is, or is
not, identical with a given one of the electrons emerging from the impact event. There is
here, it would seem, a genuine indeterminateness (I do not say vagueness) of identity.30
Lowe stresses that it is 'strictly only psychologically normal selves'31 which fully
meet his condition for selfhood. In other cases, though substances would presumably
still be involved, these would only approximate to selfhood to varying degrees.
Persons, Lowe says, are literally created by other persons; emerging, in the case of
the socialization of infants as with the emergence of a rational species, through
personal interaction.32
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We will be looking in a later chapter at the possibility of the gradual appearance of
person-substances. Suffice it to say that at all times during the creative process there
must have been some subject for socialization to have taken place; presumably a
substance, which we will need some reason for distinguishing from the person or
self. It is particularly difficult to imagine the appearance at some later stage of a
person to whom the original psychological substance, by some natural process,
bequeaths its memories and capacities. Lowe is in danger of finding himself with
overlapping psychological substances when he argues that
[...] persons are essentially things with a past and a (potential) future [...] One way of
making the point would be to deny that any genuine sense could be made of the notion
that a person, or indeed anything temporarily simulating a person, could exist for only
the span of a few moments, or minutes. The generation of a person is, I suggest,
something that necessarily takes time, because it involves processes of education,
socialization and the accretion of experience where end-products could not even in
principle be reproduced in any 'instantaneous' fashion.33
Whoever has the first thought, it will not be the fully-fledged person, for Lowe goes
so far as to claim that
[...] we can make no sense at all of a subject undergoing a single sensory experience in
the complete absence of all other mental activity, much less of a single sensory
experience - a twinge of pain, say - occurring out of the blue to no subject at all. Pace
Hume, 'perceptions', even if they are 'distinct' are frequently not 'separable'. Mental
events, even of the most rudimentaiy kinds, are only conceivable as elements within
relatively well- integrated mental economies - that is, as parts of the mental lives of
subjects.34
Yet against this, it can be argued that it is not only the very young and the mentally
ill who have mental economies which are quite fragmented. Normal adults have
many ill-assorted elements in both their conscious and their 'subconscious' mental
lives.35 Some ofmy experiences have very little in common, apart from the fact that
they are mine. Indeed, it can be argued that this fact is all-important, being precisely
that in virtue of which my existence cannot be a matter of degree. Thus when my
brain is subjected to some form of manipulation, I either survive, or I don't. Such
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considerations are vividly brought into focus by examples in which my personality
is altered, while T remain conscious throughout, and, perhaps, suffer pain. We can
make little sense of the idea that, although someone will be in pain, it 'will and it
won't' be me. At any stage, we feel like saying, either I will, or I won't be in pain.
Challenged by commissurotomy cases, we may want to stand firm, and insist that I
either have, or don't have, a part of me which is in pain - just as I either have, or
don't have, for example, an angry subconscious. It is easier to claim that a part of me
will be in pain than that a pain will belong partly to me and partly to someone else -
or fully to someone who will be only partly me.
Geoffrey Madell argues that psychological continuity theories are doomed from the
outset, in view of the fact that
the status of any experience as mine or not mine is one thing, its particular character or
content is quite another. If we accept, what is in any case obvious, that any of one's
experiences might have been different in character, we have implicitly accepted the
distinction between the ownership of experiences on the one hand and their character
and content on the other. And what goes for any individual experience also goes for
series of experiences. If the momentary state of consciousness's being mine is
independent of its content and character, then the continuing consciousness's being
mine is also independent of content and character. And so the flow of my experiences
could be radically fragmented and disconnected [...] the psychological continuity view
has nothing to say on what it is for one of two indistinguishable series of experiences -
one on Earth and one On Twin Earth, say - to be mine. The clear implication of all this is
that the disregard of the first-person view can only give us something incoherent. The
fundamental notion governing the view I am attacking seems to be a conception of
experiences as essentially impersonal elements (Parfit, for example, is quite explicit
about this), a conception which disregards the dimension 'mine/not-mine'.*
ForMadell the unanalysable quality of 'mineness' is what my existence amounts to; a
quality necessarily excluded from all external, objective descriptions of me.
'Mineness' is a quality of experiences which may otherwise be different in every
respect (for Madell is not a substance theorist). Madell points out that subjectivity is
the anchor of our references to things we do not fully understand, which we can
indicate by means of terms such as 'that thing' (i.e, the thing connected to me by
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some causal chain of communication). While we may be wrong about the nature of
things thus connected to us, we cannot be completely wrong about the subjective
anchor itself; i.e., about ourselves. One may be ignorant of one's particular qualities,
but 'not to the extent of supposing that it is possible that one may turn out oneself to
be an object like a beermug, lacking consciousness altogether.*37
Madell's views will be further discussed in the next chapter. Thomas Nagel has also
laid considerable stress on the phenomenon of subjectivity, which he presents more
in terms of the 'point of view' of the subject.38 Nagel and Madell are surely right to
draw attention to the unique and unanalysable nature of subjectivity. We must,
however, remember that the subjective viewpoint is a unique, unanalysable mode of
subjects; of individuals whose existence is, I would argue, established independently
of their point of view. Something, not 'mineness' or the point of view itself, is already
in existence. Thus it may not be quite true to say, as does Madell, that 'the status of
the present experience as mine or not mine seems to be something quite independent
of its objective character'.39 For what connects my otherwise disconnected
experiences is the owner to whom the subjective viewpoint objectively belongs.
To say T or 'mine', I do, of course, need to be conscious, to have a point of view. But
is it true that I need a point of view for something to be me or mine? After all, I need
a point of view to say that you are you, but you do not need a point of view for me to
make this claim. The use of indexicals such as 'yours', 'his', and 'mine' requires a
point of view on the part of the speaker, but not on the part of the subject to which
reference is made - even if this subject is in fact the speaker during some period of
unconsciousness connected in some way with the current period of consciousness.
The point of view, though necessarily one person's when it appears, need not appear
for that person to be present.
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We must begin the search for what we are from where we now are - especially as the
kind of thing we do when we are conscious may in some way define what we are
(and always were). It is true that I am, in the words of Nagel, 'whatever persisting
individual in the objective order underlies the subjective continuation of that mental
life that I call mine'.40 It does not follow that my mental life at or prior to this
moment is essential to my existence as a person; only that my existence somehow
underlies my mental life at and prior to this moment. For all I know, my existence
also underlies certain non- essential bodily features, such as my limbs and power of
speech, which may be lost and which need not (perhaps) have developed for me to
have existed. Such physical features are discoverable to consciousness, which,
coming and going, picks up information on what has gone on in its absence.
Remarkable and astonishing as consciousness is, it is nevertheless only one aspect of
ourselves - and not, I will argue, the essential aspect.
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Necessity and Origin
One possible result of the preoccupation with consciousness and the liberal use of
thought-experiments is a view of personal identity according to which we are, in
Mark Johnstone's term,1 'bare loci' of experience. Thus whereas Lowe, another
'simple' theorist, allows for constraints on possible biographies, Madell does not.2
Madell points out that there are many, quite different pasts and futures which we
can imagine for ourselves. Not only might I in the future look out at the world from
your body, but I might always have looked out at the world from your body - or that
ofmy mother, Napoleon, or whoever. My life might have coincided at no point with
the life I have actually lived.3 As long as there was a life somewhere with
experiences, or at least one experience, with the quality of 'mineness', that life would
have been mine. I in fact began at whatever stage in development consciousness
emerged,4 but Imight have begun at any time at all.
Most of us would agree that our lives might have been different, and that, on the
other hand, we might not have existed at all. However, many of us also have some
inclination to believe that our presence or absence would not have been a totally
'bare fact': that our existence, if conceptually prior to the existence of any parts we
may have, or changes we may undergo, is at least analysable with reference to what
is essential to our existence - our parts, perhaps, or the elements which produced us.
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One possibility is that our existence depends on the gametes which combined to
form our bodies. Thus Saul Kripke claims that we could not have come into being
with different parents from those we did in fact have. Taking an example from
Timothy Sprigge, he maintains that the Queen could not have had as parentsMr and
Mrs Harry Truman. (Kripke says that he is excluding 'such recherche possibilities as
transplants of the sperm from the father, or the egg from the mother into other
bodies, so that in one sense other people might have been her parents.'5) Graeme
Forbes6 in his paper 'Origin and Identity' discusses alternatives to the view that, for
someone to have been me, that person would have to have come from the same
sperm and ovum as I did. Forbes points out that to deny this is to allow for the
possible simultaneous existence of rival candidates to be me: the persons arising
from the original ovum, and another sperm, and from the original sperm, and
another ovum. Unless we hold some theory of the kind seen in the last chapter,
according to which our rival's existence can preclude our own, it seems we cannot
allow for this kind of variation in our origin. Forbes does not discuss in this paper
the view that the time and place of origin is essential, in addition to the 'generation
system'. A less demanding theory than Forbes' is that of Elliot and Gallois,7 who
suggest that if the matter which in fact made up the gametes of the queen's parents
had instead come to make up exactly similar gametes belonging to Truman's parents,
the resulting child would have been the queen, albeit with different parents and a
different life.
James Bogen ties the necessity of origin more closely to the actual history of the
person, which he dates from birth:
In asking whether Thelonius could have had different parents I am assuming that his
birth to X and Y was his origin, i.e., that he came into existence at birth and did not exist
at any time previous to it. The reason that we can make sense out of "Napoleon need not
have lost' is that Napoleon existed before the defeat and was then capable of doing
something or being affected in such a way as to prevent his defeat. But we can give no
sense to 'Thelonius need not have been the son of X and Y' because no man who existed
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before the time of his birth (not even if there were then men named Thelonius) was the
man we are now calling Thelonius. That is because the man we are talking about was a
nonentity before X and Y had their son. Therefore anything which might have affected
the career of any man before Thelonius was born to X and Y would have to have
affected the career of someone who was not the man we call Thelonius [...] To
summarize; Thelonius is but needn't have been the son of X and Y is unintelligible
unless Thelonius could have been, done, or suffered something before he was born to X
and Y. But this is impossible because he did not exist before his birth to X and Y.
Therefore, it makes no sense to say that he needn't have been the son of X and Y.8
Kripke makes the more general observation that:
Ordinarily when we ask intuitively whether something might have happened to a given
object, we ask whether the universe could have gone on as it actually did up to a certain
time, but diverge in its history from that point forward so that the vicissitudes of that
object would have been different from that time forth. Perhaps this feature should be
erected into a general principle about essence. Note that the time in which the
divergence from actual history occurs may be sometime before the object itself is
actually created. For example, I might have been deformed if the fertilized egg from
which I originated had been damaged in certain ways, even though I presumably did
not yet exist at that time [...]9
It can be asserted that any change occurring in the universe some time before my
origin, whenever this took place, could not have changed my origin, or caused some
later change to me unless my (spatio)temporal path was the same, at least at the
outset. When making counterfactual claims about persons (or other individuals) we
ought, on this view, to be asking either how their histories might have forked, or at
least how, within the same general (spatio)temporal path, the individual might have
had some different characteristic.10 If this view is correct it will not be sufficient, in
imagining a possible origin for myself, to imagine exactly similar gametes in
different parents, composed by some amazing chance of the same subatomic
particles; or even the actual gametes of my actual parents, combined in some other
time and place from those in which they did combine. For neither of these
alternatives would involve the grafting of possible histories on to my actual history.
The theory of the necessity of our time of origin, in addition to our 'generation
system', can be illustrated with reference to the fact that human gametes can be
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frozen and stored before they are combined. If the gametes which combined to form
me had instead been frozen for 300 years, and then combined to form some person,
this person would not be me, as her life would not coincide with mine at any point
whatsoever. If, on the other hand, my life, having once begun, had been 'put on hold'
through freezing, then my life in the 23rd century, while presumably different from
my life in this century, would be a continuation of this life. A cake could be frozen
for 300 years, just as a cake could be made today from 300-year-old ingredients. It
does not, however, make sense to point to a cake fresh from the oven and say 'that
very same cake might have been 300 years old'.
One rather startling consequence of the necessity of my original spatiotemporal
setting is that I would not have existed had my parents' gametes combined even
seconds earlier or later than they did; or even had they combined at precisely the
same time, but in a different place (say, a test-tube). The result of such a combination
would be my genetic double, and her life would doubtless be similar in many
respects to my own. The same could be said, however, ofmy actual identical twin (if
I have one), or of any counterfactual twins who might have come into being as the
result of the division of an embryo which did not in fact divide. Similar individuals
can always be distinguished by their time and place of origin. Even if identical twins,
supposing their bodies to originate on the division of the pre-existing embryo, will
arise from the separated halves of that embryo - and thus in (or in relation to)
different places, if not at different times. My twin, while resembling me in various
ways, could not have been me, withmy body, and my origin.
Persons, we believe, are entities which we can, in principle, trace backwards and
forwards in time. Normally we base our view of what might have happened to a
person on the actual history of that person. If we unmoor the identification of a
person from the tracing backwards and forwards of the person's actual history, it is
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hard to know how we are to distinguish possible histories of that person from
possible histories of others. Whichever position we take on the necessity of origin,
we will need to be able to distinguish, in counterfactual situations, between identical
and exactly similar entities.
It may be argued that sameness of matter provides sufficient individuation. Could
not my twin and I be identified, in some counterfactual situation, by reference to the
matter from which each of us came into being? It is, of course, true that two
individuals could not result simultaneously from the same collection of matter - say,
the same half of an embryo. However, they could perhaps originate at different
times from at least the same subatomic particles. To say that I am any person first
made up of those particles, or even the first person of a certain type, seems somehow
unsatisfactory. Moreover, if it is the matter alone which individuates the entity, then
we will need some way of individuating the matter to ensure that it is indeed the
same matter we are imagining. It is hard to see how we can do this except by tracing
the matter (or each individual particle) through its actual history in time and space,
and then imagining that this actual history diverges at some stage after its origin. To
anchor our thoughts on whatevermatter was present in some time and place at some
stage later than its origin will not be sufficient to individuate this matter, since a
similar collection ofmattermight surely have been there in its place.
The identity of the matter is therefore anchored on its origin. The question now
arises why in the case of matter, but not in the case of the entities it constitutes or
gives rise to, we require that its conceivable history coincide at the time of origin
with its actual history. Is it enough to say that matter, at least at the subatomic level,
cannot be broken down further, and thus individuated in some alternative way? For
if what we are primarily interested in is the human person, and if we know that
origin is necessary to individuate some things, might not the origin of the person be
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necessary to individuate that person, in addition to the origin of what first
constitutes the person or her body?
How does the defender of a 'bare locus' position respond to theories on the necessity
of origin? Madell concedes that the original matter is a necessary condition for the
identity of objects, including living bodies. But, Madell says, I am not an object to
myself, and no such constraints onmy identity apply:
What ought to be central to discussion of personal identity is the fact that this 'person-
as-object' view is impossible to grasp from the first-person perspective. I cannot, to
begin with, imagine what it could be to be such an object. The necessity-of-origin thesis
is incomprehensible from this perspective. It is not just that everyone can easily imagine
having been bom earlier or later; it is also that the thesis implies that had the series of
experiences leading up to my present state of consciousness had a different origin then
this present state of consciousness would not have been mine: and that's as
incomprehensible as anything could be. And the claim that, while this line of
experiences stretching back into the past might have been different in all sorts of ways,
it just could not have started earlier or later than it did is one which is utterly opaque.
There is solid argument for the necessity-of-origin thesis as it pertains to objects. We do
not know what it could mean to say that there is a possible world in which this very,
same oak tree grew from a different acorn; we have no idea what could pick it out as
the very same oak tree. But there is no such argument available in the case of persons.11
I would argue that, on the contrary, the cases are parallel. It would not be the same
oak tree if it had had a different origin, and the subject of experience would not be
me, if she had. What we should note, however, is that any state of consciousness
which had a different origin would not have been 'this present state of
consciousness' - any more than an oak tree which had a different origin would have
been 'this very same oak tree'. Any suggestion that this present state of
consciousness might not have been mine is certainly incomprehensible; nor can I
imagine experiencing a mental state which was not mine, as I can imagine myself
confronting a different oak tree. This is indeed a difference between the two cases, in
so far as I cannot imagine 'from the inside' an experience which was not mine, in the
way I can certainly imagine a different experience for myself.
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If my subjective viewpoint is an attribute of me, and I do in fact have a necessary
origin, then any thought-experiment will in fact be incoherent if it involves a person
with a different origin, but my subjective viewpoint. Madell believes that while
restrictions on origin are essential, for the reasons Forbes gives, in the case of objects,
these reasons are not available in the case of my identity since, in the event of two
claimants to be me, I would always be able to tell which one of them actually was me
by the fact that I found myself looking out from one body rather than another.12 To
this it could be objected that while it is true that my subjective viewpoint can be
used, by me, to distinguish between my twin and myself, this is not the only way in
which we can be distinguished, whether by ourselves or by third parties. We can
always be distinguished by our necessarily separate origin, in every real and
counterfactual situation, including one in which neither of us is looking out at the
world, though each source of a point of view exists.
Madell's claim with regard to the line of my experiences appears perhaps more
plausible than it should, due to our permissive identity conditions for series of
separate events. It is possible to say that even a 'particular' series of explosions at a
factory might have begun earlier than it did, if we mean by this that the actual
explosions might have been preceded by earlier explosions (supposing the later
explosions to be free-standing). Moreover, there is a loose sense in which 'the
explosions', like 'the re-unification of Germany' refers to 'any explosions/re¬
unification that might have occurred around that time'. In the case of personal
identity, however, we begin, at least, by inquiring into the history and possible
history, not of roughly similar experiences, but of the person whose experiences they
are. And while the person might or might not (depending on our view of persons)
have begun to think earlier than she did, I am arguing that she could not, in either
case, have begun to exist earlier than she did.
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One who believe that we are series of experiences might, unlike Madell, see our
entire mental history as constitutive of our strict identity, and any changed or
diminished version as 'me to some extent'. The series theorist might maintain (again
unlike Madell) that had none of the experiences taken place, I would not have been
present - not to any extent. The series theorist might also claim that, notwithstanding
the fact that certain early experiences might or might not have occurred, so that the
series might have begun earlier or later, elements of the series themselves have
essential characteristics. For example, no individual experience might have taken
place at a different time from the time it did take place. Moreover, one experience
would very often be causally dependent on another, in the way that Elliot suggests is
the case with 'person-stages':
The idea is that a later person-stage, y, is who he or she is, because an earlier person
stage, x, of the same person, is who he or she is. y would not exist had x not existed.
One way of fleshing out this idea is in terms of causal dependency - had x not
appropriately causally engendered y then y would not have existed. What might have
existed, had x not existed, is an individual exactly similar to, but not identical with, x. It
could not be identical with x since its origin is different from the origin of that person
whose first stage would have been x, had x existed.13
Such causal considerations should make us wary of imagining for ourselves
alternative biographies which are completely different from our actual biographies.
Just as certain experiences (say, hearing the voice of person A) could not have been
caused by anything else (say, the voice of person B), perhaps the fact that I come to
exist is necessarily related to my body, and therefore to its origin, whether or not the
two coincide. The coming-to-be in relation to the body could be seen as a condition
as necessary for the existence of any immaterial self as is the coming-to-be in relation
to the body of some individual experience.14 Thus Kripke may be premature in
claiming that
my view [...] that a person could not have come from a different sperm and egg from
the ones from which he actually originated implicitly suggests a rejection of the
Cartesian picture. If we had a clear idea of the soul or the mind as an independent,
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subsistent, spiritual entity, why should it have to have any necessary connection with
particular material objects such as a particular sperm or a particular egg?15
We could not infer from the premise that our minds are separate from our bodies - or
even the premise that our minds need not maintain some tie to our bodies - that they
need never have had such a tie. For perhaps we should agree with Locke that mental
no less than physical substances are distinguished by their origin.16 Supposing
disembodied spirits to exist, they could be distinguished at least through the time
and/or cause of their coming into being. In the case of ourselves, a connection to a
body, and hence to a certain time and place, might or might not be thought to be
essential to the mind, depending on our view of their causal relations. If, for
example, mind and body were thought to originate simultaneously, it would seem
hard to deny that there was some causal connection between them. Even if it was the
mind which was thought to cause the body, might it not still be identified as the
mind of that body? It could, of course, be claimed that themind or self preexisted the
body, in which case the origin of the body would indeed be inessential to the mind.
But a dualist who claimed that the body (perhaps in conjunction with something
else) somehow gave rise to the self after its own coming-to-be would have to admit
that not only the time of origin of the self, but at least some elements of the history of
the body were essential to its identity. For example, the origin of that body would be
necessary, if not sufficient, for the origin of that self.
We began the chapter with the point made by Johnstone that psychological
approaches to personal identity, with the thought-experiments they involve, can lead
us in the direction of a theory according to which we are loci of experience of some
unspecified kind. And in fact, just as we can imagine histories for animals
incompatible with their nature - pigs flying, for example - there is no reason to think
that we cannot also imagine histories for ourselves which are incompatible with our
nature. As Nagel puts it:
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What I imagine may be possible in so far as what I know about my nature is concerned,
but may not be possible in so far as my actual nature is concerned [...] it is the mistake
of thinking that my concept of myself alone can reveal the objective conditions of my
identity that leads to the giddy sense that personal identity is totally independent of
everything else, so that it might even be possible for you and me to switch selves
although nothing has changed [...]17
Nagel's first observation can be used to counter the view that 'this person here'
provides all the individuation we need, as evidenced by the fact that we are able to
refer to the same individual while disagreeing about his dates.18 It is, of course, true
that we can identify individuals in many real situations without knowing then-
origin. It is also true, however, that much of what we believe about our focus of
interest may be, notmerely wrong, but necessarily wrong. For all I know, the human
figure I see vaguely in the desert may be an old man, or a mirage. But if that figure is
you, at what stage in your existence might you have been a mirage, or someone born
in 1900? There are essential facts about an individual, which may not appear among
our stock of errors and the inessential facts we use to fix the current reference. For
example, while whoever I point out is trivially someone I point out, it might easily
have been the case that I failed to point that person out, without the slightest
prejudice to his existence. In contrast there are features which the person could not
have lacked, and features he could not now lack, and continue to exist.
Something more should be said here on the relationship between our essential
features and the thought-experiments we use in endeavouring to discover what
these are. Many such experiments assume what they aim to prove: that persons are
the kinds of beings who could in principle split in half, be transferred piecemeal,
body-swap, and so on. If persons are nothing more than, for example, their
experiences, then we ought to accept the theoretical possibility of partial or multiple
survival. But it may be that persons, in view of their actual makeup, cannot be
divided and multiplied in this way - in which case little can be shown about persons
by asking what we would say 'if they did'. Our beliefs about whether persons could
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be divided and multiplied may provide some insight into our other beliefs about
persons. However, our ultimate concern is not our beliefs about persons (which in
any case can be expected to vary to some extent) but how well these accord with our
actual nature.
Haksar in discussing these questions draws a distinction between claims about
ourselves which he says are based on our experience, such as the claim that a person
might have had a different psychology, and those which are not, such as the claim
that fission is possible, or survival through the mechanical transfer of thoughts. If
information could be transferred and selves emerge in this way, then the non-
reductionist view would have to be abandoned. But if some non- reductionist view is
in fact correct, then situations such as these are intrinsically impossible:
[...] it would be consistent to take the line that if persons are persistent indivisible selves
then what ultimately matters for personal survival involves the survival of indivisible
selves, along with the survival of other things such as one's memories and dispositions;
whereas if there are no persistent selves then what ultimately matters is not the survival
of the persistent self but the survival of one's memories and dispositions [...] though
imaginary examples can sometimes reveal our beliefs about personal identity, they
cannot verify or falsify them. But one has to be careful in seeing what they reveal. They
do not reveal that we believe in reductionist survival. At most they reveal that if fission,
etc. were possible then reductionist survival would be what matters.19
Certainly if we assert that persons are indivisible psychological substances, or
necessarily involve indivisible psychological substances, or are, as Haksar believes,
simple indivisible selves with both a physical and a psychological aspect, we deny
the possibility of gradual changes of identity, such as those seen in Parfit's
Psychological and Physical Spectra.20 In the case of small subtractions and
substitutions to my brain (Parfit's Physical Spectrum) there will come a point at
which the relevant substance either will, or won't, be present. After all, it does seem
that if substitutions are not made, I will eventually die after one tiny subtraction.
Parfit himself comments:
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Suppose that the cause of psychological continuity was not the continued existence of
the brain, but the continued existence of a separately existing entity, like a Cartesian
Ego. We could then claim that, if we carried out such operations, the results would not
be as I have described them. We would find that, if we replaced much of someone's
brain, even with dissimilar cells the resulting person would be exactly like the original
person. But there would be some critical percentage, or some critical part of the brain,
whose replacement would utterly destroy psychological continuity. In one of the cases
in this range, the carrier of continuity would cease either to exist or to interact with the
brain. The resulting person would be psychologically totally unlike the original
person.21
In fact a psychological substance theorist could go farther than this, and deny that
any person will result from the operation, in the absence of a replacement psyche.
Splitting into rival persons will be likewise impossible on a psychological substance
theory. Even if some indivisible psychological substance could be imagined to
communicate simultaneously through two living bodies, this would not count as the
emergence of two moral subjects. Theories which make the psyche the 'life-principle'
of the body would rule out even this situation as intrinsically impossible. What
should we say about theories according to which, while the person's existence
necessarily implies, at one time, the existence of a particular body, a person could
survive in association with a different body - or, perhaps, with no body at all? If we
might not have been without our actual bodies at our origin, might we lose them
without ceasing to be?
To suggest that we could change or lose our bodies while remaining the same kind
of being is to suggest that whatever laws underlie our unified functioning, they are
not those which define a substantial kind. There is surely no reason to believe this. I
would argue that as human persons we are biological units, so that whatever might
be thought to survive our physical dissolution, it would not be the psychophysical
unit 'human person'. We can, however, imagine different kinds of person, with then-
own identity conditions. The term 'person', as opposed to 'human person', can be
used as a very general, non-biological moral term; one which could accommodate
even non-physical beings. If we assume that human persons are a biological kind of
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their own, we avoid the problems brought to our attention by Lowe,22 who argues
that if persons in general are a biological kind, then two otherwise totally different
rational species would have to be classed together as one biological kind, having
somehow evolved identical laws of operation, though species closely related to
either have not.
Persons involving human bodies would certainly appear to qualify as substantial
units, with their own irreducible laws of functioning, conditions of identity, interests,
and so on. The union of mind and body, even should mind survive the body, is
obviously of enormous importance. The parting of mind and body, should this in
fact be possible, would be a truly catastrophic change. It would affect not only
everything else about us, but all 'our' relations with others and all their duties to 'us'.
Even if some core continuant should persist, enabling us to speak of 'our* survival in
some sense, it would not follow that 'human' as opposed to 'ex-human' persons do
not have their own conditions of existence. Moreover, if 'human person' is a term
with moral content, is this content so unspecific as not to make reference to the fact
that we can be physically harmed? Or is harm to my body, however massive, only
indirectly harm to me?
Such questions will be left to a later chapter. We will end by reminding ourselves of
the perennial problems of dualism. Dualism does not describe us as we think we are;
beings who may be the subjects, not only of mental, but also of physical descriptions.
Thus it seems bizarre when, for example, Lowe claims that the self must perceive
through parts of its body to make them its own: that at times when (during illness,
say) I am unable to feel through some part of my body, that part is not really a part
of my body.23 It is equally bizarre to suggest that what everyone takes to be me - the
physical person - might not in fact be me; nor even part ofme. I can recognize myself
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neither as the bodiless mind, nor as the mindless body into which dualism divides
me.
Yet whatever the shortcomings of theories according to which we are mental
substances, such theories nonetheless have, I would argue, the advantage over
strongly reductionist theories. If a person is neither a body, nor a mental substance,
nor a substance with both mental and physical characteristics, we are left without a
subject who can pass in and out of consciousness, and who can suffer harm during
its absence. A psychological substance provides a more plausible candidate for
moral status (and indeed, for existence itself) than does some ownerless thought or
thought-series. Moreover, any substance theory allows us to say, as we do, that
changes may take place in us, new thoughts occur, without this affecting our very
existence.
We have seen that our origin in connection with our bodies gives us some protection
against our wilder flights of fancy. Though on some dualist views I might yet
become a Martian, I might not have come into being as a Martian - or as my twin. In
the next chapter we will be looking at theories according to which our existence as
persons not only requires, but involves at all times, the existence of our bodies.
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Personal Bodies
The origin of our bodies, it was argued in the last chapter, is at least a necessary
condition of our existence as persons. Even if human persons are minds or series of
experiences, their origin in connection with a certain human body may be a
necessary feature of these minds or these experiences. There are requirements which
anchor us to our own time in history, reassuring us that however long we live into
the future, we could not have lived in 3000 B.C. Theories involving substances were
seen to have various advantages. Not only do they provide us with a continuing
subject of interests, but in allowing the person to undergo change without loss of
identity they confirm us in our belief that we might have spent the last few decades
differently from the way in which, in the event, we spent them.
We will now look at theories according to which our bodies are not merely a
precondition of our personal existence (like, perhaps, the bodies of our parents) but
rather should be said to be us. There are laws which relate to the persons we are,
made up of the kind of body we have, and not of the kind we merely imagine. By
bodies we mean, of course, living bodies: biological systems. Our respect for corpses
surely refers to the status of living persons, not to that of the corpse itself. And the
history of the mere aggregate of matter which may (briefly) outlive the human being
is not of any moral importance.
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We may be inclined to draw some further distinctions. Theories of personhood
always, or nearly always, refer in some way to our rational, or at least, our mental
life. We have looked at some of the problems involved in taking our actual thoughts
to be essential to our existence as persons. Yet it does seem likely that personhood
has something to do with ourmental life, if it does not require our actual, contingent,
often quite disintegrated episodes of mental activity.
A condition of our existence often suggested is mental capacity - though this may be
applied to a period of 'pre-personal' existence. As Peter Unger puts it:
[...] For you to exist at a future time, you must exist, continuously, from now until then.
For that to be so, there must be the continuous existence, from now until then, of your
particular basic mental capacities. For there to be the continuous existence of just those
capacities, there must be, in this wholly or largely physical world of ours, the
continuous physical realization of them in a physically continuous realizer or, at the
least, in a physically continuous succession of physical realizers. Consequently, for you
to exist at a future time, there must be appropriate physical continuity.1
By "basic' capacities Unger understands the capacities for consciousness, which he
says constitute our 'core' as opposed to our "distinctive" psychology.2 While we may
very much want to retain our distinctive psychology, we nonetheless have interests
such as that in avoiding pain which are present when only our core psychology
remains.
Warren Quinn, taking a similar approach, observes that
[...] if we distinguish between the mental faculties that are developed as a normal
human infant collects and sorts experiences of himself and the world, that is the mental
faculties that the infant or child comes to have in virtue of the learning he has done,
from the underlying mental capadties that make this learning possible, it seems
attractive to identify the latter as what is essential.3
Having looked at theories according to which a body is 'owned' by a thinking
person, we may be sympathetic to the suggestion that an organism can itself think,
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feel, and so on; that to treat the living body as incapable of thought is to engage in an
abstraction. Only if a living body is a 'fully real organic subentity' can we accept the
view that 'the foetus is the beginning of the body of an as yet non-existent human
being.'4 The words are those of Quinn, who goes on to claim that
When man is seen as a single organism capable of a wide repertoire of behaviour
varying from the metabolic and automatic to the intentional and cerebral [...] the
primitive organism is seen as something which in the course of normal development
will take on new physical, psychological, and eventually rational powers. It will first
acquire a form and capacity that will qualify it as animal; and it will subsequently take
on mental, emotional and volitional powers that will qualify it as a human being. But
through all these changes it will remain one and the same biological organism.5
If our actual thoughts are not essential to our existence, how early in development
are we moral subjects present? The question is, of course, often raised in connection
with the moral questions of abortion and embryo experimentation. Quinn argues
that the intuition that even early abortion stands in need of some justification
will seem to have serious weight only if the fetal being affected by abortion is thought
to be capable of receiving morally significant harms and benefits. If the foetus were
viewed as a special kind of short-lived individual destined at birth to fade from
existence as the human being replaces it, or as the early stage of a complex piece of
biological machinery which a human being will only later come to possess, abortion
would seem to pose no serious moral problem. It seems then that [this intuition]
demands a theory in which the future human being in some sense already exists in the
foetus.6
Once again, we are faced with the question of whether persons are substances. Many
of us do think of persons as what we are essentially, so that any time we exist we are
persons, in possession of inalienable rights (or at least, of inalienable moral status).
This view, however, has consequences we may be unwilling to accept. For if we are
linking personhood to some current mental capacity, we will want to say that the
organism, at some stage of development, acquires whatever capacity is essential to a
person. The organism which acquires this capacity surely goes on existing even after
the appearance of the person. Thus we find ourselves faced with not one, but two
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psychological beings - the organism and the person - existing in one place
simultaneously. If we reject this startling picture, we must claim either that 'person'
is not a substance sortal, or that foetuses are persons before they are sentient, or that
with the development of the foetus a new substance - a person - starts to exist, so
that we persons never were foetuses.7
Jim Stone describes the problem in the following passage, treating 'person'
provisionally as a phase sortal referring to the animal when it is rational:
We might say, following Locke, that a person is 'a thinking, intelligent being, that has
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in
different times and places'. Now I think it very strange to say that adult human animals
are not self-aware, that these capacities are realized by yet another thing, so it seems
reasonable and ontologically conservative to identify the beings which have reason,
reflection, and self-awareness with human animals. That is, human animals which have
reason, reflection and awareness are persons. But then, as the animals which exhibit
these capacities existed before they had them and were once fetuses, persons existed
before they were persons and were once fetuses. Persons aren't numerically different
entities which fetuses produce, they are fetuses at a later stage of development; hence
fetuses will be self-aware when they become persons. If I am identical to a person, it
follows that there is a person and I have all of his properties. But this person existed
before he was a person; indeed he was a fetus. Therefore if I am identical to a person,
then I am not essentially a person, for persons aren't essentially persons.8
Stone goes on to consider the view that a person is constituted by the animal during
some part of its history, as a statue is constituted by a lump of bronze during part of
its history. In this case, says Stone, the properties of the person will be parasitic on
those of the animal:
[...] if a person is constituted by a human animal they both have mental states, self-
awareness, and so on; the person is nothing more than the human animal; it is a
metaphysical epiphenomenon which owes its non-modal, non- temporal properties to
the properties of the human animal. Consequently, while the fetus isn't identical to the
person who will think, feel, and be self-aware, the fetus is identical to the human animal
which will think, feel, and be self-aware. So the animal which is a fetus will be self-
aware even though it will never be a person.9
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In the same way, it is no solution to identify the person with a stage or temporal
stretch of the animal's life. For a temporal stretch, Stone argues, can do nothing; all
thoughts and actions must be ascribed to the animal itself.10
It is sometimes claimed that, in view of the continuity of human development, we
should be looking for the gradual appearance of a person, or (as some would say) a
human being. Quinn, attempting to justify a common intuition that the foetus has
some moral importance, though less than that of the later human, considers at length
both the 'stage' theory, and the theory that humans are substances, but come into
being by degrees, like a house under construction. As Quinn puts it:
The foetus could be identified with the collection of biological materials in the process
of being transformed into a human being; it could be identified with the human being
that is coming into existence; or it could be seen as yet some third kind of object that
either gradually ceases to exist as the human being becomes increasingly realized or
that continues to exist throughout the human being's life as a constituent entity.11
Quinn considers the first and third possibilities unlikely, and proceeds to focus on
the second. What best characterizes the foetus, or house being built, is their partial
entry respectively under the substance sortals 'house' and 'human being'. 'Organism'
is not, he says, a true substance sortal, since it covers both the foetus and the later
human, failing to make a distinction between full and partial instantiations of the
human being. In the same way that 'construction' covers both the completed house,
and also the house under construction, 'organism' covers both the completed human,
and the foetus: the human under construction.
However, it can be argued that Quinn's suggestion does not take sufficient account
of the differences between biological and artefactual entities. For whereas the latter
are characterized with reference to the envisaged product, more and more fully
instantiated by the emerging artefact, the former are characterized with reference to
current active tendencies, and thus to conditions met fully in the present. Organisms
are often described as self-organizing wholes, and thus as beings which cannot exist
in degrees. (Nor, for this reason, can they been seen as mere aggregates of materials,
as in the first alternative Quinn mentions). The biological term which best
characterizes the foetus is not 'human under construction' but 'immature human
organism'. Moreover, organic tendencies will often refer to short and long-term
interests which are in some way internal. In contrast, with the artefact everything
hangs on its ultimate state - on how well it will meet our specifications. Quinn
himself seems to feel a certain tension here, for he says that
A fetus is indeed a fully fledged organism, but this is quite consistent with the claim
that such a full-fledged organism is not a fully real individual. One must not be misled
by the fact that the incipient human being gets a secure status as a coherent continuing
object of biological interest before it is a fully real individual.12
Quinn later considers some of the moral implications of the 'process' theory, and his
alternative theory that 'human being' refers to a protracted stage of the human
organism:
[...] the process theory gives a somewhat different result from the stage theory. To the
extent that the human being already exists it is susceptible to the loss of future life and
its rights under humanity come into play. But to the extent that it does not yet fully exist
it cannot, it would seem, suffer this or any other loss and is to that extent removed from
moral consideration.13
Again, Quinn's account seems rather strained. For just as it seems odd to claim that a
life both is, and is not, my own, it seems odd to claim that something both is, and is
not, in my interest (at least where the benefit itself is unambiguous). Can one half-
miss out on a benefit that is only half one's own? Perhaps if persons are seen as units
composed of mind and matter I could anticipate some harm to my disembodied
mind - my mind being seen as the 'carrier' of some non-physical interest.14 However,
here Quinn appears to be claiming that no moral subject is wholly present at the
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earlier stage of human development. So here we have not too much moral subject at
the earlier stage, but rather, not enough.
We will be looking in more detail at interests in a later chapter. Perhaps we should
note in passing that it seems especially odd to suggest that there is some natural
process in view of which an interest in one and the same benefit continues to
increase, or at least, to increase in moral significance. The latter possibility is perhaps
conceivable if special factors intervene - as when, for example, I perform a series of
heroic acts, each one of which increases my deserts. But since Quinn does not require
that a human have actual experiences, but only some capacity for these, what is the
basis on which he accords the early organism ambiguous interests in unambiguous
(if long-term) goods?
A more general problem with 'gradualist' theories of personhood is the difficulty of
knowing where, if anywhere, to stop. For example, do we ascribe higher and higher
personal status to those with greater and greater capacities, while the status of others
is correspondingly low? Or do we draw some line to mark off persons from 'quasi-
persons', and if we do, will it not look unpleasantly arbitrary?
It can, of course, be claimed that whereas some capacities are a matter of degree,
other capacities are not. For example, there is the proximate structural capacity, not
for reason, but for experience of some kind. Will there not be a point, however
difficult to determine, at which the developing organism completes a certain
structure and can now, in some environment, have an experience?
It is, however, doubtful that we can lay such stress on a capacity which seems to be
shared by many lower animals. Moreover, the theory leaves unexplained why
killing, for example, should be wrong, if the method will not in fact be painful: if the
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organism will not feel, and perhaps has not yet felt, anything at all. And with regard
to interests in later, experienced goods, can we not push such interests back before
the advent of sentience? For example, does not the animal now have an interest in
avoiding a painful death at such time as it will have acquired the structure for
experience?
The problem with all theories which make personal status depend on the acquisition
of some capacity is that the individual who will acquire the capacity seems already a
likely candidate for the relevant status. For example, what if I do not have the
structure with which to feel, but an operation will make me immediately sentient?
Do I not have some kind of interest - conceivably even a right - with regard to such
an operation? Or what if I, the organism, am just seconds away from the natural
acquisition of some capacity? The same animal which acquires the capacity for
experience might reasonably be said to have an interest in acquiring it. Can it be true
that I have an interest, or right, with regard to some benefit only when some last
piece of neurological circuitry is completed, and not before, although I am present
throughout?
Or what shall we say when capacities come and go in the same individual? Imagine
a situation in which a patient with brain-damage awakes from an operation which
has restored his capacity to learn, as soon as the environment is favourable. He is
now in the mental condition of a very young baby. Are we to insist that, due to the
gap in the presence of learning capacities (though there was no gap in the presence
of various other capacities) this is not the same person who suffered brain-damage?
That the person who suffered brain-damage had no interest in the operation - and
that the emerging person has, at least prima facie, no moral right to the previous
individual's house or insurance money? If we do not say this, why should we wait
for the first appearance of the proximate capacity to learn?
-54-
Of course, it is always possible to claim that a person comes into being suddenly
through substantial change, so that a capacity first appears, not in the foetus, but in
the being who supplants it. We will be looking further at this possibility in a later
chapter. However, it seems unlikely, given the smoothness of developmental
changes, that the completion of one normally pre-programmed organic refinement
should be enough to create a new being and eliminate the old one. It might be
replied that our actual first experience marks the appearance of something new: the
mind or soul of the organism. Yet here we must ask again if the new-found person
remains in being in between experiences, and if so, why he or she might not have
existed before the first of these took place. Moreover, there are further problems with
substantial change if we take a hardline position on the necessity of origin. Not only
must we deny that it was the pre-existing being who felt or acquired the capacity to
feel. We must also insist that for me to have existed at all, I had to have had that first
experience (or come into being with that capacity) at exactly the moment when I did.
If development had been slower, or the chance for thought had arisen later, I would
never have existed.
It is important to recognize the continuity existing between the emerging structures
and tendencies of the organism, and preexisting structures and tendencies. Just as
the infant's structure and the infant's experience give rise to those of the adult, so too
there are tendencies which give rise to all these; on the face of it the tendencies of one
surviving being. A question we should be asking is whether these early tendencies
might not be integral to the early person.
Before attempting to answer this question, we should consider a final suggestion
with regard to the significance of the capacities of the brain. We have focussed up to
now on the suggestion that what is essential to our personal existence is the capacity
for some kind of mental activity: a capacity requiring a well-developed brain. But
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what if the essential capacity is rather the capacity for any kind of brain activity at
all? For the brain is, after all, the organizer of the body, controlling not only
consciousness, but all other organic activities. So important is the brain that many
philosophers have considered it both necessary and sufficient for survival; always
supposing the brain (with whatever capacity is believed to be essential) could be
kept alive without the rest of the body. Humans are normally thought to die with the
death of our brains.15 Are we, then, alive before our brains have started to function?
Baruch Brody,16 after raising this question, argues that brain function can used to
identify our origin as well as our demise. Brody does not specify what kind of
function is needed; however he does claim that a spontaneously moving human
certainly has a sufficiently functional brain.
»
The objection to this claim lies in the fact that the absence of brain activity signifies
something different in the early organism from what it signifies in the adult. Whole
brain death is a far more comprehensive phenomenon than the commencement of
brain activity in an existing organism. Whole brain death refers to the fact that the
organism has ceased to exist, having ceased irreversibly to function as a whole. In
the mature organism the brain-stem is essential, not just to support consciousness
(for which the neocortex is usually also said to be required) but to support the
countless other functions of that organism. Should these functions be totally
maintained by foreign input - by a machine, say, after 'whole brain death' - there will
not be a living body which is organizing itself, but a collection of parts on which
some external direction is imposed.
In contrast, before the commencement of brain activity the organism is already
functioning as a whole. It is only in the relatively mature human organism that the
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brain is necessary for life. The organism, before the brain is begun, let alone
completed, has certain tendencies some of which may be morally important. On this
point Daniel Callaghan, in answer to Brody's suggestion, argues that
In the case of an irreversible coma (signalled by a flat EEG), it is not the coma as such
but the irreversibility which is the critical condition. For with the death of the brain [...]
comes the loss of all potentiality for personhood [...] In the instance of a zygote or early
embryo, however, even before the advent of brain waves - the potentiality for
personhood exists.17
Countering this objection, Brody gives the example of an adult human brain which is
liquefied and then 'recast' to form a new and working brain. Brody claims that any
potential of the liquefied brain to be recast would not signify the survival of a
person:
[...] consider the entity whose brain has died. Is he not like the foetus? Both have the
potential for developing into an entity with a functioning brain (we shall call this a
weak potential) but neither now has the structure of a functioning brain. We can
conclude, it seems to me, that an entity can go out of existence even if it retains a weak
potential for having a functioning brain, and that, analogously, the foetus is not a
human being just because it has this weak potential. What is essential for being human
is the possession of the potential for human activities that comes with having the
structures required for a functioning brain.18
It is clearly time to look in more detail at different kinds of potential, and at their
significance for the existence of organisms, and of persons.
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Potential
It is often claimed that moral status during early development rests on the potential
of the organism.1 Indeed, it is often claimed that only potential can ground such
status, whether in the case of the foetus or in that of the infant. Sometimes this is
described as the potential to be a person, and sometimes as the potential of a person.
The nature of this potential varies from one account to another. Usually, though not
always, it is said to be the potential for high-level abilities such as rationality and
self-consciousness. When it is not being claimed that a certain potential makes
something a person, it may be claimed that the increasing 'proximity' of such abilities
gradually increases the moral importance of the being in question.2
Those who do not accept that potential can have such moral significance sometimes
counter that anything can be described as potentially something else. For is not food
potentially a person, and a sperm likewise? And if foetuses, for example, have a
certain status due to potential, why not the gametes which produce them?
It has been argued that the difference between the two cases lies in the likelihood of
the potential being fulfilled. Thus John Noonan emphasizes how very much more
probable it is after, than before, conception that a baby will result from the union of
two particular gametes.3 In the same way, it may be suggested that the embryo
accumulates status over time as the chance of pregnancy loss decreases. There are,
however, a number of things which are odd about this approach. To begin with, it
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seems doubtful that the mere likelihood of survival or change could cause the rise in
status which is envisaged. For example, a child close to starvation may have very
little chance of long-term survival. While this fact may affect, say, our distribution of
medical resources, it does not follow from this that such a child has a lower status
than others - only that this child is less likely to benefit, or to benefit very much, from
certain forms of treatment. And can it be true that children in poor countries are less
human, or less persons, than children in rich countries?
The likelihood of an adult's dying by natural causes does not mean it would not be
wrong deliberately to end his life. Moreover, it is not always true that prospects of
survival increase in the course of human development. On the contrary, there are
cases in which the developing embryo has a decreasing chance of survival to
adulthood. As Michael Lockwood explains:
No doubt one could employ the term 'potential' in such a sense that it is a matter of
degree, being given either by the probability that it would develop into a human
person, were it to be transferred to a suitable womb, or, if it is already in the womb, the
probability of its developing tout court. But it would not then be true in general that an
embryo's potential was a function of its age. If an embryo is actually in the womb, at
least if implantation has occurred, then the chances that it will become a human person
will, to be sure, normally increase the closer it approaches that stage, without being
aborted. Nevertheless, any particular implanted embryo at an earlier stage may actually
have better prospects than another at a later stage. And more to the point, if we're
talking about embryos outside the womb, it isn't true, even, that the older it is the
greater is the likelihood that were it to be transferred to a womb it would develop into a
human person. For beyond a certain stage, the likelihood that it could be successfully
implanted will begin to decline sharply: the time will come when it will, so to speak,
have missed the boat.4
Singer and Dawson also make this point, adding that, with the advent of new
reproductive technologies, the prospects of the embryo now depend, not on lack of
intervention, but precisely on the skilled intervention of adults. Even with skilled
intervention these prospects are not good:
In summary, then, before the advent of IVF, it would have been true to say of any
normal human embryo known to us that, unless it was deliberately interfered with, it
would most likely develop into a person. The process of IVF, however, leads to the
creation of embryos which cannot develop into a person unless there is some deliberate
human act (the transfer to the uterus) and which even then, in the best of circumstances,
will most likely not develop into a person. The upshot of all this is that IVF has reduced
the difference between what can be said about the embryo and what can be said about
the egg and sperm, considered jointly.5
Singer and Dawson add that the development of new reproductive technologies,
such as the activation of the ovum to produce a zygote without a sperm and the
micro-injection of particular sperm into particular ova, will mean that the entity or
entities to whom potential can be ascribed will be already determined. The
unfertilized ovum, alone or considered jointly with a particular sperm, will already
have a certain genetic potential.
It is clear that in the search for some morally relevant potential a number of
distinctions will have to be drawn. Perhaps we should start by distinguishing
between a potential X and a possible, or future X. My great great grandchild, who
does not yet exist, is not a potential, but a possible, or future person. Potential Xs,
which are currently Ys, are different from possible Xs, which are not currently
anything. This is a distinction not always reflected in claims made regarding our
duties with respect to future generations.6Without, of course, denying that we need
to bear in mind the future interests of future people, we should recognize the
difference between the potential of actual beings, and the possible existence, at some
future time, of future beings.
We are looking, then, at the relationship of existing entities to a (possibly
counterfactual) future. Potential clearly relates to some kind of possibility. This kind
would appear to be nomic or physical possibility, rather than mere logical possibility
of the kind which might permit, say, the turning of rocks into people. Physical
possibility is, as Edward Covey explains
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[...] normally analyzed in terms of nomic regularities, or the laws of nature; an event or
state of affairs is nomically possible just in case its coming about is in accordance with
the laws of nature, given the initial state of affairs which actually obtains in the world.7
The question now arises whether, within the realm of 'nomic' possibility, a
distinction should be drawn between remote and proximate possibility; that is to
say, between those end states which are directly, and those which are not directly
accessible from the original state. Covey discusses an argument of David Annis to
the effect that physical possibility is not transitive; that it does not follow, from the
fact that an unfertilized ovum is potentially a zygote, and a zygote potentially a
person, that the ovum is potentially a person.8
Covey, while he believes there is something in this distinction, finds it difficult to pin
down. For example, do we say that a teenager is a potential adult, but that a ten-
year-old is, though a potential teenager, only a remotely potential adult? Is
'remoteness' of potential simply a matter of degree, like geographical remoteness,
based on the continuity of the process of change, and the similarity of the individual
in the initial state to the individual in the end state? Covey comments:
I am not persuaded that there are potentialities which are genuinely remote in this sense
except where a possible change would entail a loss of identity. In such cases, the
potential end state would be metaphysically inaccessible to the initial individual. For
example, a cow is 'potentially' a collection of steaks and hamburgers, which, if eaten,
will become' a collection of human cells and excreted waste matter, but surely by the
time this transformation has taken place the cow would no longer exist. I would argue
that this is the case with the obvious examples of remote potential which I have
mentioned. Transitivity fails between the egg's possibility of becoming a zygote and the
zygote's becoming a person because by the time that the person has developed the egg
has been superseded (at some perhaps intermediate stage) by a subsequent individual.
Person and egg are not identical.9
Before returning to Covey, we will look at another treatment of potential; that of
Francis Wade.10 Wade begins by reminding us that potential refers to continuity:
continuity in being, becoming or doing. Sometimes this potential will be a passive
potential to submit to some outside influence, and (perhaps) to be changed into some
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other thing. Water, on Wade's view, would have the passive potential to be used for
making coffee. A brain would have the passive potential to be liquefied, if not
recycled (to return to Brody's example). An ovum has the passive potential to be
entered and activated by a sperm, and thus to be totally transformed. Active potency
or tendency, on the other hand, refers to the continuity between acting and not
acting - between what an individual does, and does not do, while remaining the
same individual. A plant, for example, has the active tendency to grow, as does the
early human organism. The sperm has the active tendency to fertilize the ovum;
though here its potential ends as it forfeits its identity. A being with active potential
does not simply undergo change, but itself initiates change in the appropriate
environment.
Wade distinguishes further between different types of active potential: 'natural' and
'specifiable' active potential. In the case of 'specifiable' active potential, such as that
of a child to learn geometry or (more questionably11) that of an animal to feed, some
action beyond the agent's constitution is required from the side of the agent for it to
act:
Between the child now and his being a geometrician there are a series of acts of
learning, which he may choose or refuse to perform, and which specify the quality of
being a geometrician [...] The situation is different, however, where there is question of
an active natural potentiality. Here there is not a matter of promise only but of
guarantee insofar as the agent is concerned. Agents may not control their environment
and, where they cannot, their actions may be restricted and even rendered ineffective by
surrounding circumstances. But they are made to act and will act to their full capacity
insofar as they can. Between natural potentialities and their action there is nothing
needed except usable matter and this latter is from the side of the patient, not the
agent.12
Wade goes so far as to claim that in the case of active, as opposed to passive,
potential it is the 'remote' potential which counts for most, since this is what controls
what the being will become:
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[...] there is a recognizable difference between remote and proximate potentialities. A
fetus has no proximate potentiality to see when it has no eyes and no light to see by. It
has at most a remote potentiality to vision. But do not read this 'at most' as being a
matter of lacking something. It has all it needs to build up in the dark eyes to seewith in
the light. Thus its remote potentiality is precisely the source of acquiring the proximate
potentiality (functioning eyes) to see with. [...] The remote tendency is the source of the
drive and the determiner of any of its specifications; and a proximate potentiality is
only a modification of the ever- present and active remote, fundamental potentiality.13
If we accept Wade's argument, we commit ourselves to the view that the most
important potential is (at least in one sense) the remote active potential which
grounds all later proximate potential. It must be remembered that an active tendency
must refer to a single individual; and, moreover, that active biological tendencies
must be those of a biological unit. The point is missed, for example, by Michael
Lockwood, who claims that
[...] to the extent that a fertilized human ovum in vitro has an active potential for
developing into a human person, so do the contents of the petri dish prior to
fertilization. Given that the sperm have an active potentiality, left to their own devices,
to fertilize the ova, it follows that the combined system comprising sperm and ova, in a
suitable medium, itself has an active potentiality for giving rise to a fertilized ovum.
And if x has an active potentiality for giving rise to y, and y has an active potentiality
for giving rise to z, then it must follow that x itself has an active potentiality for giving
rise to z.14
Active potentialities, referring as they do to the continuity between not doing and
doing, must each refer to one thing in a possible environment, not to a collection of
things acting to form a new thing. Singer and Kuhse also miss this point in their
answer to a paper by B.F. Scarlett, in which they compare the potential of the embryo
to the collective potential of sperm and ovum considered together.15 The active
potential of the early organism is the potential of one thing to initiate changes while
remaining what it is. An infant, for example, has the active potential to grow to
sexualmaturity. It does not have the active potential to be six of its future offspring.
One can, of course, deny that there is anything particularly significant in the
potential of one biological entity. Thus Michael Tooley argues that
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The distinction between active potentialities that reside in systems and those that inhere
in individuals appears arbitrary and without moral significance.16
On Tooley's view it would be just as sensible to treat as a moral unit a 'conception
machine' for uniting particular ova with particular spermatozoa, as it would be to
treat a new organism as a moral unit. In defence of his claim that it is not necessary
for a person to be biologically unified, he gives the example of a split brain, the two
sides of which are in different places and linked by radio control.17It may be argued,
as we have seen in previous chapters, that such a case is impossible, given our actual
constitution. If we do succeed in visualizing this case, we must imagine that a
unified something survives the split and link-up; a something which could not be a
human person. Perhaps subconsciously we are imagining some kind of simultaneous
possession by a single, 'ex-human' spirit. In contrast we are not even tempted to
regard as a moral unit Tooley's conception machine or his 'system consisting of a
woman together with a collection of spermatozoa'18 To propose such 'systems' as
moral units seems as bizarre as proposing a man and his vegetable garden. A plant, a
person and a spermatozoon have their own separate active tendencies, which are
involved both in their separate existence conditions, and in their very different
status. We should, moreover, give some consideration to the common assumption
that human persons have an interest in, and/or right to, their lives; i.e., their
continued existence as biological units.19 This could be so whatever the rights or
interests of any non-biological persons there might be, with regard to what for them
would count as continued existence (to use Tooley's phrase).20 After all, anyone who
believes that human persons are organisms will want to maintain that our right to
continued existence necessarily involves continued life.
We have focused so far on claims that potential, of some morally relevant kind, need
not be ascribed to a single biological unit. What of the suggestion that the
unfertilized ovum which is activated parthenogenetically (i.e., without a sperm) is
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continuous with the activated ovum, whose potential it shares? Singer and Dawson,
who argue for this view, concede that it might be objected that while the ovum prior
to activation might still be fertilized by a sperm, the activated ovum already has a
potential which is fixed, or limited, at least.21 Singer and Dawson compare the
potential of the unfertilized ovum to be any one of a number of persons, with the
potential of marble about to be carved to be, first any one of a number of statues, and
eventually, only one. For is not the potential to be carved into the actual statue
among those present from the beginning? And irrespective of whether some
potentialities are closed as the marble begins to be carved (or the ovum is activated)
is not one individual present throughout?
Yet surely the crucial difference lies in the fact that the potential of the block of
marble to be carved into a statue is a continuing passive potential of that block of
marble, which persists (though changing in size and shape) throughout the carving
process. The unfertilized ovum also has certain passive potentialities, such as the
potential to be fertilized by a sperm, as well as certain active potentialities, such as
those which prepare it for sperm entry. What the unfertilized, unactivated ovum
does not have is the active potential to develop as an organism. This is shown by the
fact that no development takes place until what composes the ovum is rearranged in
some way, either by fertilization or by some parthenogenetic agent. Since it is
precisely the active potential of the activated ovum which characterizes it as the
individual it is, it follows that the absence of this potential in the unactivated ovum
means that the two cannot be the same individual. The active potential by virtue of
which the new organism exists can only be ascribed to that organism as a whole;
constituted though this organism is of parts already to hand, some of which will
retain some potential of their own. And while the unactivated ovum has, as a whole,
the passive potential to be turned into a zygote, this is not a kind of passive potential
which is compatible with its survival.
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Thus the sense in which the potential of the unfertilized ovum is 'fixed' at
fertilization or activation is that this passive potential gives way to the active
potential of an actual living entity. The potential which is essential to the entity's
existence is, of course, established at its origin. Assuming a hardline position on the
necessity of origin, if we want to refer to the active potential of a particular organism,
rather than to the potential of any which may emerge, it will be necessary to refer to
the time, place, and specific gamete or gametes which produce it. Even the passive
potential of the unfertilized ovum to give rise to a particular individual will have to
be specified along these lines.
Jim Stone, in another analysis of potential, makes a distinction between what he
describes as 'weak' potential, and 'strong' or identity-preserving potential. Thus if A
is a 'strongly potential' B, then rather than merely providing (some of) the matter for
B and forming part of the causal chain which produces it, A will 'produce a B if A
develops normally and the B so produced will be such that it was once A."22 That
identity cannot be maintained through the process of normal fertilization is
undeniable, as Stone demonstrates:
[...] if the adult human being is identical to the sperm, it follows (by the indiscernibility
of identicals) that the animal which is now adult once fertilized an egg. This seems
plainly false, though it is true that this animal once had only a few cells and was
attached to the wall of a womb. Further, the sperm could have penetrated a different
egg producing another zygote. But then, if the sperm is identical to the zygote it in fact
produces (as it must be if it is to be identical to the adult the zygote produces), then (by
parity of reasoning) the sperm would have been identical to this other zygote too. It
follows (again by the indiscernibility of identicals) that the zygote the sperm actually
produces is the zygote the sperm would have produced if it had penetrated a different
egg. Plainly this is false. It follows that the sperm is not identical to the zygote it
produces; but then it is not identical to the adult human animal either. The same
reasoning applies to the egg.23
To the suggestion that the adult human being can be identified in the composite of
egg and sperm, existing in divided form prior to conception, Stone replies that this
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[...] leads to bizarre consequences. If the animal which becomes an adult human being
existed before conception in a divided form, then it would have existed if it had never
been conceived, for if a material thing exists at a time, it exists at that time no matter
what happens at a later time. Further, it follows that this animal would have existed if
the egg and sperm had found different partners. Given two sperms and two eggs we
have four human animals, only two of which can survive their initial stages. We are
committed to the absurdity that the planet sustains billions of additional animals, each
existing in a divided form from beginning to end, its cells having nothing to do with
each other ever, and each cell part of countless other animals of the same kind. Plainly
the human animal does not exist before conception: my body was once a fetus but never
a sperm or an egg.24
For different reasons, Stone and Quinn both disagree with the claim that
parthenogenesis would imply that an ovum prior to activation has 'strong'
potentiality. Stone's reasons will emerge in due course. Quinn's contention is that
Parthenogenesis, should it become possible, will be best conceived as a transformation
rather than a development of the ovum - the parthenogenetic agent being seen as
having the power to change the ovum's essential nature, to make of it a new organism
with a quite different teleology.25
To this suggestion Singer and Dawson reply that both the environment of the egg
and that of the embryo is essential. We cannot rely on the supposed fact that the
embryo, but not the egg, needs an external trigger:
[...] Quinn's suggestion does not succeed in marking a distinction between the egg and
the embryo. For the embryo also needs a specific environment if it is to develop; and if
the particular environment which leads to parthenogenesis is allowed to count as an
entity for the purposes of denying potential to the egg on its own outside that
environment, then the particular environment which leads to development of the
embryo must also be allowed to count as an entity, and we should deny potential to the
embryo on its own outside that environment.
One might try to defend Quinn's analysis by claiming that the embryo has an inherent
potential to develop into a person, whereas the egg needs an external trigger if it is to
develop. At first glance, this appears promising; but on closer scrutiny the promise
evaporates. Both the egg and the embryo have an internal genetic code which can, in the
right environment, lead to the development of a human being [... In both cases, on the
other hand, a great deal else does have to come from outside. In the case of the embryo
in the uterus, this includes all the nutrients needed for growth; and of course in the case
of the embryo in the laboratory, it also includes skilled human intervention to transfer
the embryo to a uterus. In the case of the egg, skilled human intervention would also be
required to induce parthenogenetic development. The difference seems to be one of
degree rather than of kind.26
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Covey, while he takes a different position from Singer and Dawson on the moral
significance of certain forms of potential, makes a similar point to theirs with regard
to the rational potential of foetuses and infants. Covey argues that rationality,
requiring as it does the choice of adults to nurture, is not a physically determined
disposition:
The concept of an infant or fetus as essentially a future person expresses a normative
judgement that the infant or fetus should become a person, since, after all, it is up to us
(rather than determined by nature) whether or not it becomes a person. This
dependence on human agency, in fact, is more than just a matter of whether or not we
intervene in a natural state or process; it is we who supply the telos of personhood[...]
The judgement that an infant is essentially the person whom it will become might well
express a moral judgement that it ought to become a person, but it cannot thereby also
form a ground for that judgement, on pain of circularity.27
Covey is quite prepared to entertain the possibility that a form of potential which
requires human intervention (whether by education or by a surgical procedure) may
give rise to moral duties. This could occur, he says, whether we found ourselves able
to turn infants or chimpanzees into rational beings (supposing it to be possible to
turn chimpanzees into rational beings). Covey claims that he has not found 'any
metaphysical basis for an ethical distinction between the (physically) possible and
the (physically) physically possible."28 However, he says,
Where a chain of as-yet-unactualized means is necessary for a possible end, there will
be questions as to how we should order the priorities of our planned efforts, and the
ethically allowable ordering of priorities may often negate a prima facie judgement that
a certain potential ought to be actualized [...] Just as remoteness of actual relationships
complicates the weighing and balancing and resolution of prima facie rights and duties,
so remoteness of potential would do the same. This, however, is a very different reason
for blocking remote rights of development than would be given by a true metaphysical
argument for inaccessibility of remote potentiality.29
The links between potential, fulfillment and moral choice will be looked at in more
detail in later chapters. Here we will only note, with regard to Covey's earlier claim,
that we should not be too strict in excluding from those forms of potential which in
some way define the human all reference to human choice. It does seem likely that
rational activity in immature humans presupposes much help on the part of their
elders. 'Feral children' who have grown up among animals do not appear to develop
rational abilities by themselves. If infants are not just potential persons, but persons,
the most that one can demand, in identifying them as persons, is that they have the
active potential to benefit from teaching (and in fact, I will argue that even this is too
much to ask of every person). The fact that human choice is needed for rational
development is compatible with the prior existence of some active potential,
characteristic of the species, to respond to it. Thus the fact that choice is involved in
the fathering of a child does not mean that a man might not have (or acquire through
surgery) a 'specifiable' active potential to father a child of the kind to which the
concept 'human male' refers.
We should note that the feet that some relevant choice or intervention is (as it
happens) impossible need not always preclude the existence of active potential. Thus
with regard to the question raised by Singer and Dawson, the fact that the late
embryo cannot be safely transferred to a woman's body does not mean that the
embryo has (unlike its contemporary inside the womb) no active developmental
tendencies. If there is an environment in which, without structural change, the
embryo would initiate some further development, then the embryo retains the active
potential for further development, whatever the practical impossibility of it reaching
such an environment. Development, after all, may be externally facilitated, but is
internally driven and directed. Only if human intervention is needed to change the
individual's actual structure, rather than (say) its temperature or surroundings
should we judge that this individual does not have the tendencies of the developing
human organism.
The possibility of freezing and implanting human embryos has caused a certain
amount of confusion. Kathleen Wilkes, for example, maintains that the frozen
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embryo, unlike the implanted embryo, has 'no natural development at all, although
it has a potential for one'.30 This is, Wilkes claims, because the potential of the frozen
embryo is two-staged, like that of handicapped infants who need operations. Wilkes
does not believe, however, that frozen embryos have the same status as handicapped
infants; for one thing because such embryos lack the 'psychological property' of
suffering from a handicap for which they need to be compensated. Wilkes in fact
regards being frozen as like not existing at all: this is not, she says, an 'actual', active
life.31
Yet an entity need not be acting to have an active tendency. Even active tendencies
constitutive of the organism can be indefinitely thwarted by a hostile environment.
The fact that frozen embryos may survive to continue their development would
apparently show that they were alive while frozen; retaining the constitution to
support the potential to act, should the environment ever permit this. If it were ever
possible to 'snap freeze' living adults, would their survival stand or fall on what they
were doing while frozen, or on the fact that skilled intervention might be required to
defrost hem? With adults as with embryos, survival would rather appear to depend
on the tendency to resume their activities in a certain environment.
The question now arises what are the activities, the tendencies for which are essential
for the existence of any organism. Norman Ford quotes E.S. Russell on the subject:
Primary characteristics of the living organism are then the directive, creative and
orderly nature of its activities in relation to maintenance, reproduction and
development, to the completion of the normal lifecycle; primary conditions of existence
are the preservation of structuro-functional wholeness or normality, and integral
adaptation to an environment (or series of environments) in which the particular needs
and requirements of the organism for the completion of its lifecycle be maintained.32
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Not every organism, of course, can reproduce itself; however every organism has the
active tendency to maintain itself through various changes and pressures. As Ford
explains:
An individual, granted a favourable environment and suitable nourishment, in virtue of
being alive, of its own power from within itself actively strives to be self- maintaining,
self-developing, and functioning for its own welfare [...] The individual's heterogeneous
quantitive parts share in its life by being organized and geared to contribute to the self-
maintenance, self-development, growth, repair, and well-being of the one complex
organism. All its parts, cells, structures, organization and activities are subordinated to
serve its common interests and goals of life, directed by its species- specific instructions
encoded in its plan of life.33
We will now turn to see when these conditions are met in the case of human
reproduction, and what other tendencies define our existence as persons.
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However, the suggestion that personhood may involve potential is sometimes
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University Press, 1980), pp.181-182:
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course of events" as is any given fetus now in its mother's womb. In that sense
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of a particular child already on its way [...] Doubts about the existence of a right
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ascribed to future generations.
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The Embryo
When does the human organism first come into existence? The most obvious answer
is, at fertilization. Can this be right, however - and when is fertilization? Unger
argues that fertilization, which he equates with sperm entry, is not a moment, but a
process:
the fertilization of the egg by the sperm is itself a gradual process, even if brief by
ordinary temporal measures [...] we have a spectrum of a trillion cases, a spectrum of
normal human conception. There is not present in any one of this spectrum's cases
anything of so much metaphysical significance that is not also present in the just earlier
case.1
It may be claimed further that fertilization should be seen as a process lasting
considerably longer than sperm entry. Buckle, Dawson and Singer suggest that life
may begin at syngamy, with the lining up of chromosomal pairs from the male and
female pronuclei, which have formed subsequent to sperm entry:
If the formation of a new genotype is the formation of a new biological individual (a
criterion which is at least plausible for creatures which reproduce sexually), then
syngamy is the appropriate landmark for creatures like us. But, as has been noted, other
views about the beginning of the new individual - for example, the genesis of the
embryo proper - are also possible.2
The authors stress that whatever is taken to be the beginning of life, this does not
settle the moral question of how we ought to treat 'fertilized, or near-fertilized
human cells'. They observe that
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Perhaps only with the benefit of a decade or two of hindsight will we know whether in
the end anything of moral significance really hangs on our determining the precise
beginning of a new human life?
The authors quote a statement from the St Vincent's Bioethics Centre, according to
which fertilization is indeed the point of departure:
when the two membranes [i.e., of sperm and ovum] open to one another and the
contents of the sperm are released into the ovum, the sperm loses its separate identity
and the ovum gains a capacity it did not have while simply an ovum; that of developing
as a human individual [...] The two cells (sperm and ovum) have become a single cell
containing many interacting components which by their interaction have the capacity
for organizing all the subsequent stages of human development.4
To this Buckle, Dawson and Singer object that, on the contrary, the sperm is not
absorbed into the egg on sperm entry, since the genetic material in the head of the
sperm remains intact, forming the male pronucleus:
[...] it is at least misleading, if not downright false, to say that when the membranes of
egg and sperm open to each other, the sperm ceases to be identifiable. Those who do
take the loss of identity of the sperm as an important criterion of when a new life begins
would be better advised to look towards syngamy, rather than the moment the sperm is
enveloped by the egg, asmarking this moment.5
The authors claim that
The fact that after sperm envelopment there is only one cell is not a sufficient reason for
thinking that there can no longer be two distinct entities. Siamese twins with separate
brains can be thought of as two distinct entities contained in a single body; they are
physically one single thing, but they are two distinct individuals nonetheless. It is not
clear why we should not think of the 'male' pronucleus within the pre-syngamy cell in
this way. Why should we not regard the male pronucleus as a distinct entity, albeit
wholly contained within another cell?6
In whatever ways the pre-syngamy cell is unified, it is not, the authors claim,
genetically unified.7 Genetically speaking, the cell is 'still in the process of becoming
unified (and so cannot yet function as an individual)'.
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Notwithstanding the arguments just outlined, there are various objections to
syngamy as a starting point for the organism. An initial problem lies in the fact that
syngamy takes two hours. Is it possible to date the appearance of a new biological
unit, characterized (we're assuming) by new active tendencies, from, say, the last
pairing-up of chromosomes which were present throughout? Moreover, it seems
quite possible to claim that, genetically speaking, the recently fertilized ovum has
two genetically active parts: the male and female pronuclei. That these are parts
seems likely in view of the fact that their co-ordinated action, within the one cell
wall, is directing later developments which we will certainly have to ascribe to the
zygote itself. The two pronuclei work within one cell for a common end, at least
some aspects of which are already determined. In the case of Siamese twins, in
contrast, two brains - two separate control centres - give directions many of which
relate to physical parts not shared by the twins (for example, their separate faces).8
Within the fertilized ovum the two pronuclei engage in complementary activity
specifically directed at the ultimate development of the cell in which they are
located. The genetic codes which are read from each pronucleus result in the
production of RNA and proteins destined to be mingled within the cell. While it is
not until some time after syngamy, i.e., at the four- to eight- cell stage, that the
embryo begins to express its own genome, it would appear that the single cell directs
its own development while it is still controlled by the messenger RNA, which,
though derived from the ovum, is activated by fertilization. The very development
of the two pronuclei is a sign that the ovum is working in new ways as a unified
whole.
Moreover, whether or not a new biological unit comes into being at fertilization, it
will not be possible to claim that the sperm itself remains identifiable after entering
the ovum. For during sperm entry the sperm is broken up, not simply enveloped by
the ovum. The sperm head and tail, in entering the cytoplasm, leave the membrane
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behind to be absorbed in due course, as the tail is also absorbed while the male
pronucleus forms from the head. The sperm cannot be identified with its contents.
Even should we want to deny that the contents of the sperm turn at once into parts
of a new living entity, we must allow for the appearance of at least some new
entities: the inside of the sperm, and subsequently the male pronucleus which is
formed from the sperm head. But in fact not only the breakup of the sperm but the
activity of the ovum give us reason to think that the sperm head, from being part of
the sperm, has become part of a new living unit.
If this kind of weight is attached to the break-up of the sperm, then it seems that
there may be a critical moment of discontinuity during the process of sperm entry.
This will be when the contents of the sperm have passed right into the cytoplasm,
and have separated entirely from the membrane of the sperm, which remains
embedded in what is now the membrane of the fertilized ovum. We should follow
our normal practice of singling out a new entity when some piece of the old is
spatially disconnected from its sizeable - and qualitatively different - parent. The
fertilized ovum is spatially more continuous with the ovum prior to fertilization.
However, here also we must take account of the remarkable qualitative change
which comes with fertilization.
There are, of course, arguments for placing the appearance of the organism itself
considerably later than syngamy. Norman Ford, for example, accepts that a new
individual is present from fertilization, which he dates from syngamy:
The unicellular zygote has many heterogeneous parts but it is not an aggregate of
distinct parts as though each part existed separately resulting in the formation of an
aggregate or artificial unity. Notwithstanding dependence on the mother for survival, it
shows all the signs of a single living individual since its activities are all directed from
within in an orderly fashion for its self- maintenance. [...] it harnesses the energies of
atoms and molecules in determinate structures for its own life- processes, self-
development, and well being [...]9
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Nonetheless, Ford argues on various grounds that we do not have here an entity
continuous with the later human person. For one thing, the zygote splits into two,
which one person cannot survive. And can we claim that a group of cells dividing
within the zona pellucida is a single organism? And can we claim that the group of
cells is continuous with the body of the 14-day embryo, if sites have not yet been
marked out for parts of this body, and if cells are still 'totipotent'; i.e., can each be
used to produce the whole foetus, together with the accessory tissues, such as the
placenta?
Ford describes the zona pellucida as a 'temporary external protector'10, while
admitting that it 'gives the appearance of a single organism and unity to 8 distinct
individual cells together.'11 Ford's view of the zona pellucida is, however, open to
question. It must be remembered that the zona pellucida began as part of the
unfertilized ovum, subsequently forming part of the zygote. If it is similarly taken to
constitute part of the multi-cell embryo, after first cell cleavage, then the
cohesiveness of the mass of cells within the zona pellucida can be taken to signify the
presence of a single organism. For example, the 8-cell embryo would appear to meet
Eli Hirsch's criteria for existence as a unit of some kind: spatial connectedness and
dynamic cohesiveness, 'in the sense that its parts tend to remain together under
various pressures'.12
With regard to the unified functioning of the early embryo, Ford suggests that the
cells only gradually come to work together in harmony, as what he describes as their
internal 'clock' mechanisms become synchronized with each other.13 Yet Ford
himself refers to the opinion of embryologists who, he tells us
[...] suggest that the timing of early differentiation at the blastocyst stage is governed by
some 'clock' mechanism inbuilt into the DNA of the chromosomes of each cell of the
embryo. It seems to be set from the time of fertilization, with each cell's 'clock' running
-81-
in dependence on, and in co-ordination with, what is happening in its surrounding
cells.14
If this is so, Germain Grisez is surely right in objecting that
[...] The cells and tissues do not need to have their 'clock' mechanisms synchronized and
triggered, because they always are working together harmoniously, which is to be
expected if they are, not a mass of distinct individuals, but integral parts of one
developing individual.15
However, Ford has other arguments on which he lays more weight. What of his
claim that the 'embryo proper' must have a human shape, a front and a back, a left
and a right, to maintain the necessary bodily continuity with the later organism? For
the early cells are 'totipotent' and their progeny could form any part of the 'embryo
proper', the accessory tissues (the umbilical cord, the placenta) or even another
embryo, as in the case of chimeras:
The unity of the individual human organism would imply a characteristic minimal
specific heterogeneity of quantitive parts arranged to provide determinate sites for the
co-ordinated development of structures, tissues and organs along a primordial body
axis [...] We are not dealing with arbitrary requirements: they are determined by the
concept of person we all employ. This concept, in its turn, is based on our direct
experience and ordinary understanding of individual human persons, complemented
by reflection on this original experience in the light of metaphysical principles.16
Earlier Ford had asked in relation to chimeras:
If several cells from different sheep or mouse embryos can combine to produce a single
lamb or mouse, could it not very well be that several cells derived from the same
fertilized ovum could likewise form a single sheep or mouse in the natural situation?17
Yet surely what a cell might form if separated from its neighbours and joined to a
foreign body does not affect what it is forming now. The potential of a cell to be
separated off by a scientist and combined with cells from a different embryo can
hardly be described as an active potential of the cell during its period as part of the
original embryo. After separation, as we shall see, the cell may acquire some striking
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new potential of its own. Yet before separation - like any cell subsequently shed - it is
simply part of the original organism.
What of the objection that the parts of the embryo would have to be
spatiotemporally continuous with those of the later organism: back with back, spine
with spine, and so on? How can the early embryo be continuous with the late
embryo, when we do not know which parts of it are going to form the 'embryo
proper' and which the accessory tissues; which end is front and which is back? Can it
be true that we are 'in there somewhere' if, for example, we cannot tell from where
the spine is going to appear, within the mass of dividing cells?
Alan Holland 18 looks at this question at some length, in attempting to determine
when we originate as human beings (which he takes to be what we essentially are).
Holland points out that we are prepared to countenance significant variations both
of bulk and of form under certain biological covering concepts; that in biology we do
not require that the immature organism have the same structure as the mature: that
lepidopterans, for example, have the same structure when they are caterpillars as
they have when they are butterflies. It is true that before cell differentiation we
cannot trace ourselves, or parts of ourselves, in any part of the organism.
However, can we not trace ourselves in the whole of it? And as to the claim that
some cell progeny are destined, not simply to be shed, but to become a structure
which forms no part of the future individual, Holland argues that this description
[...] does seem to beg the question [...] with respect to the fetal human: we have not yet
agreed to count only the miniaturised adult form, shorn of placenta, umbilical cord, etc.
as the future individual.19
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Holland's point seems reasonable enough. After all, the placenta and umbilical cord
are used to nourish the foetus; we have no reason not to regard them as parts of the
early organism, discarded at birth, as the milk teeth are discarded later. The
accessory tissues are not invariably of the same genetic type as the 'embryo proper' -
but then, as we have seen, the embryo proper can also be composed of different
genetic contributions. And while it is true that the placenta may be shared by twins,
this is also true of various other organs, whichmay be shared by Siamese twins.20
Cell differentiation, like the formation of the 'primitive streak' and, later, the brain, is
produced through the active tendencies of an entity which appears, at least, to be
continuous with the later organism. There is, in fact, every sign of continuity of
organization; perhaps even, as some would argue, of a continuing, active human
'life-principle', or soul. Ford himself, a Roman Catholic theologian, explicitly dates
our appearance from the appearance of the soul, claiming further that 'one either is
or is not a human being. There can be no place for a 'no man's land' in this case."21
Ford seems, however, to feel some tension between this belief and the belief that
changes of structure and organization gradually occur before the human individual
is present, or fully present. Thus he claims elsewhere that
There is no evidence to suggest that all of a sudden, as though by magic, individual
cells become a human individual [...] A determinate, actual human individual gradually
emerges and develops from what is potentially human and indeterminate in relation to
its ultimate fate.22
Ford needs, in fact, an explanation of early development, since in the case of later
development he has in mind an extremely close relationship between body and 'life-
principle':
The dual principles of spiritual soul (form) and matter, or more simply mind and body,
are introduced to explain adequately the unity and functioning of the human person,
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understood as a primitive and underived datum of our experience. They do not pre¬
exist the human person, as though they come together to form the human being. They
begin to exist as constitutive co-principles of a person only when the ontological
individual human being is actually present. It is difficult to see how this could be so
before the actual formation of a truly multicellular individual living body. Its specific
heterogeneous quantitative parts would be needed for the activities required for orderly
self-development, self-maintenance, self-differentiation and growth. It would also be
necessaiy that its life-cycle proceed within the same continuing ontological
individual.23
Ford would appear to be saying that the human individual, if it exists at all, must
exist by virtue of its soul. The living body cannot be thought of in isolation from the
soul, which makes it alive, and which comes into being simultaneously with what it
animates. Ford's problem is in showing that no individual is present during the
period of nonetheless well- integrated development between the zygote and the
individual he believes is somehow gradually formed around the stage of the
primitive streak.
Different problems are faced by those who hold that, from fertilization to
'hominization', there exists a series of individuals, each with its own separate soul.
One who holds this view is Joseph Donceel,24 who attempts to revive the theory of
Aquinas, derived from that of Aristotle, according to which the matter present in
early development has two successive souls or 'forms' before reaching the point at
which it is sufficiently structured to receive a personal soul.
Donceel accepts that the soul is, in the words of the Council of Vienne, the 'form' of
the body; but claims that the form exists in the body like the shape in a statue,25 and
that therefore the embryonic body cannot have a personal soul. Not until the brain
and sense organs develop can a personal soul come into existence.26 For Donceel the
personal soul is thus the conclusion of, rather than the principle behind, early human
development. Donceel rejects the suggestion that the personal soul might itself form
the body of the embryo, since he claims that this is incompatible with the
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psychophysical unity of human persons. For if one entity could be said to produce
another, would they not be separate entities?27
Donceel is concerned to allow for the unity of the human person. However, one
could argue that unity would be better preserved on the assumption that soul and
body come into existence together, rather than either the soul pre-existing and
creating the body, or the soul appearing in a body which has already developed,
having passed in and out of two transitory 'forms'. In fact we have no reason at all to
believe in three substantial changes, on three separate occasions; any more than we
have reason to believe in any external addition to the organism, other than nutrition.
Everything we know about the zygote suggests that it already has both the
information it needs for further development, and the active tendency to use it. For
unlike Aristotle and Aquinas, we know that the embryo's development is directed
not, as they thought, by the active power of the semen, but rather by its own.
We should remember that not only animals, but even plants, were thought by
Aristotle to have souls28 - as indeed they do have their own distinctive principles of
organization, if this is what Aristotle meant. Whether or not we want to speak of
souls in the case of humans, it is certainly true that humans have active tendencies to
self-organization and self-development in virtue of which we are the kind of entity
we are. The nature of the zygote depends on its active tendencies; and in particular,
since the zygote is the organism at its earliest stage, on the kind of body it has the
active tendency to form.
Here, however, a difficulty arises in relation to identical twinning. For if the zygote's
constitution is defined by its potential to produce some later type of body, then what
are we to say if the zygote (or later embryo) has the potential to produce not one but
two of this type of body? Can it be identified with both? Twinning may occur so
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early that any potential, for example, to differentiate cells along a certain pattern will
be carried out by two and not by one. We have no reason to identify the original
individual with one twin rather than its sibling. Are we, then, to suppose that this
individual dies in giving rise to two descendants?
Both Ford and Stone maintain that not merely twinning, but normal first cleavage
involves a loss of identity, so that the zygote is not continuous even with the two-cell
embryo. For, as Stone argues, one cannot become two; no individual can survive
division into duplicates.29 Neither, Stone believes, can we say that the zygote is
merely constituted by the cell which fissions, so that the cell splits, but not the
zygote.30 For if a statue is constituted by a lump of bronze, then if the lump of bronze
fissions, so does the statue.
What Stone does not consider is that in the case of normal cleavage we could say that
in reality it is neither the zygote itself which divides, nor the material which
constitutes the zygote. Rather, a part of the zygote splits within a different part - the
zona pellucida - producing two new parts which divide in their turn, working
together as constituents of one organism. In contrast in the case of twinning the
resulting cells are separated, so that each begins to develop along its own path,
continuity having been broken. If this were not the case, it would not be possible to
distinguish between normal cleavage and the appearance of twins at the two-cell
stage. In such a case of twinning the original individual passes out of existence,
giving rise at the time of separation of the resulting cells to genetically identical
offspring. Ford appears to be claiming at one point that all zygotes have the 'natural
active potential"31 to twin. However, this cannot be the case; if it were, all zygotes
would twin unless prevented from doing so. The fact that all zygotes could be made
to twin by researchers does not show they have the active tendency to twin, any
more than a normal cell marked out to be cloned has the active tendency to develop
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on its own. In the same way worms can be cut in half, thus giving rise to new
worms, without this demonstrating that they have the active potential to divide (or
that they are not individuals before they do).
The cause of identical, or monozygotic twinning is, Ford says, unknown. Some
research indicates that the propensity to identical twinning may be inherited through
the maternal line.32 However, this would not, according to Ford, account for the
majority of cases of monozygotic twinning. Moreover, it would seem that even the
inherited propensity to twin would not necessarily mean that the embryo was
predetermined to twin, genetically or in some other way.33 Rather, it could simply
mean that the structure of some embryos is weak and therefore liable to fission.
If we do assume that the embryo which twins did not begin life with the active
tendency to do so, will it always be the case that twinning results from the
destruction of the original embryo? This will depend on whether the embryo divides
symmetrically or asymmetrically. If one cell is removed from a multi-cell embryo, as
in embryo biopsy, it would appear that a new individual has been generated without
sufficient disruption to entail the death of the old. In the same way, if a cell of mine
could be taken and cloned, this would not mean that in losing this part ofmy body I
ceased to exist, nor that prior to cloning I was more than one person. In the case of
symmetrical twinning, however, there is radical disruption of the organism, such
that neither resulting individual can be spatiotemporally continuous with that
original organism. Now the case is more like one in which I am split into all my
component cells, each one of which is then cloned.34
Yet there remain some puzzling questions with regard to what would count as an
active inherent tendency to twin.35 For we can imagine an embryo with some
acquired or inherited weakness such that in some environments it would certainly
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twin, and in others it would not. The nature of the embryo could not be made to
depend on which environment it was in at the time. It would seem that a mere
inherent susceptibility to external pressures is not enough to constitute an active
tendency, though if there is no environment in which twinning could be prevented,
the individual would certainly lack the critical tendency to produce a single line of
development. If, on the other hand, twinning in response to a certain environment
were part of some internal programme, then we would have to postulate the
existence not of a real human organism or person, but of (to use Quinn's suggested
term36) a 'proto-organism'. The proto-organism we could think of as lasting until
such time as the programme was carried out, or alternatively, until such time as the
programme, having been thwarted, could no longer be carried out, at which point
the proto-organism would acquire the tendencies of the normal organism or person.
It is, however, awkward to postulate the existence of such an entity, which would
have various things in common with the normal organism; moreover we need not
imagine that any such entity exists, unless it is found that some apparent embryos do
in fact have the active tendency to twin.
Agneta Sutton has suggested that if the fertilized ovum has the active tendency to
twin, then it consists in reality of two individuals, temporarily occupying the same
space.37 This is not, however, an easy position to defend - for can two of the same
kind of being occupy one place simultaneously? To assume that something like this
could happen in our own case would commit us to a distinctly dualistic view of
persons. For since the same piece of space-time would be 'occupied' by each person,
the two would originally be physically indistinguishable. And if the proposal is that
the two be distinguished by their separate souls or life-principles, the question arises
how one body could be structured according to two separate life-principles. We
would have to imagine two life-principles which somehow work in unison,38 before
moving on to animate what are certainly two new bodies (one body cannot split
-89-
symmetrically and survive). Nor can the resulting twins be thought to share one
initial history, since this would be a violation of the transitivity of identity.39 The
twins, not identical with each other, cannot both be identical with something else.
Moreover, if the split could in fact be prevented until a stage in development at
which it was no longer possible, would this mean that one of the persons had been
destroyed, or would we still have to say that there were two persons present from
fertilization, never to be physically distinguishable?
One is reminded of 'perduring' theorists such as Noonan who, having accepted the
possibility of fission, claim that two persons - two space-time worms - are present
both before the split, and after.40 Just one of the challenges of holding such a position
is that of describing the extent to which the interests present before the split can be
said to be fulfilled after the split has taken place, in view of the different fates which
the two persons might undergo. If one person will have a happy, and the other an
unhappy life, then two conflicting prognoses must somehow co-exist with respect to
an early person-stage involving the original body. In the same way, if twins co-exist
before they divide, the prognosis of what would certainly appear to be one embryo
would have to be somehow divided to take into consideration the future lives of
both twins.
I am arguing that embryos who twin do not come into being with the active
tendency to do so. If, however, what appeared to be an embryo were found to have
this tendency after some intervention, the implications of this would depend on
what active tendency, to produce what level of development, is acquired for the
presence of the human person or organism. We will be looking further at this below.
In the meantime we should note that the phenomenon of identical twinning
indicates that it is not, as is sometimes claimed, the genome itself which is the
unique, essential constituent of the person. Nor can this even be said of an instance
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of a genome; say, that of one of a pair of identical twins. For it seems highly
counterintuitive that any alteration to the genome, however limited in scope, would
bring about the destruction of the original individual, and the generation of a new
one. Even a major alteration to the genome would not necessarily entail the
destruction of the original individual, if there continued a living being who, however
abnormal, retained certain human tendencies. For example, it can happen that an
ovum is fertilized by more than one sperm, so that the embryo includes, at least for a
time, extra genetic material. This material may be subsequently rejected, so that the
organism returns to a number of chromosomes closer to the normal 46. However,
'triploid' embryos with 69 chromosomes may survive to birth and beyond,41
although they will be seriously handicapped. On the entry of the first sperm, certain
tendencies are established with regard to later development, and these are not
necessarily lost on the entry of the second sperm, though development may be
abnormal in many ways.
What would be a genetic aberration of a kind incompatible with the existence of a
human person? It would seem that we can distinguish between human offspring,
and what are no more than human products. Examples of the latter are hydatiforms
moles, formed with no maternal genetic contribution and producing only placental
tissue, and also teratomas, which may grow like cancers using cells of a live or dead
embryo, in which case they produce a jumble of disorganized tissues (teeth, skin,
and so on.)42 Both these entities are genetically unique and, in a sense, alive and
self-directing; neither, however, is human offspring.Why is this?
Some would say that the defining characteristic they lack is rational potential; that is,
in the context of early development, the tendency to develop a body with rational
abilities. Grisez argues for this position,43 maintaining that the embryonic person
must have the epigenetic primordia for a body capable of a rational act. Grisez points
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out that later abilities stem from what is normally present from fertilization onwards,
and that if one precursor of rationality, such as the foetal or infant brain, can suffice
for the presence of a person in the absence of current rationality, then there seems no
reason why an earlier precursor in the embryo should not also be sufficient. Grisez
does, however, maintain that a human person must have, or must have had at some
stage, rational tendencies.
It does seem true that most, if not all, early humans have the active tendency to
develop rational abilities, on being nurtured by older humans. It is also clear that this
tendency stems in some way from their constitution. In the words of Iglesias:
What things can do and how they appear is a manifestation of what they are [...] The
inseparability of what a thing is and its capacities is particularly manifested in its
organic continuity, in its being always the same organism. The development of personal
abilities (self-awareness, choice, creativity) does not come about independently of our
organic development. There are no bases in reality to affirm that those capacities are
'something added' (by miracle?) at any particular stage I...]44
Certainly, there seems no reason to separate the acquisition of mental abilities from
the original tendencies of the healthy organism. And in a sense a thing cannot be
separated from its tendencies, in that these cannot exist without their subject.
However, many subjects can, of course, exist without some tendencies typical of the
kind of thing they are. There are tendencies which the human organism could lose,
or not have had, without in any way forfeiting its existence.
It is possible, though not certain, that not all members of the human species have
rational tendencies, at any stage of their lives. As yet it is not clear what causes
anencephaly; the condition due to which infants are born with a working brainstem
but with a badly disorganised upper brain. Recent research indicates that rather than
anencephaly resulting, as was previously believed, from the failure of the embryo to
form a neural tube, it may rather result from the disruption of the neural tube some
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time after its formation.45 However, it may still be the case that anencephalics never
had the epigenetic primordia for a body with rational abilities, whether or not they
once had the primordia for a greater degree of organisation in the upper brain than
they have by the time they are born.46 If this is so, should we regard anencephalics as
mere human products, like hydatiform moles? Should we conclude that the
anencephalic, although it has a living body organized in many ways along familiar
lines, is nevertheless not a human person?
To return for a moment to the hydatiform mole, it is clear that such an entity can be
no more a person than a laboratory culture of skin cells can be a person. One
indication of this is that it seems odd to say that a hydatiform mole, any more than a
culture of skin cells, ought to develop a working brain. A hydatiform mole, as a
normal hydatiform mole, could not be expected to develop any such thing. In
contrast, the anencephalic baby, though sharing its features with other such babies,
is not a normal, or healthy baby. We have some idea of what the anencephalic is
missing; we are able to say what tendencies ought to be there, and are not. Moreover,
we are able to say what tendencies ought to be there by referring to tendencies which
are there. A severely damaged embryo, foetus or infant may retain the active
tendency to develop and maintain many recognizably human features.
Stone argues that to speak of normal development for an organism is to presuppose
that there is, for that organism, 'a developmental path determined primarily by the
biological natures of members of the kind to which the entity belongs, a path which
leads to their adult stage'.47 Of course, the actual path of an anencephalic infant,
assuming such an infant will in fact die in infancy, does not, in the most
straightforward sense, lead to the adult stage - although this is the stage appropriate
to the kind to which the infant belongs. In what sense could we say, nonetheless, that
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the anencephalic's constitution is sufficient to be 'the primary determinant' of a
developmental path which leads to the adult stage?
It is reasonable to suppose that there are potentialities in the anencephalic baby, such
as the potential to develop an adult body, which are simply blocked by some internal
weakness (for example, a weakness in the cardiovascular and respiratory systems48).
The adult stage is not only appropriate to the kind to which the infant belongs, but
would have been achieved by active elements in the infant, were it not for other
elements which are blocking such activity. Should it ever be possible to prolong the
lives of anencephalic infants to adulthood, we will say that this blocked potential has
been freed. We should distinguish between the active tendency of all humans to
maintain themselves and adapt to their surroundings, the blocked tendency of the
abnormal human to progress to adulthood, and the missing tendency to develop
rationality, which may always have been missing in, for example, anencephalics.
To be alive, a human must have the active tendency to maintain and adjust its
activities for its own welfare and, in the case of the early human, to progress some
distance along a human developmental path. The active tendency to differentiate its
cells would appear at least a necessary condition for early human existence. Stone
would appear to be right in claiming that
If a zygote's genetic code is so damaged that it would have to be substantially created
before it could be the primary determinant of a developmental path, the zygote is, as
Aristotle might have put it, a zygote in name alone, and talk of its normal or abnormal
development is idle.4®
If, on the other hand, cells will be differentiated to form, e.g. head, trunk, etc.,
arranged as parts of one body, then the fertilized ovum would appear to be a human,
at the earliest point of its developmental path. Difficult questions arise, however, in
the case of genetic manipulation.50 Transgenic animals can be produced which
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involve human genes. This is, in itself, unproblematic; a mouse with a human
growth hormone is a (somewhat abnormal) mouse. In the same way, a human who
was given the gene of a mouse would be an abnormal human. But what if many
mouse genes were inserted in the human genome? Or what if a chimera were
produced using human and animal cells? Researchers have already produced what
may be human-hamster hybrids, although these do not live for long.51 How much
foreign input would be too much foreign input, at or after the creation of an embryo,
so that a human organism would either cease to exist, or would not have existed in
the first place?
It is not difficult to describe even an abnormal embryo as a real human organism if it
retains the active tendency to differentiate its cells according to a human pattern.
Such an embryo would be directing its own maintenance and development along the
same lines as other early humans. What, however, do we say in the case of rival
genetic input? What if an entity could be produced which had the active tendency to
produce a head, brain and trunk resembling those of a hamster, although the limbs
would resemble those of a human? Whatever the tendencies of such a hybrid entity,
we could not, surely, say that it had the tendencies of a human. Rather, its genome
would be so radically different that we could not properly refer to either human or
hamster tendencies as being either present or missing. The entity would have to be
viewed as a new type of organism - with a 'normal development' specific to itself.
In sorting out these somewhat hypothetical cases, we will have to decide what part
of the mature human body would necessarily indicate the presence of a human. The
obvious candidate is, of course, the human brain, which is necessary both for life
itself as the mature 'organizer', and for rationality in the case of humans who have
reached the age at which they can begin to develop rational abilities. A human brain,
even a damaged human brain, found to be present in an unusually furry neonate,
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would surely give us good reason to treat him or her with respect, whatever his or
her other distinguishing features. Similarly, the tendency to form a human brain
could be seen as an indication that it was a human organism which was replacing
and differentiating its cells, albeit under some distorting influence. If instead there
was present the active tendency to produce a non-human brain, this could be taken
as indicating that the organism was not human. If there were present active
tendencies to produce some later body, but neither an animal nor a human active
tendency to produce a brain, the question would arise whether there might be
nonetheless a blocked tendency to produce some kind of brain.52 If experimentation
were able to free the tendency to produce either a non-human-, or a human-type
brain, then this would count as proof that the entity was either, say, a severely
mutilated hamster, a non- human hybrid, or a severely mutilated human. We are
assuming that the organism cannot have two 'life-principles'; that no non-human
organism could have, together with its active tendencies, the 'freeable' capacity to
produce a human brain. Thus if the capacity to produce a human brain were
blocked, for example by the lack of a hormone produced elsewhere in the embryo,
the freeable capacity, and hence the human person, would nonetheless survive. It
should be noted that the primordium for the brainstem would be sufficient - just as a
brainstem is sufficient in the case of the anencephalic for survival as a living, self-
organizing body.
The active tendency to produce the mature organized body, and at least the blocked
tendency to produce the human brain are, I would argue, essential for the existence
of an early human person. Why should the brain be so important? It is because a
body which has a human brain, or which has the active or blocked tendency to
produce a human brain, is clearly the kind of body which ought to develop rational
abilities, at the appropriate stage of its life. A being with a human brain, or the
tendency to produce one, is a rational kind of being.
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In the next chapter we will be looking further at rational kinds of being, and at some
reasons for thinking that the class of human persons includes both normal and
abnormal members of our kind. We will end this chapter with a final assessment of
the human embryo, and of the plausibility of its claim to be a person.
It does seem as if our reluctance to admit the claim of the embryo may be grounded
above all in the embryo's wildly unfamiliar appearance.53 We have seen the
implausibilities of various other suggestions for our time of origin as persons; the
irrelevance both of our actual thoughts and experiences, and of the immediate
capacity for these which is developed, at some negotiable time, by a being already in
existence. Yet we are left with a candidate for personhood who bears little outward
resemblance to ourselves as we are now. Can it be true that a entity which seems so
unlike us belongs to the same category as the best of adult exemplars; is, in fact, that
very adult exemplar at the beginning of his life?
Embryos are, in fact, quite unfamiliar to most of us. It is not, however, familiarity
which should decide the question.54 For arguments from the 'inhuman' appearance
of the embryo must assume the point at issue: that this is not what human persons
do in fact look like at an early stage of their lives.55 We do, no doubt, begin the search
for our personal origin with a picture of the paradigmatic human person; someone
with eyes, face, limbs, and so on; someone of our own age and appearance. The
search did not, however, concern these features in themselves, which were not
assumed to be essential, but rather, what might be found to underlie them and
others, maintaining continuous existence. There was every possibility that an
imagined substance sortal, 'being-with-arms-legs-thoughts- etc.', was in reality a
phase sortal all along, while the real substance sortal was more hospitable than we
thought. Wiggins rightly criticizes the
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[...] conceptual conservatism into which no philosophical inquiry into substance should
find itself forced, viz. the supposition that one can tell a priori, for any given sortal, e.g.
the sortal tadpole or pupa, whether or not it is a substance-sortal or merely a phased
sortal. Room must be found for the empirical and surprising discoveiy that there is
something which is first a tadpole and then a frog [...J56
We are to remember that natural kinds are defined not by outward appearance, but
by underlying structures and activities:
[...] The determination of a natural kind stands or falls with the existence of lawlike
principles, known or unknown, that will collect together its actual extension around an
arbitrary good representative of the extension. For the name to stand for a natural kind,
everything depends on whether there is some nomological grounding for what it is to
be one of the kind. If there is, and if the predicate is worthy to survive as a natural kind
term, then the holding of the relevant principles is nothing less than constitutive of its
exemplification by its instances. To be something of that kind is to exemplify the
distinctive mode of activity that they determine.57
Later again, Wiggins renews his insistence that the essences of natural kinds are
indispensable for individuation:
Essences of natural things, as we have them here, are not fancified vacuities parading in
the shadow of familiar things as the ultimate explanation of everything that happens in
the world. They are natures whose possession by their owners is the very precondition
of their owners being divided from the rest of the reality as anything at all.5®
If Wiggins is right, then biological features of the kind we have examined in this
chapter may well be what is essential to our existence as persons, however far
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would not be the case if it were a new pair of individuals who were subsequently
able to develop human brains. The development of the brain would take place
when twinning was no longer possible, so that if a fertilized ovum had the active
tendency to twin, it could not be a human organism or person.
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See John Kleinig, 'Persons, Lines, and Shadows', Ethics 100 (October 1989), p.113:
'Our inability to identify with a zygote [...] may show a lack of imagination as
much as any morally significant difference. Were fertilization to be registered by
a transformation of the conceptus into a being having a minute human-like
morphe, we would find this differentiation much more difficult to make.'
Stephen Schwarz makes the point that the unfamiliar appearance of the embryo
is a characteristic not of the embryo but of the adult observer, and moreover that
the extent to which the embryo looks unfamiliar can be expected to change as
techniques for viewing the embryo become more widespread and better
developed. (Stephen Schwarz, The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1990, p. 50.)
Anthony Fisher, IVF: The Critical Issues (Melbourne: Collins Dove, 1989), p. 138.






We began our search for the origin of persons by assuming we were
persons ourselves, at least at the time of making the inquiry. We
are now in a position to see ourselves in a wider context. As
animals, we form a reproductive community; we are members of one
class of being. What is this class of being?
We have seen that human provenance is not sufficient to establish
membership of humankind. It is not quite true to say, as does
Holland, that:
[. . . ] 11 remains a contingent fact that an individual member of a
species has the characteristics which it has. Individuals are
human not by virtue of their intrinsic properties but by virtue of
their extrinsic relations with each other. The criterion of origin
rules.
We can agree with Holland that provenance is necessary; that humans
are characterized by their historical links both with other humans
and with pre-human primates. That is, not only do individual
humans necessarily have the ancestors they do, but any human we
imagine must have a similar ancestry, just as any dog must have an
10*
ancestry involving dogs and, ultimately, wolves. A dog lookalike
with a totally different ancestry, or a synthetic, but animated
"dog" (if there could be such a thing) would be a different kind of
thing from the dogs we know. However, in identifying an animal of
a certain kind we must look not only at provenance, but at
constitution. Persons do not only give rise to other persons;
they also give rise to teratomas. Not every product of
reproductive cells is remotely plausible as human offspring.
There seems little doubt that rationality must be in some way
central to the concept of either a human or a non-human class of
persons. On discovering that extraterrestrials engage in rational
behaviour, the ethical space-traveller will change his plans for
research. As Rosalind Hursthouse points out , our views on non-
rational Martians will presumably correspond with our views on non-
rational humans. If we believe, for example, that we have a strong
obligation to enable and/or permit the non-rational to attain what
we see as their rational fulfillment, then it seems that the
biological group we refer to in this moral context is that of
rat ional-iyjie humans (or Martians or whatever).
How do we single out the group for which rationality is "normal"?
The more bizarre suggestions can be quickly rejected. However many
primates or biped mammals are rational, it is not normal for
primates or biped mammals to be rational, only for a certain type
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of primate or biped mammal. Again, we cannot treat infants, the
insane or the mentally handicapped, as members of their own
separate biological class. In the case of infants, this would
clearly be flying in the face of overwhelming evidence for
continuous human development. Nor can I declare my mental (or
physical) illness to be normal on the grounds that I comprise a
class of my own.
Wiggins suggests that a person is an animal
[...]the physical make up of whose species constitutes the species'
typical members thinking intelligent beings, with reason and
reflection, and typically enables them to consider themselves as
themselves the same thinking things, in different times and places
The weak spot is, of course, the word "typically", which would seem
to relate to the number of species members who are in fact
rational. Noting this, Carter"' imagines a situation in which there
is a sharp decline in the number of rational humans. Carter gives
the example of a space-traveller returning to Earth after 40 years
according to the clocks on his spaceship, only to find that due to
some catastrophe the entire human race is now incapable of thought.
Homo sapiens has ceased to be sapiens. apart from the spaceman
himself. Is he no longer a person - though liu hasn't changed?
Again, if human persons are descended from non-rational primates,
would the latter belong to our class of personal subjects, if by
10 6 ("■")
some chance they were closely enough related to be able, in principle, to interbreed
with humans?
Tooley6 also raises these questions, arguing that a biological classification such as
species membership cannot be morally relevant in itself. Just as it would not be
appropriate to treat 'featherless bipeds' as a moral class of being, it would not be
appropriate to treat as a moral class the human reproductive community. The fact
that species members living after a mutation were able to interbreed with those
living before is not, Tooley would argue, relevant to the task of identifying a moral
community. Moreover, if we focus on what is typical for the species, will we not be
passing over individual achievements, in favour of statistics for the group? Is is fair
that a retarded member of a largely rational species should be treated differently
from a retarded member of a largely irrational species? Or if my species changes
from being largely rational to being largely irrational, should this affectmy status for
the worse?
Tooley and Carter would appear to be right in rejecting the emphasis on 'typical'
rationality, if this is taken as referring merely to how many species members have
actual rational abilities at any one time. However, Tooley and Carter are, I would
argue, wrong in failing to recognize the importance of membership of the species, or
of some biological class, in determining, not what is statistically likely behaviour, but
what is normal, or healthy behaviour.
But surely 'normal' must refer to the current rationality of other members of the
relevant class? No - for what if all members were simultaneously brain-damaged?
The fact that the entire human species had been affected would not make it normal
to be incapable of thought. Just as the presence of an active human tendency does
not depend on the likelihood of the tendency's being carried out, so the fact that the
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tendency is present or missing in one individual does not depend on the number of
others by whom it is carried out.
We cannot, surely, do without the concepts of 'healthy' and 'maimed', 'functional'
and 'dysfunctional'. There is no way of using these concepts unless we are able to
specify the class within which they apply. It is no loss for a brain-damaged, or even a
normal parrot to be unable to study nuclear physics - although it is a loss for a brain¬
damaged human.7 For this to have been a loss to the brain-damaged parrot, he
would have had to have been so different from all the other parrots that he would
count as belonging to a new class of being, even if this class consisted only of
himself. His constitution would have to have been somehow fundamentally different
from that of apparently similar parrots, so that if after brain-damage he acted like the
others, we would have to say that he, unlike them, was a brain-damaged (parrot)
person.
But then it seems that numbers must be let back into the picture. For will it not be
necessary to say that most members of a rational group must have, at least at some
time, rational tendencies? Unless we do say this, there would appear to be no sense
in which we could speak of, for example, 'missing' or 'faulty' genes. If an active
tendency to function in a certain way is present in most members of a species, the
species member who lacks this tendency must be described as maimed or abnormal,
at least in this respect. In contrast an animal cannot be classed as maimed for not
having a tendency which none of its class ever had.
But can we not imagine a situation in which only half or less of the species had
rational tendencies - and this due not to some unprecedented catastrophe, but to a
well-established genetic lottery? What would be then be normal for the group? How
big a group are we looking at - stretching, backwards and forwards, how many
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thousands of years? Are we interested merely in what is normal among those
animals which remain able to interbreed? For surely what is normal for related
communities will change over thousands of years?
These are difficult questions to answer, if we are looking for a sharp divide between
the rational group and related, non-rational groups. If we accept that some humans
at the present time can be 'rational-type', though missing rational tendencies, was
this also true of humans when they first emerged as a rational class of being? If so,
we will have to distinguish between maimed members of the rational type and
healthy members of the non-rational type. Those animals who are structured
according to some distinctive life principle will either have, or rarely and
significantly lack, rational tendencies, among their other characteristic tendencies.
What unites the genetically normal and the genetically abnormal is a common life-
principle, in virtue of which they are structured a certain way, normally including,
but sometimes missing, those parts essential for rationality. If we go back far enough
in evolutionary history, we will find beings of a radically different kind from
ourselves, who, though progenitors of the new, rational kind, cannot be said to
operate according to the same life-principle, or belong to the same genetic kind in
any morally relevant sense. This conceivably might be so whether or not they were
still in principle capable of interbreeding with rational humans, who would, if this
were possible, belong to a genetic group originally smaller than a species. If we think
it likely that the rational group emerged in response to the plan of a divine creator,
will tend to expect that the new community will propagate its own kind; that the
quantum leap forwards is not going to be reversed in any future descendants of
rational humans.
What if we neither are theists, nor are prepared to countenance talk of 'rational-type'
life-principles? In this case we may be able to imagine a situation in which only half
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or less of a species have (sufficiently?) rational tendencies - a situation which would
make it impossible to describe those without such tendencies as maimed or
abnormal. However, in the situation we have at present, there is little doubt what is
normal for the contemporary reproductive community: what, for example, severely
mentally handicapped members lack, and what treatment would be in their interest,
should it ever be possible to provide it. On questions such as these we can rule with
a confidence absent from our speculations about the remote past or future.8
With some idea of what we mean by humankind, we can ask what counts as benefit
and harm for beings like ourselves. There are characteristic tendencies of our kind of
being, tendencies the absence of which leads us to call some humans less healthy or
flourishing than others. It is good for humans, not only to develop rationality, but to
develop healthy hearts and functioning immune systems. Such benefits are relevant
in some way to our actions, so that we supply by surgery tendencies which are
blocked ormissing, and work against any tendencies we think should not be there.
Yet if all we mean by 'good for human persons' is to refer to what makes possible
behaviour characteristic of our kind - or even, perhaps, what makes possible
characteristic functions - can this be the 'good' we refer to in moral statements? After
all, plants and insects also have characteristic functions, which can be promoted or
frustrated. Can we base reasons for action on 'mere biological' interests of persons, of
the kind shared by other living things?
For example, it may be conceded that the human embryo is the same organism as the
adult, and even that it can undergo "biological' harms and benefits, according as its
biological functions are promoted or frustrated. It may still be denied that the
embryo (and/or foetus and infant) has morally significant, and in particular
'personal' interests, of the kind whichmay give rise to, for example, personal rights.
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Michael Tooley, on this subject, agrees that
A plant [...] may be spoken of as having an interest in getting enough water9
However, he adds immediately:
[...] something that was capable of interests only in this attenuated sense could not be a
right holder. To be a subject of rights one needs to be capable of having interests in the
sense that involves the capacity for having desires.
In an earlier passage,10 Tooley formulates the 'particular interest principle', according
to which it is 'a conceptual truth that an entity cannot have a particular right unless it
is at least capable of having some interest which is furthered by its having right R.'
With regard to the necessary connection between interests and desires, Tooley goes
so far as to suggest that neither rationality, nor self-consciousness would suffice for
personhood in the absence of desires.11
Tooley offers no argument for his emphasis on desires, which naturally has its
critics.12 For why should those not already convinced of Tooley's position accept that
it is the capacity for desires which has such significance? Tooley's statement, as
several critics have argued, would appear to beg a question central to his account of
personal status. Before going further into this question, however, we should look at
Tooley's account in more detail.
The capacity for desires and hence for interests 'in the morally relevant sense' is
introduced by Tooley to deal with some obvious problems with linking particular
interests with particular desires. For it is easy to think of examples in which both
interests and rights persist, not only in the absence of a desire for the relevant good,
but in the presence of some contrary desire. Tooley gives the example of women who
have been conditioned so that they do not want to participate in intellectually
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challenging activities,13 and of a person who, having contracted a disease, is
temporarily in a 'desireless state', while retaining an interest in, for example,
nutrition.14 Thus Tooley concedes that particular interests and rights of persons need
not be matched by particular desires. Some desires must, however, be had at other
times; that is, not just at the present time, which Tooley believes will indicate only
the presence of a 'momentary subject of interests'.15
Here indeed is the crunch: at which other times? For of course sentience, and
presumably simple desires, begin some time before birth. If past desires are essential,
might we not consider the past desires of the mature foetus and infant? Ormight we
not rely wholly on possible future desires: those related to the interest in question, or
others? If the entity which has desires at other times is the organism, then any
normal embryo is a subject of non-momentary interests.
Tooley does mention the possibility of considering future specific desires, but rejects
it as 'the resulting account of rights will be very complex' and 'it may not be very
clear when one has arrived at a complete analysis'.16 With regard to the embryo
Tooley simply states that it has no capacity for desire and hence, no interests at all.17
By means of further stipulations Tooley avoids the inclusion of foetuses and infants
in the relevant class. Not only are they not capable, lacking the relevant concepts, of
desiring to persist as a 'continuing self or mental substance', but the fact that they
lack such concepts means that their lives are insufficiently unified for the possibility
of non-momentary interests. No individual who at no time has such a self-concept
can have any desires at different times.18 Yet as Michael Wreen points out, though
persons, on Tooley's own definition of them, need to have this concept to exist at all,
there is nothing to suggest that other individuals - dogs, for example - do not exist
while having desires at various times.19 Even if we insist that an individual must
have had desires in the past to have any 'non-momentary' interests now, there will
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still be no reason to exclude the mature foetus and infant from an interest in
continued existence; that is, unless they are excluded from the beginning of the
argument intended to prove their lack of 'personal* interests. If the only subjects of
desire seriously considered are those whose mental lives are unified in the way
which Tooley favours, then of course it will appear that to exist as the right kind of
subject one needs to be unified in precisely that way. As Tooley puts it:
What is needed, apparently, is that the continued existence of the individual will make
possible the satisfaction of some desires existing at other times. But not just any desires
existing at other times will do [...] it is not even sufficient that they be desires associated
with the same physical organism. It is crucial that they be desires that belong to the
same subject of consciousness.20
Coherence of personality and causal connectedness, though essential, still do not
suffice for the existence of a person:
My own inclination is to say that such continuity, though necessary, is not sufficient If
desires are to be interrelated in a morally significant way, there must also be recognition
of the continuity by the enduring mental substance in question.21
This can happen through thoughts about the past or (possibly) thoughts about the
future. How do desires come to form a morally significant group? Tooley gives the
example of an adult, Mary, in whose interests it was that the baby who grew up to be
the adult was not destroyed.22 Was it also, he asks, in the interests of the baby that
she not be destroyed?
The baby, Tooley imagines, is capable of simple desires. Some things are therefore in
her interest - is survival to adulthood? Yes, says Tooley, but only if Mary the baby is
the same subject of interests as Mary the adult. If the adult can clearly remember the
experiences she had as a baby, then they would appear to be the same subject of
interests. 'On the other hand, suppose that not only does Mary, at a much later time,
not remember any of the baby's experiences, but the experiences in question are not
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psychologically linked, either by memory or in any other way, to mental states
enjoyed by the human organism in question at any later time.23' In this case, Tooley
thinks, it 'cannot be correct to transfer, from Mary to the baby, Mary's interest in the
baby's not being destroyed.'
It is unclear whether Tooley, in giving this example, is sufficiently careful to keep
apart the belonging-of-thoughts- to-a-unified-subject, and the recognition of this by
the subject herself. Is it only to future desires that the 'thought about self will now be
appropriately related, or is this thought (as Tooley seems rather to be saying)
appropriately related also to the past? The question that arises is whether some
infant desire, which gives rise to subsequent memories and thoughts about the past,
is thus retrospectively made part of a morally significant group. It would indeed
seem odd if two rather disconnected desires, previously not part of one subject of
non-momentary interests, could be made so by subsequent thoughts about them
both. (Indeed, it would then be too late to further any interest which was damaged
before the two were unified). Or alternatively, suppose a baby's desire A gives rise to
a later desire B, in the absence of any clear concept of a 'continuing self or mental
substance', only to be followed by the advent of this concept in memory C of desire
A. Did A and B (certainly in some way causally connected) belong to the same self
previously or not?
If Tooley is prepared to settle for unification through very simple memories, in the
absence of any coherent self-concept, would he count any vague memory of A
implicit in B? If he would, would he accept that desires A and B form part of a
morally significant group of interests? If he would, then Mary the two-month old
baby is at least related appropriately to Mary the three-month old baby. Whether or
not the two- month-old Mary has an interest in living to be an adult, she has an
interest in living to be a three-month-old baby, who in turn has an interest in living
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to be a four-month-old baby, and so on. In this way, successive Marys (or Mary the
organism) would seem to possess the interests of a continuing subject of experiences.
Nor need this cautious procedure begin at birth. For can we see the mature foetus as
only a subject ofmomentary interests - even if we are adamant about the importance
of memory?24
Questions regarding the connection between interests and psychological continuity
bear on the question sometimes raised of why death is bad. Death, unlike non-
conception, involves loss to an individual, whose enjoyment of certain goods is
curtailed. (To be the subject of an interest, one must exist at some time, so that we
cannot seriously speak of it being 'in the interest' of counterfactual people to be
conceived.) It may be claimed that death involves real loss to a person only if it
interrupts connected experience - for experiences are all that matter in human lives.
The goods we hope for are benefits to us only in so far as we are psychologically
connectedwith the people who enjoy them. As JeffMcMahan puts it:
If the infant dies, there is a sense in which its losses are less than those that an adult
human being normally suffers through death, since the future it loses would have been
less dosely connected to it in the ways that provide grounds for egoistic concern - or
perhaps, in this case, grounds for concern for its sake. Of course, the infant's death may
mean the loss of a glorious future life. But the only loss that matters significantly where
the infant - qua infant - is concerned is the loss of those parts of its future life with
which it would have been psychologically connected.25
McMahan claims that we cannot simply sum up the goods lost by death, but that
these goods must be
weighted in such a way that the loss through death of some future good will count for
more the doser the psychological connections would have been between the person as
she was at the time of her death and as she would have been at the time at which she
would have recdved or experienced the good.26
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Psychological reductionism has been discussed in an earlier chapter. What of the
view, which need not be accompanied by psychological reductionism, that the
principal harm of death lies in the interruption of consciousness, the impact on our
already formulated plans, desires, and so on? Is it not worse for a adult to die than a
newborn baby, and if so can we say that the two are equally subjects of 'personal'
interests?
It is certainly true that the interruption of worthwhile projects (writing a book, say,
or raising a family) may be a serious harm to an adult person, a harm of which he
may well be aware before it occurs. However, we cannot say that all adults are
equally harmed by death in this way, or that this is the only way in which death is
harmful. An adult person is surely no more or less a person - no more or less a
member of our moral and biological class - simply because he enjoys more or fewer
of the benefits available to members of this class. Again, can we say that the baby's
loss is morally insignificant - despite the fact that she is not even able to begin any
projects? While the baby cannot be distressed, as an adult can, by the thought of
death, she will nonetheless miss out on any whole projects she might have begun. If
the ability to carry out worthwhile projects is a serious loss to the adult, might it not
also be a serious loss to the infant? And if, in fact, we can save the infant, so that she
will die some decades later, should we not go to some lengths to do so? 27
Harm to older persons can be painful and/or frightening, and interrupt the
execution of cherished plans. Yet not all harm, as we shall see, is like this. Moreover,
there are cherished plans which give rise to reasons, not to aid their execution but to
thwart them at all costs. In contrast, the very young human cannot be hurt or
frightened, but can be deprived of much life in response to no threat of her own.
Perhaps there are some harms which, though neither frightening nor painful, can
nonetheless constitute serious wrongs.
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On the subject of plans and desires concerning the future, Quinn makes the point
that while these may make possible certain kinds of loss, they may be in various
ways misguided:
The future that one now dead had planned and hoped for might, after all, have turned
out to be very unsatisfying to him, and good might have come to him from changes in
his life that he never imagined. And even if the hoped for future would have proved to
be as good as expected, it seems odd to explain the badness of its loss by reference to
the hope rather than to the good things the future would have contained.2®
There is, Quinn says, a kind of loss - loss of the goods of life - which remains when
all mental connections with a possible future are absent.29 Don Marquis takes a
similar line, maintaining that the goods lost through death need not have been
already experienced. While stressing that The change in my biological state does not
by itself make killing me wrong', Marquis goes on to claim that the effect of 'the loss
ofmy biological life is the loss to me of all those activities, projects, experiences, and
enjoyments which would otherwise have constituted my future personal life."30 In
the same way, when the foetus dies there is a loss of the very 'activities, projects,
experiences, and enjoyments' which adults value so highly. Killing a foetus may
therefore be wrong, Marquis argues, for the same reason as killing an adult, or older
child.31
In fact it seems undeniable that harms and wrongs need not always be connected
with actual desires and experiences. Philip Montague,32 focusing on wrongs rather
than harms, argues that wrongs need have no perceptible impact on the person
wronged. For if we are robbed, say, or sterilized without our knowledge, even if we
die soon after, or the damage is promptly reversed, our rights are infringed at the
time of the action, at whatever age this takes place. A wrongful attack on an infant or
foetus need not therefore be attached, in so far as it constitutes the infringement of a
right, solely to the more mature person who may eventually feel the effects of the
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infringement. If adult rights can be infringed at one time irrespective of what
happens later, killing can surely infringe the rights of an infant (or a foetus) despite
the fact that he or she will not live to regret the infringement.
To this it might be replied that wrongs must be based on possible, if not on actual
future experiences. The reason why it is wrong to harm an adult, whether or not the
adult dies or the damage is reversed, is that one is thereby diminishing, as far as one
can tell, the chance that the adult will enjoy a certain experience. This reason is also,
of course, available in the case of the infant, as indeed in the case of the embryo and
foetus. To harm an infant or foetus in certain ways is to lower the possibility,
perhaps to zero, that the individual concerned will experience some benefit.
As we shall see, Montague does not, in fact, require that rights refer even to possible
experiences. Montague's emphasis is not on interests (which he finds hard to pin
down) but on rights, and specifically, on 'rights dominion'. Montague claims that we
have the right, even as infants, not to have decisions made by other people which are
ours alone to make, if and when we can. Thus our infant rights not to be sterilized,
killed, and so on, are in this respect the same as our rights as adults. It is for the
infant to make certain decisions, if and when he or she can. Montague's approach
contrasts with that of H.J. McCloskey, who also lays emphasis on the choices of the
individual killed, but who claims that even fatal choices can be made for infants on
the assumption that they would make such 'rational' choices themselves if they had
the capacity to choose.33
Also at variance with Montague is Loren Lomasky, who argues that harm to the non-
autonomous refers to the eventual impact on the project-and-claim pursuing adult:
Common morality ascribes rights to the child because it recognizes rights in the adult it
will become and to which it is numerically identical. To damage an infant is to damage
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the project pursuer that it will be. Indeed, what counts as damage or benefit for an
infant is determined by what will likely further or diminish its eventual success in
living as a project pursuer.34
We should, however, take seriously Montague's demonstration of the problems
involved in connecting what appear to be present wrongs to future states which may
or may not eventuate, whether because the individual escapes the effects of the
wrong, or because the individual dies or is killed. It is true that a wrong may relate
to the likelihood (or the likelihood as far as the agent can tell) that some future state
will eventuate. But the claim that some action reduces the possibility, or the
possibility as far as one can tell, of the older person's enjoying some benefit would
seem to take us back to the individual at the present time, whom we wrong if we
make less likely the enjoyment of that benefit. The older person who does escape the
effects of an earlier harm has indeed been wronged - but in childhood, not in
adulthood.
It is interesting to look in this context at Feinberg's approach to the question of
prenatal rights. Feinberg, while recognizing the continuity of some kind of subject,
regards any social rights we may ascribe to the unborn as mere 'placeholders'35 for
the eventual rights of the 'full-fledged interested being'. He claims that
The clearest cases of rights that a fetus does have [...] are rights to the present protection
of future interests, on the assumption that he will be born. To say he has such a right to
is to say that must be held for his arrival.36
Yet surely interests, and rights referring to interests, do not need to be 'placeholders'
for future rights and interests if there is one subject present throughout. Harm to the
foetus is not, like damage to an unfertilized ovum, a harm or wrong which can be
ascribed only to some later subject. Harm to a limb of the foetus, for example, is like
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harm to a limb of the infant; a harm which may affect the subject at every stage of his
life, and which will certainly affect the subject at the stage at which it is inflicted.
The discussion of interests is complicated by variations in the way in which the word
'interest' can be used. We must, for example, distinguish between 'having an interest'
and 'taking an interest'; one need not imply the other at any stage. Interests we have
refer to harms and benefits (for example, we have an interest in nutrition), whereas
interests we take, while they may refer also to harms and benefits, refer primarily to
our actual desires. If we confine our attention to the interests we have, there remains
an ambiguity with regard to how we refer to our relation to some possible long- term
benefit Of a person who, unknown to him, is going to need surgery, we can say
either that he has an interest in good health insurance, or that he will have an interest
in good health insurance. Interests in the former sense do not have dates, except, of
course, that they must refer to a time before the time at which the benefit can be
enjoyed. Whichever way we speak of interests, we can agree that reasons may be
present now for us to act to secure some long-term benefit. The central issue here is
the relationship of a person to some possible benefit in the future of that person.
But in fact we do very often refer to long-term interests when we speak of our
present relationship to future benefits. I have an interest (whether or not I am now
interested) in a happy and healthy retirement. I had, as a child, an interest in being
booked into high-school, and immunized against various diseases. Long before I
acknowledge something to be in my interest, much less take an interest in it myself,
there will exist a relationship between me, some benefit for me, and some action of
mine or others which may secure it.
-119-
Most importantly, it would seem that there are interests which do not refer to
experiences, whether actual or possible. Both our interests and (as Montague argues)
our rights may be affected without this affecting, or being able to affect, our
experience at any time. Most of us can be spied on, and slandered behind our backs,
and some of us even have a life's work to be destroyed when we die. With regard to
desires and choices, although it can sometimes be argued that, in such and such a
situation, we would desire, or choose, that something be the case, to rest too much
on this argument is not to go to the heart of the question of either interests, or rights.
As Jenny Teichman puts it:
[...] it is possible to be harmed in ways one did not know existed, and possible to be
harmed without understanding the cause, and possible to be harmed without realizing
one has been. And violation of a right (unlike physical pain) is exactly the kind of harm
which one can suffer while remaining ignorant in all or any of these ways [...] Tooley's
idea that the concept of right is founded, not on benefit and harm, but on desire,
substitutes a notion which in this context is secondary and derivative for one that is
primary and fundamental.37
And indeed, we tend to desire things we believe to be good in some way. Just as our
lives are not made ours by the fact that we want to live (for do we not rather want to
live because our lives are ours?) so we do not really believe that the goods of life are
good merely because we happen to desire them. We believe on the contrary that
there are desires and desires - and that their proper influence depends very much on
their object. Sadistic, masochistic, or simply illogical desires are not among those we
think we ought to favour - whatever our respect for the autonomy of those who do
in fact favour such desires. The object of desire may be important, but the desire
itself, insufficient to form an interest, may not even be necessary.
Yet it may be insisted that, whether or not a necessary connection exists between
desires and interests, a morally significant interest must refer to the kind of good in
which the human organism cannot always participate. 'Mere biological' benefits,
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such as life, are often regarded as having only instrumental value. Thus James
Griffin describes well being as 'the level to which basic needs are met so long as they
retain importance'.38 What are important, on Griffin's view, are 'informed desires'
and the autonomous pursuit of the objects of these, from which he derives many
human rights:
Taking one's own course through life is what makes one's existence human. We value
our humanity, so we value what makes life human, over and above what makes it
happy!—] this personhood consideration [...] goes some way towards making the notion
of a human right more determinate. It generates most of the conventional list of civil
rights: a right to life, to bodily integrity, to some voice in political decision [...] It also
provides a right not to be tortured, because torture aims at destroying ones capacity to
decide and to stick to the decision [...]39
Nagel, on the subject of the value of our lives, observes that:
[...] the value of life and its contents does not attach to mere organic survival: almost
everyone would be indifferent (other things equal) between immediate death and
immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening.40
Many writers claim that no bodily harm, however extensive, would have moral
significance in itself unless some good were damaged relating in some way to the
victim's experience. This view is widespread, and has a certain appeal. Responses to
it will be looked at in the following chapter.
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Respect for Persons
Human persons are, I have argued, 'rational-type' organisms, functioning in
accordance with laws which are specific to our kind, and refer to our physical
environment. Life is therefore intrinsic to persons, as living entities: a condition of
our existence, and hence of our well-being. The question now arises whether life is
merely a condition of our well-being, without significance in itself. Is life, despite
being necessary and sufficient for our existence, no good for us, in any morally
significant sense, apart from the mental activity it makes possible?
Perhaps we could believe that life, though intrinsic to our existence, is insufficient to
ground any morally significant interests - that it is not even an aspect of our well-
being. Such a view could, however, have the effect of placing human lives lower on
the moral scale than the lives of other organisms; that is, if we assume, as seems
reasonable, that non-human lives have a value in themselves which can provide us
with reason for action. We need a reason of some kind for killing even an insect; and
is there no presumption against killing a 'rational-type' human, alive but incapable of
thought?
Moreover, the claim that our lives have only instrumental value leads us in the
direction of the view considered earlier, according to which there are times (say,
after the seemingly permanent loss of some psychological potential) in which we
exist, but without personal rights, or interests of any moral significance.1 Most of us
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feel that our personal status is something 'inalienable'; hence the attempts, on the
part of those reluctant to trace the moral subject back as far as fertilization, to
postulate the appearance and disappearance of some entity distinct from the living
human organism.
With regard to the moral importance of survival in itself, the natural law theorist
Germain Grisez, together with Finnis, Boyle, George, and others, argue that life is
intrinsic not only to our existence, but to our full-being or welfare. Life is, these
writers maintain, one among several "basic goods' of human persons.2
Natural law theories cover a wide variety of positions. The theory we will look at in
detail is the 'new classical' natural law theory propounded by the writers mentioned
above. These writers go to some lengths to emphasize where their theory differs
from most other natural law theories, claiming that it derives not from those
developed in recent centuries but from those of Aristotle, and later, Aquinas.
According to the 'new classical' theory, moral principles appear in relation to certain
'basic goods' of human persons. Unlike Rawls' 'primary goods', the basic goods of
the new classical theorists are good in themselves, not mere preconditions for the
enjoyment of other goods. The goodness of basic human goods is underived from
other things, and for this reason is not susceptible of direct demonstration.
Basic goods are not derived from our natural potential No conclusions can be drawn
from our natural potential as such to what it is good for us to do, or to have. A non-
evaluative account of our natural potential would include the potential to act on
such feelings as spite and self-hatred. Basic goods are underived; there is therefore
no question of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. For example, with regard to the
question we saw raised by Tooley, we could not derive the moral status of a
biological group from a totally non-evaluative description of that group.
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If the basic human goods neither require, nor admit of derivation from anything else,
how can their existence be defended? The answer of the new classical theorists relies
on their understanding of practical, as opposed to theoretical reasoning. Following
Aristotle, as they interpret him, they identify a mode of reasoning which is
concerned with human activity and human fulfillment.3 In the course of reflecting on
activities in which we are engaged, we realize that there are certain things we
pursue, for ourselves or others, not for the sake of other things, but for their own
sake; things which give point to our practical activities and make them intelligible;
things it is good for us, and those like us, to have, to do and to be. These are 'pre-
moral' goods, notmoral conclusions, but from them arise both general principles and
specific moral norms. Life is among the basic goods, irreducible to the others, and
can therefore provide reasons, sometimes conclusive reasons, for acting:
One often chooses to do something to protect a human life, one's own or another's,
without thinking about any good beyond life itself. Of course, life is important for all
the other human goods, and so one can have ulterior reasons to protect life. But what is
characteristic of a basic good is that it can provide the ultimate reason for a choice
which bears upon an instantiation of it, not that it always does provide it [..J4
To the objection that people do not desire merely to live (as in a vegetative state) but
to live well, the new classical theorists reply that while the basic goods can provide,
just in themselves, reasons for human action, in no basic good considered in
abstraction can one find 'all the richness and so all the rational ground for action
present in integral human fulfillment'.5 To the objection that life itself cannot be of
intrinsic value to persons, shared as it is by plants and lower animals, they reply that
life is as diverse as what lives, and that
to be partly perfected by activities generically common to plants and animals is not to
be partly a plant [...] To belong to one species precludes belonging to any other, and any
individual of a certain species is through and through of that kind.6
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Moreover, it is claimed that capacities such as rationality and free choice are
involved in the most perfect instantiation of the good of life:
We do not use the word 'life' in two different senses, but in a single sense to refer to a
reality which, like other basic human goods, can be instantiated more or less perfectly.
When instantiated most perfectly, human life includes vital functions such as speech,
deliberation, and free choice; then it is most obviously proper to the person. But even an
impoverished instantiation of the good of life remains specifically human and proper to
the person whose life it is.7
Life (and its maintenance and transmission) is not the only good of persons. Other
basic goods proposed by the new classical theorists are the following: 'play',
knowledge and aesthetic experience, 'friendship' or harmony between oneself and
others, peace of mind or harmony between one's feelings and one's judgements and
choices, and peace of conscience or harmony between one's judgements and one's
choices. Finally, they say, there is the basic good of 'religion': harmony between
oneself and some 'more-than-human source ofmeaning and value'.8
It is argued that knowledge cannot be coherently denied to be a basic human good;
that is, assuming the denial is made for its own sake, not for some ulterior motive.
For the very denial, intended as a serious contribution to a debate, would constitute
an acknowledgement of the good of knowledge. Nor does it seem at all reasonable to
doubt the pre-moral value of friendship or harmony with others. While the new
classical theorists deny that the basic goods, being underived, can be inferred from
other things, they do regard broadly similar behaviour in different cultures,
motivated both by reason and by pre-rational urges, as evidence for the existence of
the basic human goods, which are both served by reason and bound up with
common desires.9
In response to the recognition by the new classical theorists of the 'is/ought' or, more
generally, 'is/is-to-be-sought' distinction, Henry Veatch, an Aristotelian of a different
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school, objects that already 'written into" the 'is' of the nature of human beings is how
human beings should be; their good or fulfillment.10 For can we understand what it
is to be a human (or other living thing) if we do not understand what is good for
humans (or other living things)? Though suggesting that 'ought' is already written
into human nature, Veatch nonetheless claims that it is through theoretical reasoning
that we determine what is good, after which practical reasoning, in Veatch's sense of
practical reasoning, simply determines the means to the attainment of this end.11
To this Finnis replies12 that it is indeed necessary to know what is good for persons
in order to have a full picture of our nature, but that this picture is composed with
the aid not only of theoretical, but of practical reasoning (by which Finnis means to
refer to our understanding of what gives point to human activity). This reply seems
reasonable; however, it is surprising how little space is left for any good which is
theoretically known and refers simply to normal biological functioning. Finnis
asserts, in his paper in reply to that of Veatch, that judgements about man's 'natural
end or fulfillment or good', about 'what he ought to be', are 'primarily (though
perhaps not exclusively) judgements of practical reason or practical science.'13 One
might object that 'good' in the sense of 'an aspect of normal functioning' can also be
used in the case of non-human living things, without necessarily referring to any
reason for action on the part of human persons. Cockroaches, too, can participate in
this kind of good, which does at least seem to qualify as an 'internal' kind (unlike the
'goods' of machines which relate to human purposes). Such functional goods are
identified, not by cockroaches from the inside, but by people from the outside, in
what may seem on the face of it to be purely theoretical, severely scientific
judgements.
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Finnis would appear to agree that some theoretical knowledge - of our constitution,
and of other things - is a precondition of any reference to 'is-to-be' and 'ought-to-be'
in the case of human persons. However, Finnis stresses the fact that practical
knowledge of our human fulfillment is essential to any full knowledge of our human
constitution, or even, perhaps, of the constitution of members of other species. Take
the following passage from Finnis's original work, to which he refers in replying to
Veatch:
It is true that the natural law theory of, say, Aristotle and Aquinas goes along with a
teleological conception of nature and, in the case of Aquinas, with a theory of divine
providence and eternal law. But what needs to be shown is that the conception of
human good entertained by these theorists is dependent upon this wider framework.
There is much to be said for the view that the order of dependence was precisely the
opposite - that the teleological conception of nature was made plausible, indeed
conceivable, by analogy with the introspectively luminous, self-evident structure of
human well-being, practical reasoning, and human purposive action [...]14
Whatever we think of this interesting reversal, it does seem to be the case, as Finnis
would probably agree, that there exists a irreducible gap between on the one hand
both 'y prolongs X's existence' and 'y makes X a well-functioning specimen', and on
the other hand any 'is to be sought' statement, let alone a moral conclusion.15 In
practice we refer without hesitation to function and dysfunction, healthy and
unhealthy states of plants and lower animals. Though decline is as characteristic for
these as flourishing and growth, the latter, and not the former, is seen as in their
interest. Further examination of such teleological assumptions would, however, take
us too far from the subject under discussion.
One benefit rightly claimed for natural law theories in general is that they do refer to
the fulfillment of human persons, unlike theories which see moral norms as mere
side-constraints, or as the fruit of some intuitionist, or other moral thinking
dissociated from any general, objective good. We should note, however, that if there
are objective goods which supply moral reasons, then our desires play a lesser role
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than they do in some moral theories, whether or not they are necessary, as the new
classical theorists claim they are,16 to stimulate us to respond to moral reasons.
Desires can be for things far removed from human fulfillment, whether one's own or
that of others. Yet desires will very often refer to some basic good of persons, which
nonetheless will not necessarily imply (as we shall see) that the action they indicate
is one which is fully reasonable. Both the basic goods and the demands of morality
exist independently of our choices and desires; good, not as chosen, but as to-be-
chosen.
The new classical theory thus calls into question something which is often taken for
granted: that all personal rights are, in principle, waivable, whether or not the right
holder is in a position to waive them. Autonomy, while necessary for many forms of
fulfillment, provides no guarantee that choices appropriately correspond to the basic
goods (though respect for autonomy will sometimes dictate that we do not attempt
to force benefits on others). A choice to allow oneself to be murdered, or tortured,
would not involve the genuine waiving of a right. The new classical theory does not
basemorality simply on respect for agents' choices. For if your possible participation
in basic goods can provide you with reasons for action, however you choose to
respond, cannot the possible participation of other persons provide you with
reasons, whether or not these persons are agents at all? While it is true that rights
relate to the kind of thing which can be rightfully claimed, no-one need actually
make, or relinquish, the relevant claim in order for a right to exist.
Respect for persons, according to the new classical theory, involves respect for the
basic goods which fulfill them. Of course, in acting for the basic goods, we can only
hope to promote them in the persons for whose sake we are acting. Thus love for a
person refers, in the full sense, to the whole person: both the person's given reality,
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and the fulfillment still hoped-for. 17 When we focus on love in
the practical sense, however, the only way we can act for a person
is through fostering, in and for that person, the basic human
goods. For whatever about a person is already given is not
something which can be affected by our actions, and therefore not
something which can enter into a practical love of that person.
What, then, are the guidelines for this practical love or respect
for human persons (including oneself)? The new classical theorists
refer to Aquinas's principle of "synderesis" or practical reasoning
- "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided" - which they
believe should be understood as providing not moral, but pre-moral
guidance for action. 18 They claim that the first principle of
practical reasoning does not as yet exclude all immoral choices,
but merely directs us away from point1essness in practical
thinking; say, doing something or thinking something over and over
again, long after the point has been exhausted. The principle
requires, in the words of its proponents, that "every deliberative
action be undertaken ultimately for the sake of some benefit - that
is, something in which one is basically interested because one is
directed to it by a practical principle which is a premise of one's
practical knowledge." 19 From the first principle of practical
reasoning its proponents go on to formulate the first principle of
morality:
Insofar as it is in your power, allow nothing but the principles
corresponding to the basic goods to shape your practical thinking
as you find, develop, and use your opportunities to pursue human
fulfillment through your chosen actions. 20
/??
The new classical theorists thus distinguish between an immoral use
of practical reasoning (focusing on one intelligible benefit, but
failing to respect the others) and the use which corresponds to the
ideal of "integral human fulfillment": participation in all the
basic goods, by all human persons. Immorality is therefore best
described as an unjustified narrowing of one's concerns:
[...]the ought-to-be which calls for morally right choice
represents the full directiveness of the principles of practical
knowledge, while the is-to-be which commends the morally wrong
choice represents only a fragment of that directiveness operating
in isolation from the whole. 21
We must, it is claimed, adopt an attitude of openness towards those
basic goods we are not promoting at any one time. This attitude
will require that we do not discount or maliciously attack an
instantiation of a basic human good. Indeed, the attitude asks
more of us than this, in the view of the new classical theorists.
They claim that one may never attack an instantiation of a basic
good - even in defence of an instantiation of that good or others -
even when defending oneself or others against an attack. Harm to
persons may never be intended, since
The principles of practical knowledge of themselves always direct
to the opposite - ±o benef i t persons, both oneself and others.
Moreover, these principles direct one to live at peace with others
and to avoid hurting oneself, and everyone knows from experience
that harming others is likely to have consequences contrary to
these interests. 22
We will be looking later at some of the problems arising at this
level in the new classical natural law theory. Here we will
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mention briefly some alternative suggestions with regard to the
principle that good is to be done and evil avoided. Veatch, as we
have seen, holds that the good of humans and animals is ascertained
"theoretically" through an examination of their natural potential.
The synderesis principle is, in Veatch's view, the principle which
directs man to act as he must in order to fulfill this pre-existing
potential. Since man is not only a rational but also a political
animal
the good alike of oneself and of one's neighbours just is a
part of one's own goal, as being the natural end of any human
being: it just is what any one naturally desires. Very well, if in
the light of theoretical reason this is seen to be the true good
for man, and if by the first principle of practical reason the good
is that which is to be pursued just as evil is to be avoided, then
practical reason may therewith move in to demonstrate that one does
indeed have a moral obligation to love one's neighbour as oneself
[...]23
At this point it might, of course, be objected that the empirical
fact that human beings are the kind of being who tend to group
together and to value what they see as each other's fulfillment
says nothing about whether or not they ought to do either of these,
if they happen to have no interest in either. However, since
Veatch sees values as "written into" what he calls a theoretical
understanding of human nature (for example, he would presumably
distinguish between the potential for "fulfillment" and the
potential for "decline"), he could respond that whatever else his
theory involves it does not involve an attempt to derive the moral
from the value-free.
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Vernon Bourke in his discussion of the synderesis principle takes
it to refer to the need to distinguish between good and bad
desires, and to mean:
"of the items you desire, seek and do the ones that are good for
you as a human being - and reject the others" 24
Bourke thus interprets the synderesis principle as a moral, not as
a pre-moral principle, arguing that it refers to the "suitability
or unsuitabi1ity of what is contemplated practically, in relation
to the agent in his actual circumstances as ordered to his ultimate
end." 25 All acts in the concrete are morally good or bad, and the
function of the synderesis principle is to order that certain moral
goods are to be worked for, while contrasting evils are to be
rej ected.
Ralph Mclnerny 26 has also taken a different view of the synderesis
principle from that of the new classical theorists. Like them,
Mclnerny argues that things desired are already desired as
desirable, in the sense that they are thought of as "to-be-
desired"; as perfective of the agent. However, Mclnerny does not
concede that that things desired are in reality to-be-desired in a
pre-moral sense, as the new classical theorists argue is the case,
at least where the agent does not aim at some purely emotional
goal. 27
/?4 (c
Mclnerny claims that the meaning of the synderesis principle is to
direct the agent to ask whether something already sought as
perfective of himself is in fact so perfective. If it is not, then
he has no reason to seek it (though he may go on to do so, through
weakness of will). While there are "goods" - natural objects of
inclination - shared by humans and other living things, such goods
only become human goods through entering under the guidance of
reason, which is distinctive of human beings. Moreover, human
goods are good only when pursued in a way appropriate to a rational
agent. Human values, and the principles of practical reasoning,
are not pre-moral, but moral. Like Bourke, Mclnerny sees the evil
referred to in the synderesis principle as moral evil, not as pre-
moral harm or damage. In particular, he is unwilling to accept
that human values, together with the principles of practical
reason, can direct us to bad action, as well as to good. Of the
precepts of natural law Mclnerny says that these are
general directives to the ultimate end, the most general one
pointing to the human good in all its amplitude, other very general
ones aiming at constituents of the human good. 28
Against Mclnerny it can be argued that a value such as life,
however immorally it is pursued, is still a human good in the sense
that it provides reasons for action which are both real and
particularly serious, relating as they do to the life of a human.
An immoral action to save the agent's life is rational in a way in
which an immoral action to inflict pain is not - or not without
some further story as to how the action will bring about some
basic, intelligible good (the new classical theorists will here
suggest the basic good of "harmony between one's feelings and one's
judgements and choices"). The life of the immoral, like that of
the moral person, is always a human value-to-be-pursued. If the
immoral person pursues this good rationally (like a human) but
unreasonably (without respect for other values and principles) is
this not a case in which a genuine human good provides some kind of
reason, though not a moral reason, for action?
Natural law theories are not, of course, the only theories which
seek to ground morality in objective goods of persons. Among
theories which accept the existence of objective goods, rather than
mere individual preferences, there are those according to which
these goods are to be promoted according to different moral
principles. Consequential i sts may share with their opponents, in
the words of Phillip Pettit, a "theory of the good" (or at least,
some aspects of a theory of the good) while parting company with
their opponents in their "theory of the right" regarding which
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option one should choose.
Consequentialism cannot be defined too exactly, as
consequentialists hold a variety of beliefs. The following are
some characteristic beliefs, a selection of which is likely to be
held by the consequentia1ist.3° It may be claimed that the only
reason for or against the performance of an action are the
consequences performance or non-performance
will have - consequences being taken by many to include the fact that one performs
the act in question. All reasons are comparable, and can be ranked by weight. An
action or class of actions is right if and only if its performance maximizes value, or
expected value. In evaluating an action the consequences of omissions count for just
as much as the consequences of commissions - and the foreseen consequences of an
action just as much as the intended consequences. The comparable value of any two
states of affairs is the same from the point of view of all agents.
One objection often raised to consequentialism concerns this last assertion.
Consequentialists may agree with non- consequentialists that reasons for action are
sometimes 'action reasons': that is, that persons can be fulfilled in certain ways only
through their engaging in certain actions. Consequentialists may, however, claim
that our duties are 'agent neutral': that in encouraging or discouraging actions there
is no reason to treat our own actions differently from the actions of others. To this it
has been objected that it is an attack on a person's integrity to expect that person to
put his own projects on a par with everyone else's.^' For whereas agent relative
moralities allow the agent to put his own projects first, within reason, agent neutral
moralities alienate the agent from the projects with which he is most closely
identified.
It can be claimed, more specifically, that it is a serious shortcoming of
consequentialism that it passes over our special responsibility for our own actions,
making nonsense of the claim found in Plato and Democritus32 that it is better to
suffer evil than to do it. The objection is that your own participation in some action
(say, killing an innocent person) is not something which can simply be added to or
subtracted from the other implications of that action. The idea that you may have a
duty to kill, to prevent a greater number being killed by someone else, ignores this
special subjective phenomenon of willing, or not willing, that you yourself take a
certain kind of action. Your own action, unlike those of others, must have your
assent: a fact which is morally significant. If you perform an action then you must
have willed it, if only as a means to something else, which is not the case if someone
else wills the same action, following your refusal. The benevolent person, as Philippa
Foot puts it,?? does not will that a whole consisting of a killing to minimize killings
be instantiated either by him or by anyone else. And if such a whole is instantiated
by someone else, following the benevolent person's refusal, this is not something the
benevolent person has willed, any more than he wills the killings which have been
prevented. There is, on this moral approach, a difference which can be conclusive
between allowing something to happen without your will, and purposely bringing it
about.
The most radical form of criticism of consequentialism is that which contends that
the whole consequentialist approach of seeking to instantiate 'the best' state of affairs
is not only misguided, but senseless. Grisez follows this line of argument further
than Foot, arguing that to attempt to sum up benefits in the way that
consequentialism requires is like trying to sum up 'the quantity of the size of this
page, the quantity of the number nineteen, and the quantity of the mass of the
moon'.'4 Goods are good, after all, in different ways; and there is no 'supervalue'
running through the various values, in virtue of which one can be unqualifiedly
better than the others. One argument offered by Grisez in support of this claim refers
to the very possibility of choosing among options.55 Grisez claims that free choice is
possible precisely because one option for choice is not better in every respect than
another. No option offers the same good as other options, plus some additional
good. We are rationally torn between possibilities because they are
incommensurable - both instantiations of different goods and instantiations of the
same good. For it is not just categories of value, but individual values which are
incommensurable, so that the lives of different persons, for example, cannot simply
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be added to and subtracted from each other. Grisez claims further that even within
the same life instantiations of the same good will not be commensurable in the sense
that one instantiation promises all the good of other instantiations, and then some.*6
What are we to make of this line of argument? It does seem to be the case that many
free choices are made between rationally attractive values, despite the fact that some
free choices, as indeed Grisez now argues,? 7 are not directed at one among the list of
basic human goods, but rather at some emotional goal. However, it also seems that
rationally attractive values, even if one is not better in every respect than the others,
can be compared for moral purposes, if not commensurated in the sense used by
Grisez. We should look for some morally relevant scale on which values can be
compared, notwithstanding the fact that no value promises all the good, and more,
which is offered by any of the others.
For example, Grisez and other proponents of the new natural law theory will not
want to deny that values and disvalues can be compared on any scale. They will
naturally want to maintain that there is one scale on which non-moral harms weigh
less than moral wrongs. (Here it should be stressed that talk of weighing or
comparing does not imply that enough of one value will equal a certain amount of
another.?s>On the contrary, no non-moral disvalue could weigh more, on the moral
scale, than actual wrong-doing.31')
In order that values may be compared for the purpose of making moral decisions it
is not, therefore, essential that one be superior in every respect to the others; only
that it be superior to the other values in some respect which is morally significant.
What could be the common measure used in the moral assessment of different
instantiations of goods? We could claim that the common measure is good 'to
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someone's life' - but this merely confronts us once again with the fact that
instantiations of different goods will be good to a life, or different lives, in different
ways. Is it possible to say, nonetheless, that a 'small' instantiation of one good may
benefit some person or other objectively less than a 'large' instantiation of a different
good?
Some attempt to defend consequentialist comparisons by referring to the unifying
scale of what we or others prefer, or would prefer with different information.
Michael Perry makes the point that very different goods can be compared on such a
scale of preference.*® Yet as Robert George points out in his paper in answer to
Perry,*' our preferences with regard to a particular moral action cannot be what
makes it right and wrong. The standard of what I prefer cannot be the standard of
comparison the consequentialist needs. For the consequentialist wants to say not 'I
happen to prefer this option' (sadists, after all, will have different preferences) but
'this option is morally preferable.' Moreover, the standards by which we judge
something commensurably better than something else cannot be justified in
consequentialist terms,'*2 since these standards would have to be already in force for
any consequentialist commensuration.
This point becomes clearer when we consider what we would regard as examples of
appropriate distribution of goods among persons. There is, notoriously, no pre-
moral 'amount of good' we can calculate in order to find out which of these
outcomes would contain 'more good': greater benefits for fewer people, or lesser
benefits for more. Sometimes, to be sure, relative amounts will seem unproblematic.
It is hard to deny that a happy family is better than a happy manA3 However, in
those situations in which the "better' situation does not simply contain as much good
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and more as the 'worse' situation, it is obvious that we must be making our
judgement on the basis of moral presuppositions.
To begin with (and this will apply even to the case of the happy family) whose good
do we count - ours, some people's, or everyone's? We will only consider everyone's
on a pre-count principle of justice; we are not weighing amounts of good in a moral
vacuum. We are reminded of problems with contractarianism concerning the
conditions for a choice of moral principles. If we insist that those in the position of
choosing moral principles are not to be allowed to choose with the benefit of 'unfair'
advantages, then we already have at least one moral principle prior to the
establishment of the mechanism for determining moral principles. In the same way,
a certain distribution of goods among persons may be counted a good thing partly
on the basis of its conformity with justice.
It is in the light of justice that we compare possibilities. Justice directs us not to
discount the interests of other persons: to regard values as values, in whichever life
they fall. Yet justice must refer to the internal importance of particular instantiations
of good in the lives of particular people. Both justice and some principle of internal
'balance' are needed to tell us when one instantiation in one person's life is of less
importance, morally speaking, than another in someone else's.
Perhaps, after all, we can agree with the consequentialist that all reasons are
comparable in strength - comparable, that is, on the moral scale. A small
instantiation of one good is the kind which tends to produce slight reasons for action
relative to others. In contrast, there are more complete instantiations of good: those
which tend to produce weightier reasons. We must, of course, bear in mind the
wider moral context when coming to moral conclusions. The good of staying alive
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may be a greater benefit to me (the kind of instantiation that tends to produce
greater reason for action) than some item of knowledge is to you. However I may not
lie my way into getting you, a stranger, to meet the cost of my very expensive life-
saving operation. This would be, among other things, a deliberate attack on the good
of knowledge (to use the term of the new classical theorists); moreover, there are no
special factors present in this case, of the kind we will look at shortly. The
implications of my choice will include this wrongful attack, and my choice will thus
be worse, on the moral scale.
To return to the case of the killing to minimize killings, we should agree with
Philippa Foot that the non-consequentialist need not concede to the consequentialist
that to forgo such a killing is to bring about a 'worse state of affairs'.44 For even a
wrong to minimize wrongs may not improve the outcome in any sense relevant to
the choice of the prospective wrong-doer. If you believe there is some moral reason
against your envisaged action - say, it involves a serious lack of respect for another
person - you are unlikely to think that this can simply be added to or subtracted
from the consequences of the action in question - even that of promoting respect for
persons.
Comparing values and disvalues is not very difficult when one option already
consists of what can be seen as morally conclusive. We will now return to the more
alarming task of comparing, or commensurating, the pre-moral values of various
options. Here I would argue that a concept such as the new classical ideal of 'integral
human fulfillment' actually requires that particular instantiations of goods be
commensurated in some sense for the purpose of making decisions, notwithstanding
the fact that the new classical theorists deny that commensuration is possible. For
even assuming that no damage to any good is intended, does not the concept of
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'integral human fulfillment' refer also to the possibility that basic goods may be
wrongfully neglected? If so, does this not suggest that relative 'amountness', by some
moral standard, of separate instantiations of goods must be involved in our
judgment that values in some category are being wrongfully neglected? How will we
know if we are responding adequately to the ideal of 'integral human fulfillment'
with regard to our own lives, if the various instantiations of basic goods cannot be
compared with each other? The same is true if we are assessing the lives of other
people. Parents may act unjustly by favouring one good in one child 'very much
more' than a different good in a different child. And in general, if choosing one good
at least incidentally damages another, and if this is not to count as insufficient
respect for that other good, then it seems that (allowing for our prior responsibilities)
the first good is providesmore or equal reason for action than the second.
It is interesting that the new classical theorists, while claiming that even 'same
person/same good' instantiations of good can be, in their sense, incommensurable,
nonetheless want to say that aggressors should be deterred with minimal force: Le.,
by means which cause less damage than other means, though (presumably) not less
damage in every respect. If instantiations of the same good can be compared as
reason- providers, despite one not being better in every respect than the others, can
we not imagine many other forms of comparison if not (in the strictest sense)
commensuration?
Charged with the fact that the morality of accepting side- effects presupposes that
there is some sense in which goods can be weighed, the new classical theorists offer a
surprisingly subjectivist account of this kind of moral judgement.^An adverse side-
effect is too great in relation to the intended good if the harm of the side-effect is
greater than one would be prepared to accept for oneself or one's friends. The
problem with this approach is that we can imagine a situation in which much more
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would be acceptable to the agent than, we might want to say, was reasonable. Both
my own and others' judgements of what is 'too much' should surely be based on
something other than how we feel, or would feel. Subjectivism is only appropriate
when we are concentrating on some emotional harm or aspect of harm, such as pain;
and even here, it is the sensibilities of the subject, not the agent, which count. If we
leave aside the emotional aspect of the harm, or consider a harm without an
emotional aspect, we will find ourselves confronting not what is preferred, but
rather, once again, what is preferable.
For example, a harm to the good of knowledge may be slight in relation to other
harms to the good of knowledge, and similarly, less important to a person's all-
round fulfillment than a very comprehensive harm to the good of health. A world in
which people did regard, say, the loss of their right arm as a reasonable price to pay
in the course of avoiding some trivial error would be a world of the insane. It is
interesting that despite their description of commensuration as subjective, the new
classical theorists claim that
the upright person's subjective commensuration by intuition of feelings itself will be
formed and tested by moral standards. The temperate person does not have the feelings
of the intemperate, and so on. 46
We should, I would argue, recognize further that these moral standards are what
ought to be guiding our judgements. The question 'how would you like it?' should
be treated not as an invitation to base a judgement on one's own emotional data, but
as a rough and ready test for bias.
Before moving on from the subject of commensuration we should note one serious
problem in weighing alternatives for choice. This relates to the question of
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indeterminacy of outcome - to the fact that we may find ourselves choosing between,
for example, a small risk of a very substantial disaster, or a substantial risk of a small
one. Alternatives may not be merely indeterminate with reference to our knowledge,
but indeterminate in principle, as depending on the free choices of other agents,
following some free choice of our own.47 It is clearly ridiculous to attempt to
consider indefinitely branching possibilities. A cut-off must be made quite early. Yet
the likelihood that those most nearly affected by our action will act in a certain way
themselves is clearly something we have to bear in mind as we make our decision.
Can it really be the case that, when faced with different likelihoods of different
instantiations of goods, we are unable to make an objective, rational judgement, to
the effect that one option is 'more wise', 'less wise', or 'as wise' as another?
We cannot hope to compare the endlessly unfolding outcomes of every possible
option for choice. However, we can compare, in the light of pre-existing moral
principles, a limited number of instantiations of good which are likely to follow from
a limited range of options. Consequences should be compared in so far as this is
reasonable - in so far as they are sufficiently serious or likely to eventuate, and
sufficiently close to the action envisaged. In limiting our consideration of possible
consequences to those related in certain ways to our actions, we are parting company
with the consequentialist, and moving in the direction of theories according to which
our duties depend on such factors as our particular relationships, as well as on
whether some outcome is part of our intention, or at least, closely enough related to
what is part of our intention.
It is, I would argue, essential to recognize a distinction between our chosen actions
and the side-effects of these - without, of course, assuming that side-effects cannot
provide conclusive reasons against possible actions. As we saw earlier, it can be
morally significant that a certain outcome is not merely permitted, but intended;
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moreover, we cannot favour all values simultaneously, and any choice to favour one
will involve the (usually innocent) forgoing of chances to favour others. For example,
it seems incredible that to use scarce medical resources to save one person rather
than another is the same kind of action, morally speaking, as killing one to use her
organs for another. We are not looking simply, as a consequentialist might, at what
results in a loss of benefits for persons, but at the kind of relationship between this
loss of benefits and the intention of the agent. There is more to homicide than the
curtailment of some (necessarily uncertain) span of life. We would not think we
should save the life of someone critically ill by 'heroic' medical intervention only to
subject this person to fatal experimentation; and this despite the fact that such a
course of action would involve no greater loss of life than would non-intervention.
What of the claim that basic goods can never be directly, that is, deliberately
attacked? Is this a necessary condition of respect for persons? As we have seen, the
new classical theorists believe that basic goods such as life may never be attacked,
not even in the case of unjust aggression. For aggressors, after all, are persons, and
life is as much a basic good for them as it is for any other person.
If life is a basic good, there does seem to be an anomaly in defending killing, for
example, in self-defence. Certainly life, like other human goods, must be recognized
as a good for every human person, and never endangered out of malice or
indifference. However, I do not think that the new classical theorists have shown
that life, or indeed any other basic good, must never be attacked under any
circumstance whatsoever.
We should remember that the category of 'life' includes, on the new classical theory,
health and bodily integrity. The theory allows that lethal damage may be caused an
aggressor in the course of legitimate self-defence.4^ An unjust aggressor may be
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repelled with necessary force, which may prove incidentally fatal. However, it is
likely that the choice to use necessary force will include the choice to cause enough
damage to the aggressor's body to halt the act of aggression: surely at least a
deliberate, and perhaps a substantial attack on health and bodily integrity. If a choice
to damage bodily integritymay be permissible, why not, as a last resort, the choice to
kill? Only if we are literally using mere defensive force (as when we push our
assailant away, and only incidentally off a cliff) can we truthfully say that we are
intending no direct attack on any basic human good.
I have, as will by now be apparent, a great deal of sympathy for the new classical
natural law theory. However, I do not believe that this theory can be accepted as it
stands. Where I think we should depart from it is at the stage of formulating the
guidelines for respecting persons, which, I would argue, should be brought more in
line with common non-consequentialist moral norms. Deliberate attacks on play or
knowledge, or life itself, are sometimes countenanced for sound, non-
consequentialist reasons. Thus in the case of knowledge it is often claimed that the
right not to be deceived is a right which can be forfeited; for example, when, due
either to malice, or simply a liking for gossip, the possession by one person of some
item of information would endanger the life of another. As the direct harm
envisaged grows more substantial, so too must the reason for causing it; and must
involve, when the direct harm is more than slight, a serious and deliberate threat on
the part of the person harmed. Moreover, we should remember that the welfare of,
for example, an unjust aggressor may not be accorded no value, or a negative value.
Aggressors may not be killed by just anyone, or for just any reason, although they
have laid themselves open to some forms of attack. Direct harms, even when
inflicted for the sake of some good, are always unfortunate, and often wrong.
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To sum up: the new classical theory, while in many ways attractive, should be made
more heterogeneous. The fact that direct attacks are often wrong does not mean that
direct attacks are always wrong: however slight the good harmed, however good the
good promised, however guilty the victim of a much more harmful intention. A
somewhat different 'theory of right' will have to be constructed. What will such a
theory look like?
It will be built on the basic human goods, which indeed are not easily discounted as
aspects of our fulfillment. It will be responsive to the link between outcome and
intention, and therefore to the difference between what we might wish for
independently of our choices, and what we can realize only through a choice of our
own, of the kind for which we are peculiarly responsible. It will disallow many,
though not all, direct attacks, which are intimately bound up with our intentions, as
well as the causing of side-effects unacceptable in the light of justice, the internal
balance of each person's life, and so on. As responsive to the fact that the goods of
persons are good for all persons, it will disallow any total discounting of these, and
any direct attacks on them for the sake of, say, emotional gratification, rather than for
some genuine good. It will disallow any attack on a substantial instantiation of a
basic human good, except in the case of some who have wrongfully chosen to attack
such an instantiation in others.
What will be some further characteristics of this theory? These will be left for the
following (and final) chapter, in which we will be considering, not persons in
general, but persons at a time close to their origin.
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Perhaps someone who was 'merely' alive could be said, on this view, to have an
interest in a hypothetical cure, although if there was in reality no chance at all of
a cure, the interest would give rise to no rights and duties. Stone, who sees moral
importance only in psychological potential, touches on this in connection with
the infant born without an upper brain: 'Unlike rocks and trees, Andrew has a
welfare - there is a good for Andrew - but as Andrew will never be conscious, he
will never attain it. Nothing we can do will enable Andrew to actualize his
nature, hence there is nothing we can actually do which benefits him, for
Andrew has no interest in a life he will never experience' (Jim Stone, 'Why
Potentiality Matters', Canadian Tournal of Philosophy 17 (1987), p.822.)
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Conclusion
Before ending with a discussion of the status of early persons, we will briefly run
through the findings of previous chapters. Theories were looked at according to
which we are minds, or series of experiences. It was argued that we are, on the
contrary, biological entities, whose experiences are not (but whose spatio-temporal
origin is) essential to our existence. Theories were looked at according to which we
first existed as persons at some stage later than fertilization, whether as entities
distinct from the early organism, or as phases of that organism. It was argued that
the human organism is itself a person, from its first appearance as a rational kind of
being, so that morally significant interests in the future of a human appear
simultaneously with the human. A recent natural law theory of human goods was
looked at, consequentialism looked at and rejected, and some principles sketched out
regarding the treatment of persons, in order that the status of which we are the
bearers could be somewhat better described.
What should we say in particular about our moral status during the times closest to
our origin? Persons are alike in all being morally important; however, not all persons
have the ability, or even the potential, to participate in all the human goods.
Therefore, to say that all persons are the same kind of moral subject is not to say that
we are all subjects of, for example, exactly the same personal rights. Our being
persons (and thus morally important) is indeed 'inalienable'; however, this cannot be
said of our personal rights. Some rights may be forfeited through actions of our own.
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Others may simply fail to apply to us at all, if we are unable to lose, or enjoy, the
benefit to which they refer.
For example, one of my rights as a person is (most of us would agree) that I not be
brainwashed. It is not, however, a condition of my personal existence that I be
susceptible - now, or ever - to this kind of harm. It is merely true that, if I am so
susceptible, I must not be subjected to this harm. While typical persons can be
brainwashed, tortured and corrupted, some persons are immune from these harms
for the whole of their lives. However, due to the nature of human persons as living
moral subjects, there is one harm to which we are almost always susceptible. Life is
unusual in being an aspect of persons in which we not only can, but must
participate. Persons, as living entities, are susceptible to assault and neglect. Rules
about homicide therefore apply to persons in general. We are assuming that persons
may not be deliberately killed - or at least, not until we forfeit some of our rights
through aggression, naturally at a time far removed from our origin.1
The sphere of respect for persons is wider than that of rights, in allowing space both
for supererogation, and for obligations to help, not one person in particular, but one
(or some) out of many. We should also remember that there are rights and
obligations which exist among friends, family, and so on, but not among people in
general. In fairness we need a reason for ascribing an obligation to one person rather
than to others. A reason may be found if we refer to goods such as friendship, which
can only exist in the context of particular relationships, which naturally involve
particular burdens. More generally, the existence of particular relationships means
that tasks are usefully divided. The principle of no arbitrary preference among
persons requires not that persons be treated indistinguishably, but that any
differences of treatment be justified, rather than simply explained.
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Rights-talk is used, at least sometimes, to refer to moral conclusions, which, unlike
claims and interests, cannot be said to conflict (that is, if we take it that there is
always an answer to the question 'what, if anything, must I do?') Some of our rights
originate in particular relationships involving family members, or simply those who
find themselves, accidentally or otherwise, responsible for our welfare. Rights such
as these, together with rights against the world at large, are particularly important
for our survival through childhood. For as the kind of being we are, we need care
and feeding for many years after birth, and maternal feeding and shelter before.
It is sometimes claimed, however, that to refuse this kind of support - or at any rate,
to refuse prenatal support - can be justified as being, not an active harm, but a mere
refusal to benefit. Conferring a benefit is seen as more often supererogatory than
avoiding active harm to others. Thus Feinberg argues that
It is generally much more plausible to make claim against others not to be harmed than
to make the claim to be positively benefitted, contractual considerations aside [...] When
a fetus with a promising future is aborted, neither he nor any other existing being is
harmed by it (unless harm is confused with nonbenefit).2
With regard to this point, it should be noted firstly that the refusal to benefit may be
backed up by direct killing, with the aim of preventing the individual killed from
requiring benefits at any stage. Thus if, for example, handicapped persons are
deliberately killed by the State, this cannot be seen as simply a missed opportunity to
benefit handicapped persons. If it is true that persons originate at fertilization, and
that the direct killing of innocent persons is unjust, then direct abortion, together
with destructive research on embryos, must be regarded as unjust. Direct killing
involves either the intention to end the victim's life, or the intention to make such
inroads on the victim's physical integrity as to be incompatible with survival.
Abortion by any means which involves this kind of attack cannot be seen as a mere
refusal to benefit.3
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What of cases in which our intention is indeed, at very most, to refuse to benefit
some person? We should remember that indirect killing, like other forms of indirect
harm, may be justified in many cases. There are many blameless activities which
pave the way for deaths which, though unintended, are expected. Such activities
include the building of bridges and highways, the selling of drugs which for some
will have fatal side-effects, and the allocation of scarce food or medical resources to
one person rather than to another. This last is an example of a refusal to benefit one
individual in particular, who, as an immediate consequence of our refusal, forfeits
not some chance, but all chance of survival. Can we describe some forms of abortion
- together, perhaps, with the non-implantation of embryos conceived in vitro - as a
justified refusal to benefit some persons in the interests of benefiting others?
We will focus here on the intentional withdrawal of support, rather than on cases in
which the withdrawal itself is a side- effect, so that its effects are still further
removed from the agent's intentions (for example, when a miscarriage will result
from radiotherapy).4 The question here is whether support by the pregnant woman
can be seen as 'extraordinary' or 'heroic' support, of a kind which may be
intentionally withdrawn. We do not regard it as wrong when, without intending a
person's death, we decline to do everything conceivable to save that person's life.
Pregnancy can involve significant burdens, both physical and emotional, for the
pregnant woman. Can it, then, be regarded, at least in some situations, as
'extraordinary' support?
It is often claimed that the case of pregnancy is unique in involving the body of the
supporter. We must remember, however, that the fact that we are living beings
implies that our bodies are always involved, in one way or another, when we give
each other support. A newborn child, for example, needs constant holding and
feeding, whether by its parents or by others. In a situation in which the child will
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only survive if nursed by the mother (say, she is on her own, or the only woman in
her tribe) the relationship between her and her child is as necessary to the child's
survival as is the pregnancy relationship itself. Reasons against regarding pregnancy
as 'ordinary' support may need to be considered in relation to other forms of
support, such as the care of newborn children. What could such reasons be?
Sometimes it is suggested that the very dependency of the foetus - and, it may be
added, of the newborn child - is a reason for denying that there exists a right to be
supported by those less dependent. Such reasoning appears to be behind the claim
sometimes made that viability is a cut-off point for morally justified abortions. If it is
dependency of any kind we are looking at, this argument is not persuasive. Any
right to support implies some form of dependency. We are all dependent on others
for survival at various times in our lives. Disabled people may need care, from their
families or others, for the whole of their lives; care which may be as burdensome,
though as willingly provided, as care for a newborn child. Such care is generally
seen by the disabled and their carers as a matter of right, not of supererogation.
Morality is, after all, concerned with the basing of relationships not simply on power,
but on respect.
Granted that the sheer powerlessness of the person needing help would provide no
reason for the other to refuse it, can pregnancy nonetheless involve burdens so great
as to take it beyond the call of duty? In general we do not think that there is a
obligation to go to all possible lengths to protect the lives of dependent persons, even
if they are friends or family members. Is pregnancy - like, perhaps, some forms of
intensive care for premature babies - extraordinary or heroic support?
It seems this cannot be so in standard cases. For pregnancy resembles normal care
for the newborn far more than, for example, intensive care for the premature.
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Support in pregnancy is even a paradigm case of ordinary support, being a kind we
all receive. To refuse this support is to engage in a form of 'free-riding' on the face of
it no more justified than refusing one's infant the basic care which saved one's own
life. It is true that the burdens of pregnancy, and of care for the newborn, will differ
from one situation to another. However, if the supporter remains in control of his or
her actions, these burdens will normally make obligations harder to meet, rather
than cancelling them entirely. Moreover, in the case of an indirect abortion support
is not simply discontinued, in the way that, for example, one might not feed a baby
during one's very painful illness. Rather, support is discontinued via the deliberate
removal of the foetus from its normal place of safety; a place of the kind which
shelters every human person, and which sheltered both its parents. The rights of
supporters to the help of other people do not include the right to help in ceasing all
support, if this will result in the death of the person supported.
This last statement needs to be qualified, however, when we turn to cases of
extrauterine pregnancy. Here we can no longer speak of normal support or shelter.
We need to consider the unusual location of the foetus, the increased precariousness
of the support it receives, and of course, above all, the increased danger to the
mother. The first factor alone would not suffice to swing the balance in the direction
of extraordinary support. We would not, after all, omit some medical intervention
merely on the grounds that it was unusual. Abdominal, as opposed to tubal
pregnancy, has been taken to term without serious risk to mother or child. In the
case of tubal pregnancy, in contrast, the second and third factors are present to a
marked degree. Support through the fallopian tube is not only abnormal, but short-
term, precarious, and highly dangerous to the supporter. We may therefore
withdraw this support by removing the fallopian tube with the foetus inside, whose
death, though expected, is not sought.
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What if support is of the more normal, uterine kind, and will save the child, but at
serious risk to the mother? Here it is especially hard to make an impartial judgement.
Means of support cannot simply taken from one in the interests of another - unless,
as in the case just seen, support for the former person was, for example, so
precarious as to be worth comparatively little. However, we do believe that one
person may sometimes be endangered in the attempt to save another's life. The
plank which is in the blameless possession of Shipwreck Survivor A (though perhaps
originally in the possession of Shipwreck Survivor B) cannot simply be taken from A
and pushed over to B. However, when A is close to the lifeboat, the plank can
perhaps be taken from A and given to B, to give A and a more equal chance. In the
same way, premature birth can perhaps be induced, thus endangering the child, if
this will give mother and child a more equal chance. Our often much greater
sympathy with persons like ourselves, especially those already loved by us or others,
should not make us unjust to those who, loved as yet by no-one, are innocently in
possession of the means of survival.
We have not so far made much of special relationships, like that of parent and child.
Some of the arguments looked at can be applied to situations in which we are
obliged to care for the child of a stranger - as when we find a baby on our doorstep.
Our duties can only be multiplied in cases where we have voluntarily brought about
our position with respect to the life of another - or, at any rate, voluntarily brought
about the risk or possibility of finding ourselves in this position. Thus an IVF
scientist who has deliberately achieved the conception of an embryo in vitro must,
on the face of it, go to some lengths to protect this embryo, having brought about her
need for support.5 The same would appear to be true of the embryo's parents.
One reason often given for abortion, and/or infanticide, and/or the destruction of
embryos in vitro is that such actions are a form of euthanasia, whether on social or
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on medical grounds. It is claimed that there are futures which are so badly
impoverished that we are not wronging humans whom we deprive of such a future.
Only if a person will have a 'future of value'6 are there compelling reasons to save
that person's life. So important to Feinberg is this consideration that from it he
derives the only prenatal right he recognizes as being non- contingent on birth: the
'right not to be born'7.
In the last chapter, it was argued that life was a basic good of persons. If this is true,
then the basic interest in survival will persist throughout a person's life, giving rise
to certain rights and obligations whatever the person's physical condition. Thus
when a person with some handicap claims that his life nonetheless has value, the
value can be seen as attaching, not only to the other human goods his life contains,
but to life itself. This is not to say that, for example, the pain a person will suffer may
not influence our actions with regard to that person's life. A very painful and costly
operation, which is nonetheless appropriate to secure a painless future, may not be
appropriate to secure a future full of pain - or a short future, or one in which the
patient will be unconscious. The benefits achieved would appear to be simply less, in
relation to the burdens of intervention. It seems that the value of a life which is
painful, short, or unconscious is less than it might be, in that there is insufficient
reason to operate. Yet despite these considerations, there remains present what
might be described as the 'core value' of the patient's life, providing conclusive
reasons against some actions which would involve a lack of respect for this life. The
question of what counts as appropriate medical intervention is a good example of
the commensuration of values and disvalues in the context of existing moral
principles; of the difference between putting a negative value on someone's life, and
saying that a particular instantiation of the good of life is not enough to justify a
certain cost in time, pain, money, and so on. It is not that life cannot be, in a sense,
added and subtracted from other values and disvalues, but that this cannot be done
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in a moral vacuum, or without a remainder. Despite all disvalues the value of life
continues, generating duties which are themselves incommensurable with pre-moral
goods and harms.
There remains to ask what we might defensibly think were our duties, if we were not
convinced that the human person came into being with the human organism. How
might we defensibly act, for example, if we did not know what to believe with
regard to the origin of persons, but thought that there was some chance that we were
now responsible for the welfare of a person? In this case the safest course would
surely be to assume that the organism in question was a person, in view of the fact
that even if we were inclined to doubt this, the killing of a personwould be the more
serious risk to run. For example, if a woman considering abortion assumes that the
foetus is a person, the risk will normally be that she, and/or other people, will suffer
needlessly during and, perhaps, after pregnancy.8 If, on the other hand, the woman
assumes that the foetus is not a person, the risk is that the abortion will destroy,
perhaps painfully, a valuable and innocent life.
Moreover, even if we were quite convinced that the person, or personhood, began
some time after the organism itself, it would not follow that we had no obligations at
all with regard to the early human organism. The survival of the very young is, after
all, essential if there are to be any future goods enjoyed by older persons. It would be
strange if there were nQ obligations concerning the treatment of very young
members of our species - even if we did not think that justice required that such
members be protected from attack. There are moral principles, we can reasonably
assume, with regard to the engendering of persons, at least some of which refer, not
to the need to avoid this, but to the need to admit new members to the world of
rational agents. Whatever the origin of persons, at least some cases of abortion,
infanticide, and even sterilizationwill be in some sense 'anti-social'. Such actions will
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be free-riding, if not in the strong sense involving injustice to a fellow human person,
in a weaker sense involving lack of generosity: the refusal to produce beneficiaries of
the kind one is oneself. (In addition, of course, abortion and infanticide may involve
lack of humanity, if pain is needlessly caused a sentient being).
Thus whatever our views on the origin of persons, we would expect to find moral
principles of some kind regarding what is necessary for the existence of human
society. Rules against the killing of young members of our species are essential if
anyone is to benefit from anything at all, after the earliest stage of human
development. It is not only, as Engelhardt suggests,9 respect for agents which is a
pre-condition of the moral enterprise. Respect, or at least some protection, for pre-
rational humans is, in a different sense, a precondition of the moral enterprise -
though of course, given this precondition, one generation of agents could act for that
generation alone. I have argued that there are strong reasons in favour of tracing our
origin back as far as fertilization, and that both our interests and our rights as
persons should be recognized from that time on. But even if none of this were true,
we would still have reason to be grateful for those rules which govern the protection
of immature humans. Such rules are, after all, those from which we have derived
most benefit - or alternatively, those due to which we, and all our later triumphs,
first came into being.
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